Toward a reconciliation of virtue and freedom in contemporary political philosophy by Okumuş, Ahmet & Okumus, Ahmet
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TOWARD A RECONCILIATION OF VIRTUE AND FREEDOM IN 
CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
 
 
by 
AHMET OKUMUġ 
 
 
 
 
Submitted to the Institute of Social Sciences 
in partial fulfillment of 
the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science 
 
 
 
 
Sabancı University 
Spring 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Ahmet OkumuĢ 2010 
All Rights Reserved 
 
iv 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
TOWARD A RECONCILIATION OF VIRTUE AND FREEDOM IN  
CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 
OkumuĢ, Ahmet 
PhD, Political Science 
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. ġerif Mardin 
Spring 2010, ix + 201 pages 
 
 
 
Ever since the Enlightenment, modernity presented itself as a story of human 
emancipation and as a culture of freedom. In the history of the modern thought, freedom 
has been the master principle of morality and the foundational premise of politics for 
varying philosophical approaches. Philosophically, this theme has been most emphatically 
developed during the Enlightenment, and most clearly spelled out by Kant. Politically, 
however, the idea of freedom culminated in the great Western revolutions, and acquired its 
formal manifestation in the declarations or bills of rights. On the other hand, there is the 
older, classical tradition of virtue. Some scholars argue that the most fundamental 
difference between the ancients and the moderns lies in their respective focus on virtue and 
freedom. However, recently, in the midst of Western modernity, there has been a revival of 
the classical virtue tradition. The opposition, then, is not only between historical epochs 
(e.g. between the ancients and the moderns), but is a conflict inside the contemporary 
political philosophy. This dissertation aims to provide insight into this tension by 
concentrating on a number of major political thinkers advocating the primacy of freedom, 
such as Rawls, or the primacy of virtue, such as MacIntyre. After a critical evaluation of 
‗aretaic minimalism‘, ‗liberal virtue‘ theories, and Aristotelian communitarianism in 
contemporary political philosophy, it is argued that the ‗ethics of the good‘ articulated by 
Taylor offers a stronger reconciliatory standpoint open to an aretaic or ethical 
understanding of freedom.             
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ÖZET 
 
 
 
ÇAĞDAġ SĠYASET FELSEFESĠNDE  
ERDEM VE ÖZGÜRLÜĞÜN TELĠFĠNE DOĞRU 
OkumuĢ, Ahmet 
Doktora, Siyaset Bilimi 
DanıĢman: Prof. Dr. ġerif Mardin 
Bahar 2010, ix + 201 sayfa 
 
 
 
Aydınlanma‘dan bu yana modernlik kendini bir insani kurtuluĢ öyküsü ve bir 
özgürlük kültürü olarak suna geldi. Modern düĢüncenin tarihi serüveni içinde özgürlük 
muhtelif felsefi yaklaĢımlar için ahlakın ana ilkesi, siyasetin temel öncülü oldu. Bu tema 
felsefi olarak en kuvvetli biçimde Aydınlanma çağında geliĢtirilmiĢ, en açık Ģekilde de 
Kant tarafından telaffuz edilmiĢtir. Siyasi olarak ise özgürlük fikri büyük Batı 
devrimlerinde zirveye çıkmıĢ, insan ve vatandaĢlık haklarına iliĢkin bildirgelerde de formel 
bir hüviyet kazanmıĢtır. Aynı süreçte, ahlak ve siyaset düĢüncesi daha eski bir gelenekten, 
klasik ‗erdem‘ geleneğinden kısmen uzaklaĢmıĢtır. Öyle ki, kimi düĢünürlere bakılırsa, 
modernler ile antikler arasındaki temel fark özgürlük ve erdem ilkelerine yönelik 
vurgularında görülür. Fakat yakın dönemde ve yine modernliğin tam ortasında klasik erdem 
geleneğinin uyanıĢına Ģahit olduk. Öyleyse burada yalnızca tarihi dönemler (antikite-
modernite) arasındaki bir karĢıtlıktan değil, çağdaĢ siyaset felsefesine içkin bir gerilimden 
söz etmek gerekir. Bu tez çağdaĢ siyaset felsefesinde Rawls gibi özgürlüğe öncelik tanıyan 
düĢünürlerle, MacIntyre gibi erdeme öncelik veren bazı önemli düĢünürlere odaklanarak 
söz konusu gerilimi aydınlatmayı amaçlamaktadır. Özgürlük ve erdem arasında zorunlu, 
içkin bir gerilim var mıdır? Birini diğeri ile uzlaĢtırmak, telif etmek mümkün müdür? 
‗Asgari erdemler‘ fikri, liberal erdemler ve Aristocu cemaatçilik gibi yaklaĢımların eleĢtirel 
bir tahlilinin ardından, Taylor‘da gördüğümüz türden bir ‗iyi etiğinin‘ erdemli ya da ahlaki 
bir özgürlük anlayıĢına açık güçlü bir telif çerçevesi sunduğu ileri sürülmektedir.        
 
 
 
Anahtar sözcükler: erdem, özgürlük, iyi, MacIntyre, Taylor 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION: MODERNITY, FREEDOM, AND VIRTUE 
 
 
 
I 
 
Modernity as a philosophical category has variously been defined as the philosophy 
of consciousness, the metaphysics of subjectivity, the metaphysics of immanence, the new 
gnosticism, or even as the second overcoming of gnosticism. The essence of modernity as a 
political philosophical problem, however, can best be captured in relation to the idea(l) of 
freedom because, ever since the Enlightenment, modernity has presented itself as a story of 
human emancipation and as a culture of freedom. In fact, given the anthropocentric turn 
that is deeply entrenched in modern civilization, freedom, as an attribute of subjectivity, 
has been the core element in the self-understanding of modernity. The Hegelian definition 
of history as the progress of man to higher levels of freedom and rationality reveals this 
self-understanding succinctly.  
In the long history of modern thought, the idea of freedom has been the master 
principle of morality and the foundational premise of politics for varying intellectual 
traditions. Expressed either as a corollary of social contract and consent theories or as a 
component of natural rights theories, freedom constitutes what Hirschmann calls the 
―obsessional core‖1 of Western modernity. It is true that, even in pre-modern times, 
                                                          
1
 Nancy J. Hirschmann, ―Eastern Veiling, Western Freedom?‖ in Fred Dallmayr (ed.), Border Crossings: 
Toward a Comparative Political Theory, (Lexington Books, 1999).   
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freedom, or liberty, has been conceived as a legal status -- under patrimonial rules, for 
instance, it was granted by the monarch as a legal right. Free cities, autonomous 
communities, and free persons as opposed to slaves, were all conceivable in pre-modern 
eras. Alternatively, it was a matter of metaphysical speculation about free will. What is 
truly new in modernity, however, is that  
for the first time in history freedom was seen from the standpoint of the 
individual…Now, it was a quality of life; not an instrument but a good in itself, 
a quality of man and of society which enabled moral personality, moral 
development, self-realization. A mature man is a free man…Society is not just 
to tolerate individuality, to allow it because it can do no other. It should foster 
it.2 
This strong turn to freedom as a property of the individual has been institutionalized, 
and acquired its concrete or, in a Hegelian vein, determinate, form through the great 
Western revolutions that paved the way for the expression of freedom as the highest 
aspiration of humanity. That is, the idea of freedom culminated politically in the American 
and French revolutions and acquired its institutional and formal manifestation in 
declarations or bills of human rights. The doctrine of human rights is still a predominant 
feature of Western democracy today.  
Philosophically speaking, however, the idea was developed during the Enlightenment 
and was most clearly been spelled out by Kant. The Kantian idea of man as an autonomous, 
self-determining being represents the best philosophical articulation of modern 
concentration on freedom. Kant developed his notion of freedom in a number of important 
works, giving it a central place in his comprehensive system. His concern with freedom 
was powerfully motivated by the challenge posed by the naturalism of his day. Newtonian 
mechanistic cosmology had problematized the very notion of freedom and made such ideas 
as moral responsibility and moral agency highly suspect, given the deterministic quality of 
                                                          
2
 Owen Chadwick, The Secularization of the European Mind in the 19
th
 Century, (Cambridge University 
Press, 1975), pp. 25-29. 
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nature. ―If all events in the world can be experienced only under the category of causality, 
what room is there for freedom?‖3 This was Kant‘s guiding question. 
Kant answered this question with what we may call a ‗two-step radicalization‘. He 
radicalized both the Cartesian ontology and Rousseau‘s idea of self-prescription. Seeking 
the ‗transcendental conditions‘ of our practical (or moral) experience, he posited freedom 
as the fundamental postulate of morality and placed it in the secure plane of the noumenal. 
Here he was in fact repeating the Copernican revolution. Although part of our nature was 
causally determined, embodied, and empirically affected, we had another part that was 
morally free and rational. This part, our noumenal self, was the true locus of freedom. In 
this way, Kant conceptualized freedom in metaphysical terms and vested moral freedom ―in 
a kind of metaphysical agency.‖4 Here the stark opposition between our empirical and 
noumenal selves points to the radicalization of Cartesian duality. There is another step, 
however, which radicalizes, this time, Rousseau‘s legacy. Simply put, for Rousseau, those 
are free who are capable of obeying their own self-prescribed law. Kant articulated the 
same idea within his practical philosophy: Those are free who are capable of obeying 
universal moral law prescribed by reason alone. Freedom is possible so long as we are 
capable of purifying ourselves of our contingent desires, empirical motivations, particular 
interests, and natural impulses and so long as we are motivated purely by the dictates of 
what Kant calls ‗the categorical imperative‘, that is, by universalizing the maxims of our 
actions, and by treating others always as ends in themselves (never as means or instruments 
for an ulterior end). ―Only by doing its duty,‖ as given by the categorical imperative, ―for 
the sake of duty, does the will become truly self-legislative.‖5 Freed from contingent 
causes, the moral subject legislates for itself the proper course of action, but does this 
through rational self-reflection, which, in the end, provides the content of the categorical 
imperative.  
                                                          
3
 Norman Melchert, The Great Conversation (McGraw-Hill, 2002), p. 464. 
4
 David Ingram, ―Introduction‖, in David Ingram (ed.), The Political (Blackwell, 2002), p. 6. 
5
 Paul Franco, Hegel’s Philosophy of Freedom (Yale University Press, 1999), p. 11.  
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In the final analysis, two elements stand out in this formulation that have been highly 
significant for the later course of modernity: reason (or rationality) as the engine of 
morality and politics, and self-legislating, spontaneous subjectivity6 as the locus of moral 
freedom. By centerstaging these elements in his own manner, Kant was in fact developing 
his idea of freedom against the naturalistic conception of morality and freedom, which 
constitutes another powerful theme in modernity, best exemplified by Hobbes and Hume, 
according to which our natural being is not an obstacle to, but the very premise of our 
morality and freedom. In addition, and as a natural corollary to this, reason can never be the 
arbiter of our passions -- it cannot legislate our duties -- but can only show the efficient way 
of satisfying our wants: reason is the slave of passions. Put differently, ―our desires are 
taken as given for moral reasoning‖ and ―are beyond the arbitration of reason.‖7 Construed 
in this way, freedom amounts to nothing more than the unimpeded pursuit of one‘s 
naturally given inclinations and desires. This was clearly antithetical to Kant‘s idea of 
freedom, which is predicated upon a rational will, totally free from any determination 
coming from nature. But Kant‘s treatment of freedom, though decisive for modernity due to 
its radicalization of the Cartesian turn and its repetition of the Copernican revolution in the 
realm of morality, is not the only approach to the issue. Another way to trace the 
progressive diversification of the idea of freedom can be found in Berlin‘s seminal essay on 
liberty. In his Two Concepts of Liberty Berlin8 distinguishes between a negative conception 
of freedom and a positive one. The former reflects the absence of external constraints and 
points to a protected private domain unobstructed by anyone else, whereas the latter refers 
to the ideas of self-mastery (or self-rule), autonomy, and self-determination (or self-
realization). Embarking with this distinction, Berlin suggests, one can analyze the various 
                                                          
6
 Robert Pippin, Modernism as A Philosophical Problem (Blackwell, 1999). 
7
 Charles Taylor, Hegel and Modern Society (Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 74. 
8
 Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford University Press, 1969). 
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conceptions of freedom in the history of ideas. This function of this distinction, however, is 
not only for analytical purposes. Berlin also advances it for critical purposes, that is, to be 
able to criticize some very common understandings of freedom. In Berlin‘s account, 
positive conceptions of freedom are suspect due to their political implications. The ideas of 
self-mastery, self-direction, and autonomy undergirding positive notions of freedom tend to 
divide selfhood into two hierarchical domains: higher and lower, authentic and inauthentic, 
or autonomous and heteronomous. The problem here is not simply the emergence of a 
‗divided self‘ presupposed by these positive ideas of freedom. The real problem, or danger, 
according to Berlin, lies in the possible political implications of the idea of plural selves in 
one person. Once it is accepted that there is a self higher than the phenomenal or 
empirical/natural one, appeals to a trans-individual conception of self, in the form of a tribe, 
a state, or a nation, become very easy. This, in turn, opens the door for coercion and the 
restriction of liberties in the name of a higher self construed as a collective personality. 
Obviously, Berlin‘s target here is the totalitarian regimes of the 20th century that justified 
gross hindrances of individual liberties in the name of some higher aspiration represented 
by the state, the nation, or the proletariat.  
In contemporary political philosophy, and especially among liberal and libertarian 
theorists, this understanding of negative freedom has been very influential and has taken a 
variety of forms. In Hayek and Nozick, for example, one finds strong emphasis on a 
negative understanding of freedom. According to Hayek, for instance, ―Freedom refers 
solely to a relation of men to other men, and the only infringement on it is coercion by 
men.‖ Freedom is one‘s ―independence of the arbitrary will of another.‖9 Nozick comes to a 
similar point by invoking the primacy of rights-based liberties. On his account, the domain 
of freedom is defined by the rights of individuals, or, more properly, by the formal liberties 
                                                          
9
 F. A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1960); cited in Chandran Kukathas, 
―Liberty‖, in R. E. Goodin and P. Pettit (eds.), A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy 
(Blackwell, 1998), p. 540. 
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of self-ownership.10 Rawls also pays tribute to freedom, but in a somewhat different way. 
Instead of taking a side in the debate over the negative and positive conceptions of freedom, 
he follows the idea that any notion of liberty should include both the negative and positive 
aspects of liberty. In this view, freedom is a ―single triadic concept‖ comprising (a) the 
agent or agents (of freedom), (b) constraints, restrictions, and interferences (the negative 
aspect), and (c) actions or conditions of character or circumstance (the positive aspect).11 In 
addition, by assigning lexical priority to basic civil and political liberties in his system, 
Rawls recognizes the centrality of freedom in modern politics.             
 
II 
 
The modern concern with freedom has sometimes been described as a fundamental 
contradiction of the ancient understanding of morality and politics. Phrased differently, the 
primacy of freedom has sometimes been taken to be the fundamental difference between 
the ―ancients‖ and the ―moderns.‖ In his life-long quest to revive interest in the classical 
tradition, Leo Strauss, for instance, assigns priority to virtue as the central theme of 
classical political philosophy. Virtue, or human excellence, is the axial concern of the 
Socratic search for the best life. As a corollary to this, for the ancients, ―The state exists to 
promote human happiness, understood as the life in which the highest human faculties are 
                                                          
10
 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Blackwell, 1974). There is a considerable amount of 
controversy in contemporary literature on whether liberalism and libertarianism are theories based, first 
and foremost, on a principle of liberty, or rather on a principle of equality. Although many libertarians are 
keen on the idea that their theory is in principle a theory of liberty, there are counter claims. For an 
interpretation of both liberalism and libertarianism as equality-based theories see Kymlicka (2002). For an 
argument stressing the centrality of liberty as the core value of liberalism see Freeden‘s (1996) 
morphological account of ideologies.     
11
 Chandran Kukathas, ―Liberty‖, in R. E. Goodin and P. Pettit (eds.), A Companion to Contemporary 
Political Philosophy (Blackwell, 1998), pp. 534-535. 
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cultivated.‖12 Political philosophy, in turn, is equivalent to the quest for the best political 
order, the order most conducive to the practice of virtue.  
Modernity, on the other hand, represents a progressive split from this concern with 
excellence, or a conscious break with classical understanding. This cost of this break has 
been, according to Strauss, a narrowing of the horizon of political philosophy, which now, 
lowering the standards of inquiry, aims at a modus vivendi among willful individuals, rather 
than revealing the objective standards of morality and the virtuous life. It is no accident, 
then, that Strauss locates the first crisis of modernity in the thought of Rousseau, who 
―attacked modernity in the name of two classical ideas: the city and virtue, on the one hand, 
and nature, on the other.‖13  
In a similar vein, Voegelin identifies the classical understanding with the quest for the 
―right order of soul and society.‖ Taking inspiration from what he calls ―the Platonic-
Aristotelian paradigm of the best polis,‖14 Voegelin ―believed that order and disorder in 
society and history are rooted in the order and disorder embodied in persons according to 
their success or failure in pursuing an authentic life.‖15 Political analysis, in turn, ―is 
concerned with the therapy of order.‖16 Compared to this Platonic-Aristotelian world-
picture, modernity represents, according to Voegelin,17 the attack on virtues, and a new kind 
of gnosticism, resulting in ―egophanic revolt.‖ Gnosticism is, in fact, the code word for his 
indictment of modernity. In Voegelin‘s sense of the term, modern, secular Gnosticism (or 
radical immanentization, as he sometimes prefers to describe it), stands for all attempts at 
                                                          
12 
Shadia B. Drury, Leo Strauss and the American Right, (Macmillan, 1997), p. 107. 
13
 Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (The University of Chicago Press, 1965), p. 253. 
14
 Eric Voegelin, The New Science of Politics (The University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 15-21. 
15 
Kenneth Keulman, The Balance of Consciousness: Eric Voegelin’s Political Theory (The Pennsylvania 
State University Press, 1999), p. 170. 
16
 Voegelin, The New Science of Politics, p. 19. 
17
 Eric Voegelin, Science, Politics, and Gnosticism (Regnery Gateway, Inc., 1952). 
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creating an alternative, perfect order on earth depending upon the power of knowledge to 
transform reality.18 Voegelin cites all the mass ideologies and movements of the modern 
world under this category. These movements, and modern gnosticism in general, represent  
an attempt to alter the inevitable human perspective, from participant in a 
whole not of one‘s own making (seeing from the inside) to observer and 
participant, having access to some Archimedean point. Ideologies require this 
assumed perspective, because they suppose a closed system about which they 
have knowledge. Gnosticism is a closing of the soul and the construction of an 
alternative reality.19 
 The ultimate consequence of this gnostic turn is modern totalitarianisms, according 
to Voegelin. Despite his hash criticisms of modernity and his espousal of the classical 
tradition, however, Voegelin acknowledges that the classical concern with the best polis is 
inadequate given the complexity of the modern condition. As he states, ―The Platonic-
Aristotelian paradigm of the best polis cannot provide an answer for the great questions of 
our time -- either for the organizational problems of industrial society or for the spiritual 
problems of the struggle between Christianity and ideology.‖ Yet, he adds that the basic 
situation of political science remains the same: ―Today, just as two thousand years ago, 
politike episteme deals with questions that concern everyone and that everyone asks. 
Though different opinions are current in society today, its subject matter has not 
changed.‖20  
This fundamental difference between the ancients and the moderns can be identified 
also in terms of the primacy of the good or the right. As Rawls explains in his Lectures on 
the History of Moral Philosophy:  
                                                          
18
 For a comprehensive analysis of Voegelin‘s understanding of gnosticism in comparison to other treatments 
of the topic see Gregor Sebba, The Collected Essays of Gregor Sebba: Truth, History, and the Imagination 
(Louisiana State University Press, 1991). 
19
 Ted V. McAllister, Revolt Against Modernity: Leo Strauss, Eric Voegelin, and the Search for a Postliberal 
Order (University Press of Kansas, 1996), p. 23. 
20
 Voegelin, The New Science of Politics, p. 21. 
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The ancients asked about the most rational way to true happiness, or the 
highest good, and they inquired about how the virtuous conduct and the virtues 
as aspects of character … are related to that highest good. … Whereas the 
moderns asked primarily, or at least in the first instance, about what they saw 
as authoritative prescriptions of right reason, and the rights, duties, and 
obligations to which these prescriptions of reason gave rise.21      
This stress on virtue did not remain confined to classical times, however. Apart from 
Strauss and Voegelin, there is a growing interest in the classical virtue tradition among 
students of moral and political philosophy today. This renewed interest in virtue tradition is 
largely the consequence of attempts at finding an alternative ethics and politics to the 
Kantian and utilitarian traditions. In other words, virtue tradition has been revived mainly 
against what came to be called the ―legalistic turn‖ in ethics and politics, represented by the 
deontological and consequentialist theories, with their emphasis on the rightness of actions, 
rules, and obligations, rather than the quality of mind and character. Against these two 
traditions, virtue thinkers take inspiration from the Platonic-Aristotelian conception of 
arete, or excellence. In this sense, virtue ethics culminates in a ―systematic re-exploration 
of the Aristotelian model.‖22 As Cottingham points out, the basic assertion of this model is 
that ―guided by the excellences of intellect, we can set about training ourselves so as to 
develop excellences of character.‖ The principal claim of the virtue tradition is that 
―strengthened by the instilling of the right habits, and guided by a rational vision of the 
good life, we shall be able to actualize the potentialities we are born with, and achieve an 
optimally successful and enriching life -- the life of eudemonia or happiness.‖ Among 
contemporary philosophers, Alasdair MacIntyre in particular, through his role in current 
debates in moral and political philosophy, represents almost a sea change in the 
understanding of the virtues and their relevance for modern man. 
  
 
                                                          
21
 John Rawls, Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy (Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 2. 
22
 John Cottingham, Philosophy and the Good Life (Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 24. 
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III 
 
To summarize what has been said so far: Freedom constitutes the guiding theme of 
modernity as a political philosophical category. Philosophically, this theme was most 
forcefully developed during the Enlightenment, and most clearly spelled out by Kant. 
Politically, however, the idea of freedom culminated in the great Western revolutions and 
acquired its formal manifestation in declarations and bills of rights. On the other hand, 
there is the older, classical tradition of virtue. Some scholars argue that the basic difference 
between the ancients and the moderns is the difference between their respective focus on 
virtue and freedom. However, recently, in the midst of Western modernity, there has been a 
revival (or an attempted revival) of the classical virtue tradition. It seems, then, that the 
opposition is not only between historical periods (between the ancients and the moderns), 
but is a conflict within contemporary political philosophy. My thesis aims to investigate 
this conflict by concentrating on major thinkers championing the primacy of freedom and 
the primacy of virtue. In the end, I want to explore whether there is a way to reconcile these 
two major streams of thought. Are these two lines parallel, perpendicular, or overlapping? 
Is there a necessary, inherent tension between freedom and virtue? Can they be reconciled 
at all?  
The reason I am asking these questions is not simply the factual coexistence or, more 
properly, the historical coincidence of these two traditions within contemporary political 
philosophy. In fact, the coexistence of the classical virtue tradition with what we can call 
the primacy-of-freedom approaches is nothing but the clearest manifestation of deeper, 
substantive questions within contemporary political philosophy. The classical virtue 
tradition never paid special tribute to democracy. On most occasions, it was even hostile to 
democracy on the grounds of the classical search for excellence. Most proponents of virtue 
were elitists seeking the rule of the best. Can, then, as Slote rightly asks, there be a 
11 
 
democratic theory of virtuosity?23 Similarly, the classical ethicists have always tied their 
theories to what White calls a ―strong ontology‖24 and an objectivist account of the human 
good. Given the incommensurability of goods in the increasingly complex societies of late 
modernity, however, in what way can concern with virtue be incorporated into a politics of 
freedom, or in what way can virtue be reconciled with freedom?25 
Therefore, the question that I would like to address in my thesis is whether there is an 
opposition or tension between freedom and virtue. Is it possible to cultivate a kind of 
virtuosity, which is capable also of addressing the modern turn to freedom?  
The first culmination of this problem can be followed in Hegel‘s critique of the 
Kantian understanding of moral freedom. Briefly, Kantian ethics, according to Hegel, is 
nothing more than an ―empty formalism,‖ unable to yield the content of our moral 
orientations. Insensitive to the concrete context of inter-subjectivity in ethical life, Kantian 
autonomy posits morally free subjectivity, under ‗ought‘ claims, against causally 
determined, embodied personality, under ‗is‘ conditions. Hence, Kantian ethics cannot 
ground the morally virtuous character in a determinate fashion. In Kant, virtues are like 
heroic acts against the ordinary way of the world; the subject assumes a heroic stance 
against contingency, against his own inclinations, and against the dictates of circumstance; 
he dutifully stands against is with ought claims. In a fully developed ethical life, however, 
virtues are like habits, and part of custom, which is itself the reflection of the spirit. In a 
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sense, virtues become one‘s second nature -- the great Aristotelian ideal; there remains no 
gap between one‘s duties and inclinations, and virtues turn into one‘s character 
dispositions.  
Sometimes such a picture of an ethical life is evaluated as too good to ever become 
true. Hegel‘s characterization of the fully developed ethical life and the virtues in it 
presents difficulties, especially in terms of freedom. This is because the virtuous character, 
in Hegel‘s ‗ethical life,‘ acquires an unreflective proximity to his duties that seems difficult 
to reconcile with the notion of autonomy, or subjective freedom. In his Philosophy of Right 
Hegel asserts:  
The ethical, in so far as it is reflected simply in the natural character of the 
individual, is virtue. When it contains nothing more than conformity to the 
duties of the sphere to which the individual belongs, it is integrity. What a man 
ought to do, or what duties he should fulfill in order to be virtuous, is in an 
ethical community not hard to say. He has to do nothing except what is 
presented, expressed and recognized in his established relations.26  
Understanding the way in which Hegel addresses this question requires further 
elaboration. For the time being, however, it can be said that, as the Hegelian opus 
emphatically puts it, in the dialectical unfolding of the spirit, ethical life already 
incorporates its prior modes. That is, ethical life already incorporates    the element of 
subjective freedom within itself. In a sense, Hegel resolves the question with recourse to his 
philosophy of history. Franco explains this with reference to Hegel‘s comparison between 
the Greek ethical life and the modern one. Whereas Greek ethical life, because it has not 
been reborn through the struggle for subjective freedom, remains at the earliest stage of 
subjective freedom and preserves a sort of natural ethicality, ―modern ethical life has, in 
fact, been reborn from the historic struggle through which subjective freedom has 
developed itself. Modern ethical life precisely does incorporate the rights of personality and 
moral subjectivity that are the fruits of this historic struggle.‖27  
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This point can, I think, be better put, without appealing to the philosophy of history, 
by borrowing from something noted by Hauerwas in another context. ―To emphasize the 
idea of character [as Hegel does in the above quotation] is to recognize that our actions are 
also acts of self-determination; in them we not only affirm what we have been but also 
determine what we will be in the future.‖ Accordingly, character denotes also ―what is in 
some measure deliberate.‖28 Alternatively, as Dallmayr makes clear, ethical life, or virtuous 
character for the purposes of our discussion, in Hegel, means the ―concrete coincidence of 
goodness and subjective will.‖ Although in the Kantian conception of morality there is a 
conflict between subjective will and goodness, Hegel seeks the possibility of reconciliation 
between the two. Ethical life combines subjective will and objective goodness, but in a 
manner that ―relies on subjective intention and conviction,‖ ushering in a new kind of 
freedom, ―namely, actualized freedom … that finds in self-reflection its conscious will and 
through action its concrete reality.‖29           
Another way to raise or detect the question about the proper relation between 
freedom and virtue is to look at republican critics of the negative idea of freedom. At this 
point, Arendt‘s critique of liberalism readily comes to mind.30 Just as Hegel criticizes 
Kant‘s idea of moral freedom and virtuosity predicated on the inner realm of subjectivity, 
Arendt criticizes liberalism for removing freedom from the political realm. In her words, 
―liberalism, its name notwithstanding, has done its share to banish the notion of liberty 
from the political realm.‖31 This critique is in fact embedded in a more comprehensive 
critique of modernity. Although freedom has philosophically been articulated in modern 
times -- it was not among the cardinal virtues in ancient times -- modernity, in Arendt‘s 
view, represents a progressive narrowing of freedom, its progressive retreat into private 
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solipsism -- in Berlin‘s words, a retreat into the inner citadel. In radical contrast to the 
ancients, who conceived of freedom as a function of practical political life (or what Arendt 
called vita activa), and as a property disclosing itself only through participation in the life 
of the polis, in later periods and especially in the modern era, freedom came to be 
conceived either as a matter or property of the will or as part of an economic activity. As a 
result, freedom lost its proper location, namely, the public realm of politics. Political 
activity, for Arendt, should be considered as the highest point in the hierarchy of human 
activities. Having its own intrinsic value, political agency is the only means by which 
human beings can transcend their finitude and overcome, in a sense, mortality. Public life, 
practical engagement, active political life, and human interaction in the political realm are 
the fundamental facets of such agency. Paying tribute to the older republican tradition, 
Arendt states, ―Freedom as inherent in action is perhaps best illustrated by Machiavelli‘s 
concept of virtu, the excellence with which man answers the opportunities the world opens 
up before him in the guise of fortuna.‖ Thus, for Arendt, freedom is possible only with 
public virtuosity.        
What Arendt achieves in her arguments is a rebuttal against the modernist 
metaphysics of subjectivity locating freedom in the will, or in private inwardness. Against 
this, she situates freedom in a kind of public virtuosity. This, of course, generates some 
clear difficulties for contemporary liberalism. In particular, the Aristotelian emphasis on the 
intrinsic value of political life creates trouble from a liberal perspective. This is because, in 
a liberal view, even this neo-Aristotelian stance is a particular conception of the good, and 
at least for a Rawlsian liberal, particular conceptions of the good should never be evaluated 
from a public standpoint. The modern primacy of private life in contemporary societies 
does not seem in line with Arendt‘s prioritization of active political life. For most of the 
people in contemporary liberal democratic societies, private life is the most appropriate 
realm for the pursuit of particular conceptions of the good. For this reason, the elevation of 
active public life to a superior position, if it is adopted and promoted from a public 
standpoint, seems contrary to liberal sensibilities. Nevertheless, without public virtuosity, 
genuine freedom never comes into being, according to Arendt. Another way to understand 
15 
 
the stated question about the proper relationship between virtue and freedom is to look at 
the neo-Aristotelian resurgence in moral and political thought. The most outstanding name 
in this context is Alasdair MacIntyre. In his seminal After Virtue and later works, 
MacIntyre tries to develop a sort of modern Aristotelianism predicated upon a 
comprehensive critique of all Enlightenment theories of ethics. Two features of the 
Enlightenment are essential in order to grasp the fundamental failure of the Enlightenment 
project of developing a secular morality. One is the loss of ‗teleological functionalism‘ in 
moral considerations; the other is the absence of a concept of human nature to ground an 
ethical view of the human being. Especially through its rejection of teleology, modernity 
deprived itself of the insight that ‗man‘ is a functional concept and ―to be man is to fill a set 
of roles each of which has its own point and purpose.‖ The modern mode of moral 
reasoning, on the contrary, takes man as an ―individual prior to, and apart from all roles.‖32 
What this amounts to in the end is the loss of ―any concrete context allowing for character 
formation, that is, for a shared experience exceeding the realm of privacy and private 
individual preferences.‖33 In this way MacIntyre presents a critique of a conception of 
freedom predicated solely on privacy and the ―emotivist‖ self of contemporary society. 
More specifically, he is criticizing the liberal outlook in morality and politics. According to 
MacIntyre, liberalism‘s professed neutrality toward competing conceptions of the good 
necessitates a subjectivist outlook in moral thinking. As such, he is in fact targeting not 
only liberal political philosophy, but also, more generally, the wider public culture of 
liberal societies in which what he calls ‗emotivism‘ and value-skepticism dominate. In 
addition, he seems to concur with Arendt on the value of republican tradition due to its 
attempt at building a richer notion of liberty that is compatible with a teleologically 
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construed vision of virtues.34 MacIntyre also affirms the centrality of character formation, 
and virtue, as tied to shared understandings of particular communities.35 
Hauerwas shares the same concern in his works and develops an ethics of character 
from a theological standpoint. In his Vision and Virtue and other related works, he derives 
ethical reflection toward virtue and character and toward an ethical-political freedom. 
According to Hauerwas, the reason the ethics of character and virtue has come into a 
certain degree of disrepute is that character is sometimes interpreted as a ―limiting aspect of 
our human freedom‖ and having character is sometimes thought as ―being set in one‘s 
ways, inflexible, or unbending.‖ Against such a view, and incorporating elements from the 
Kantian understanding of autonomy, Hauerwas affirms the significance of self-
determination and agency in the very process of character formation. He emphasizes, 
―Man‘s capacity for self-determination is crucial if he is to have character.‖ Moreover, for 
Hauerwas, freedom is itself a virtue:  
―Freedom or the autonomy of the self is not a status to be assumed but a task to 
be undertaken…To be free is the successful embodiment of the descriptions we 
choose as morally true…Freedom is genuinely a virtue, a determination of the 
self, that protects us from being at the mercy of the moment.‖36        
Another name that deserves consideration in this context is Charles Taylor. Indeed, a 
careful examination of Taylor‘s evolving opus reveals that his is also an attempt toward an 
ethical-political freedom combining action and character, and harmonizing freedom and 
virtue. Like Arendt and MacIntyre, Taylor launches his criticisms against both the 
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modernist metaphysics of subjectivity, on the one hand, and the resulting public culture of 
liberal societies, on the other. In Taylor‘s characterization, the definitive feature of liberal 
societies is ‗atomism‘ in social philosophy. This social philosophy misrepresents the 
relation between the individual and his community because, contrary to the liberal 
understanding, there is a constitutive relationship between the two. Individuals‘ self-
understandings are necessarily constituted in relation to a social, linguistic, communal 
matrix. This is a quasi-empirical or sociological consideration with a Hegelian emphasis. 
Hegel‘s emphasis on the concrete inter-subjectivity of ethical life, as opposed to what he 
calls Kant‘s empty or abstract formalism, seems to have a direct influence on this 
consideration. In fact, when Taylor discusses the topic he proposes what he calls ―the social 
thesis‖ against the atomism of certain liberal theories and, in formulating this thesis, he 
profoundly builds on the Hegelian opus. For Taylor, social theories affirming the social 
nature of man point to the fact that man can develop his characteristically human attributes 
only within a certain form of society in which autonomy, rational self-determination, and 
self-directedness are cultivated. Embracing this social thesis, Taylor criticizes 
contemporary liberal theories due to their insensitivity to the fact that even autonomy 
requires the cultivation of a certain form of society and a certain conception of the good.        
In his criticisms of atomism, Taylor seems to agree with Arendt‘s rebuttal of the 
liberal or, more generally, modern, constriction of liberty into the subjective domain. 
Taylor‘s statement in his Sources of the Self that ―a society of self-fulfillers, whose 
affiliations are more and more seen as revocable, cannot sustain the strong identification 
with the political community which public freedom needs,‖37 shows his appreciation of 
public-oriented freedom in moral and political life. In his theoretical intervention into the 
liberal-communitarian debate, Taylor underlines the merits of the republican ideal of self-
rule and participation as the essence of freedom. Thus far there is shared terrain between 
Arendt‘s concern and Taylor‘s project. Taylor moves further, however, and focuses on the 
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character domain of virtue as a necessary corrective for negative freedom. In other words, 
Taylor does not remain at the point where Arendt stands, and is not satisfied with the 
republican conception of liberty as self-rule through active public life alone. His critical 
examination of the negative notion of liberty and his construal of an Ethics of Authenticity38 
steers the concern with freedom toward an ethics of virtue rooted in self-transformation 
sensitive to higher and lower forms of freedom. In his famous analysis of negative liberty, 
Taylor shows the inadequacy of conceiving freedom simply in terms of external 
constraints. Exclusively defending the most extreme form of negative freedom, according 
to Taylor, is mostly a strategic choice aimed at avoiding the most extreme forms of positive 
freedom, namely, totalitarian control as a way of collective self-rule. For whatever reasons, 
however, adopting such an extreme form of negative freedom amounts to abandoning and 
repressing our post-Romantic intuitions, ―which put great value on self-realization.‖39 
Contrary to the naïve moral psychologies of utilitarian thinkers, specifically Hobbes and 
Hume, obstacles to freedom can be internal as well as external. So construed, freedom also 
requires some internal conditions, such as being true to one‘s authentic ends, self-control, 
and being able to critically examine one‘s motivations. With this emphasis on internal 
conditions, Taylor points to the importance of character formation and self-transformation 
for genuine freedom. The principal concern for Taylor here is the liability of freedom to 
possessive lifestyles and extreme anthropocentrism. In Dallmayr‘s words, ―Using 
authenticity as a code word for the ambivalence of modern freedom, Taylor acknowledges 
that, under the impact of modern subjectivism, freedom easily deteriorates into self-
centeredness and self-indulgence.‖40 Against this condition, Taylor tries to promote a 
carefully balanced view of freedom. Addressing, but at the same time questioning, modern 
post-Romantic sensibilities, Taylor asserts that the subject can never be the ―final authority 
on the question whether his desires are authentic, whether they do or do not frustrate his 
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purposes.‖ Accordingly, one cannot be the final authority on the question of whether or not 
he is free. This, however, does not mean that there should be an external social or public 
authority to decide on this matter. This is in complete contrast to our post-Romantic 
understanding that one‘s true realization is original; ―each person has his own original form 
of realization.‖ Giving the role to public authority in this matter destroys ―other necessary 
conditions of freedom.‖ Instead, we should settle for the fact that ―the nature of a free 
society is that it will always be the locus of a struggle between higher and lower forms of 
freedom. … Through social action, political change, and winning hearts and minds, the 
better forms can gain ground, at least for a while. In a sense, a genuinely free society can 
take as its self-description the slogan …: the struggle goes on – in fact, forever.‖41 
 
IV 
 
As the above sketch delineates, the search for a proper relation between freedom and 
virtue seems to be a characteristically modern, or contemporary, question. The primacy of 
freedom in the self-understanding of modernity is manifest in various orientations in 
modern political philosophy. In fact, almost every modern ideology has affirmed the 
centrality of freedom and justified itself as a better way of actualizing freedom. Recently, 
however, in the midst of modernity, there has been a revival of interest in the classical 
virtue tradition. This is, I think, a clear indication that the virtue-freedom question is an 
issue within contemporary political philosophy. What is shared and what is not between 
freedom and virtue? Where is the shared terrain, if it exists, and what are the possible flash 
points between freedom and virtue? Alternatively, are they essential for each other, 
mutually indispensable? In terms of possible wider implications of this topic, what kind of 
a politics would it be that reconciles and takes into genuine consideration both freedom and 
virtue? 
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In order to explore various complications of this question in contemporary political 
philosophy I will proceed in four main steps. In the first chapter I will focus, in the case of 
John Rawls‘s political liberalism, on aretaic minimalism in political philosophy. In the 
second chapter I will focus on a number of mostly liberal attempts to go beyond such 
minimalism on the basis of alternative conceptions of liberal virtues. Then I will move to 
two relatively more coherent and philosophically more developed attempts at retrieving the 
tradition of the virtues and an ethics of the good in the works of Alasdair MacIntyre and 
Charles Taylor, respectively.     
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CHAPTER 2 
 
ARETAIC MINIMALISM IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY:  
RAWLS’S DISPOSITIONS 
 
 
Subtle and complicated works of first-rate political philosophy usually give the 
impression that they are treating almost all the critical themes in their field in a relatively 
integrated way. In many instances, this is of course not only an impression but corresponds 
to a fairly large measure of truth. No doubt, within the bibliography of contemporary 
political philosophy the work of J. Rawls assumes such qualities. All the critical issues of 
political philosophy find some measure of treatment in his works: freedom, equality, 
solidarity, justice, stability, legitimacy, order, and virtue. However, in order to be able to 
comprehend how exactly these delicate issues are elaborated and appreciate how densely 
they figure in these works, one needs to adopt a more discerning and discriminating 
approach. Accordingly, in this chapter I will examine and critically assess the way Rawls 
treats the question of the right and the good in terms of his broader conception of practical 
reasoning. This will help us to see the contours of what I would like to call ‗aretaic 
minimalism‘ in political thinking.                                            
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2.1. Aretaic Minimalism in Practical Reasoning 
 
Although the right and the good as a distinction sounds fairly contemporary, it is 
more appropriate to see it as a contemporary manifestation of a much older bifurcation in 
moral and political thought. In fact, these two terms could be seen as referring to two 
alternative grounds or principles structuring the whole domain of morals and politics since 
antiquity. The right and the good stand, respectively, for the juridical and goal-seeking 
interests of ethics and politics, alongside its interest in self-cultivation.1 These three ethical 
interests can be seen as three paradigms rooted in different, yet sometimes fairly 
overlapping philosophical traditions. Here the goal-seeking paradigm is characteristically 
associated with the greatest names of ancient philosophy and Athens, namely, Socrates, 
Plato, and Aristotle; whereas the juridical paradigm takes us back first to Jerusalem, 
through Stoic interest in natural law, to Kant as the best representative of the juridical take 
on morality. But already in Athens and more strongly in the Stoics what is referred to above 
as the ethics of self-cultivation could be discerned as another major orientation. And 
although today this bifurcation with respect to structuring principles is usually treated with 
reference to the distinction between the right and the good, alternative pairs are also on 
offer: deontological and teleological, the moral and the ethical, the imperative and the 
attractive, ethical formalism and material ethics.       
Now, as in many other issues in contemporary political philosophy, the question of 
the priority of the right or of the good has become a structuring reference in contemporary 
political philosophy with Rawls‘s well-known work A Theory of Justice. Rawls‘s principal 
reservation about the good stems originally from his indictment of utilitarianism, as the 
then-prevailing ethico-political vision of modern politics, due to its inability to do justice to 
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our considered judgments or convictions about the inviolability of certain rights, 
irrespective of whatever prospects one can envision about the attainability of a higher good 
at the expense of those rights. Rights are not subject to ‗felicific calculus.‘ They have a 
distinctive normativity of their own, irreducible to considerations of well-being or welfare. 
As Rawls declares on the very first page of his magnum opus: ―Each person possesses an 
inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override. 
For this reason justice denies that the loss of freedom for some is made right by a greater 
good shared by others.‖2  
But this is only one aspect of a larger defect in the utilitarian prioritization of the 
good. Another problematic aspect is the monistic conception of the good promoted by 
utilitarianism in its mainstream forms. ―Beginning with Greek thought.‖ Rawls notes, ―the 
dominant tradition seems to have been that there is but one reasonable and rational 
conception of the good,‖ and ―the classical utilitarianism … belongs to this dominant 
tradition.‖3 In fact, it is because utilitarianism condenses the field of the good into a 
monistic conception that the felicific calculus or considerations of greater benefit seem 
capable of packing together diverse pursuits and conceptions of the good in a single overall 
evaluation. All goods or intimations of the good are ultimately comparable, which is 
certainly an idea with powerful policy implications, at least from a bureaucratic or, let us 
say, physiocratic point of view. But, given the diversity and irreducible plurality of the 
good, this monism remains wide of the mark in its evaluative ambition. 
Interestingly for our present concern, even as he admonishes utilitarianism, Rawls 
underlines his concern with the good; or, in other words, in one single act Rawls indicts 
utilitarianism and rehabilitates the good. Given this background, Rawls‘s opus can be seen 
as a majestic attempt at giving to the irreducible plurality of the good its due within a 
framework of rights. But just how such an attempt is worked out, how it manages the good 
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in its diverse manifestations, and what ideals of practical reasoning it fosters rightly 
continue to spawn a rich array of questions.       Against the two defects mentioned above in 
utilitarian practical philosophy Rawls envisages two protective measures, both based upon 
the priority of the right over the good: rights as trumps (as has later been made into a fairly 
popular motto) and the non-deducibility of the right from the good. These measures are in 
fact two complementary interpretations of the priority of the right over the good in Rawls. 
It is because the right is not deducible from the good that it has the power of trump.4 The 
whole scenario of ―the veil of ignorance‖ is designed to illustrate how such priority is 
secured. Accordingly, the participants in this scenario are held to be incognizant of all 
robust and identity-shaping goods in order to ensure the rightness of the norms expected to 
come out of such a procedure. Only a thin or minimal sense of the good, covering only 
those goods in which people of quite different persuasions regarding the good life must all 
have an interest (―a high-order interest‖), called ‗primary goods,‘ is allowed to guide the 
scenario. In fact, the whole theoretical edifice rests on a system of normative priorities: the 
priority of the right over the good and the priority of the principle of liberty over the 
principle of equality, which in turn gives priority to the maximin principle over the 
principle of equal opportunity, all as a ‗lexical‘ ordering of  principles of justice. A Theory 
of Justice, as a scheme of priorities, where each level of priority can be seen as part of an 
overall appeal to an ultimate moment of unconditionality in practical reasoning, is a feat of 
deontic proceduralism in political philosophy.  
To the extent that we follow Rawls in his justification of the priority of the right over 
the good, however, what we have presented so far is incomplete, because what makes 
Rawls skeptical about the good is also the hold of intuitionism both as a moral theoretical 
alternative among moralists and as a general pre-philosophical or common sense morality 
among the general public. Rawls finds intuitionism wanting, particularly because of its 
inability to provide or generate an objectively justifiable ranking of principles, and thus 
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ineffective as a premise of moral problem resolution. The priority of the right, then, is also 
an appeal to an ideal of objectivity or clarity unattainable by intuitionism, which is bereft of 
an ―explicit method‖ and ―priority rules.‖5  
Taken together, Rawls‘s opposition to both utilitarianism and intuitionism leads us to 
an ideal of practical reason that stipulates a certain level of disengagement or abstraction 
from substantive, concrete, or particular ideals of the good as necessary to recognize the 
import of our sense of the inviolability of the right, to make a reasonable case for the 
plurality of the conceptions of the good under the auspices of the right, and to take hold of 
the principles of the right, or justice, in as objective a way as possible. The name Rawls 
gives to this ideal of practical reasoning is ‗constructivism,‘ or, more particularly, ‗Kantian 
constructivism,‘6 and accounts for the principles of justice it specifies as the outcome of a 
procedural interpretation of Kant‘s categorical imperatives. 
Rawls‘s account of the proper relation between the right and the good has been 
subjected to various criticisms. Critics were ready to detect even in such meticulous 
deontology specters of the good somehow having trespassed beyond the deontic veil, 
whatever measure of ignorance Rawls had assigned to the original position of the theory. 
For some, Rawls‘s neutrality was in fact too subordinated to ―rationalist humanism,‖ as a 
particular conception of the good, to allow any true priority to the right here. And if we 
acknowledge partial knowledge of the good, why don‘t we engage in a fuller discussion 
about the good?7 Part of the reason for the slippage of the good through Rawls‘s carefully 
sanitized framework seems to be that, although what Rawls tries to achieve through 
                                                          
5
 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 34-40.  
6
 John Rawls, ―Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory‖, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 77, No. 9 (Sep. 9, 
1980), pp. 515-572. 
7
 William A. Galston, Liberal Purposes (Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 92-93. Galston contends that 
all neutralist theories of liberalism are covertly guided by rationalist humanism as a liberal theory of the good, 
which comprises three main considerations of worth: the worth of human existence, of human fulfillment and 
purposiveness, and of rationality.  
26 
 
recourse to ―a certain procedure of construction‖ is what he calls pure procedural justice, as 
opposed to perfect or imperfect justice, his constructivism already presupposes certain 
foundational conceptions and values. This is why what is constructed here is the ―content‖ 
of the political conception of justice, and, crucially, not the original position (―structure‖) 
itself, which is ―simply laid out‖ as a representation of ―a well-ordered society as a fair 
system of cooperation between reasonable and rational citizens regarded as free and 
equal.‖8 Accordingly, first we get an independently justified procedure and then this serves 
to generate a procedurally justified outcome. In this sense, the structure of the constructivist 
procedure here could be understood as a much more elaborate version of the coin toss 
procedure, in which the legitimacy of the procedure relies on the fact that it is a procedural 
incarnation of the principle of equality of opportunity, whereas the legitimacy of the 
potential outcome relies on the already given or prearranged legitimacy of the procedure.9 
In any case, the procedure itself is not purified of conceptions and values but, on the 
contrary, presupposes a number of them.  
If this is an accurate description of Rawlsian constructivism, however, then the whole 
enterprise would seem at least to be an attempt at clarifying an already presupposed 
conception. But clarification would probably seem too innocent to characterize the 
endeavor here. Ricoeur offers a more pointed portrayal, contending that ―a procedural 
conception of justice at best provides a rationalization of a sense of justice that is always 
presupposed,‖ which subverts lexical linearity. The whole theory now seems to rest not 
upon a lexical but a circular ordering, noticeable for instance in the fact that ―a moral sense 
of justice founded on the concept of the Golden Rule‖ is pre-supposed by the theory and in 
the pre-insertion of ‗self-respect‘ into the decision procedure as a vital ingredient of the thin 
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theory of the good, both embodying an indirect plea for an ethical foundation for justice, 
even in a self-professedly ―purely procedural‖ theory.10  
From what has been said so far it must be clear that there is some circularity in 
Rawls, leaving certain preconceptions unfiltered by the structure of the theory. But 
circularity is not in itself a problem; on the contrary, as Agnes Heller notes, true practical 
discourse is always circular.11 Crucial here is whether, and the way in which, one takes 
account of circularity, which for a theory aspiring to be a purely procedural constructivism 
might cause some trouble. This is why even among those who largely follow in the 
footsteps of Rawlsian constructivism, the ‗non-constructed‘ character of the procedure of 
construction itself might seem defective. Starting the process of construction from 
―reasoned standards‖ (or Rawls‘s ‗considered convictions‘) would, according to O‘Neill, 
for instance, ―be circular, hence unreasoned,‖12 and preclude a constructivist justification of 
the procedure of construction.13 On such a view, which is bent on sharpening the 
constructivist credentials of procedural practical reasoning, even this level of engagement 
with considered convictions appears illegitimate and unsatisfactory from a normative, 
constructivist perspective. 
Rawls himself would acknowledge, unapologetically even, that he relies on certain 
preconceptions in his theory construction.14 Moreover, in some ways he might seem to be 
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doing a hermeneutic clarification of certain foundational conceptions or deep insights of the 
liberal tradition of political thought.15 But what is crucial for Rawls is that these 
conceptions are prevailing ideas in the public culture of liberal democracies; a condition 
delivering them from the burden of justification on the basis of a particular comprehensive 
doctrine or world view. Rather, these preconceptions have to be given a coherent shape by 
way of a ‗reflective equilibrium,‘ and they have to be given expression and modeled in a 
fair procedure of construction (or decision procedure). That is, they are not necessarily 
comprehensive, and they can be embodied as a fair procedure of decision that would serve 
to decide principles of justice as a broad ‗overlapping consensus‘ above particular 
allegiances.  
Now, if Rawls from the outset admits the presence of some conceptions in his 
construction, is the question of circularity off target? Is referring us to the public culture of 
liberal democracies when accounting for the preconceptions of his theory sufficient 
justification to accept his argument about the non-comprehensive character of his 
enterprise? What is the normative status of a preconception ―collected,‖ as he says, from 
the public culture ―at all level of generalities‖? As Enoch makes clear, part of the appeal of 
constructivism in practical philosophy comes from its real or potential promise of providing 
the fruits of moral realism without being realist.16 Similar to this, Rawls wants to reap the 
benefits of certain pre-understandings or convictions with comprehensive roots without 
embarking on a comprehensive project. He wants to use the merits or fruits of fairly 
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comprehensive pre-understandings for non-comprehensive purposes.17 This is why he does 
not rest with the quasi-hermeneutical character of his enterprise, but rather wants to devise 
a fair decision procedure out of his preconceptions to go on to generate principles of 
justice, which would rise above circular beginnings, at least at the level of the public 
standpoint, and thus manage to attain the status of an overlapping consensus.    
That the good or, following Rawls, a particular conception of the good, slips through 
the contours of Rawls‘s framework was not the only problem here. From the very 
beginning, not only the so-called communitarian and, more generally, non-liberal, but also 
liberal critics of Rawls found behind all this talk of the diversity of the good, held to rest 
under the mandate of the right, a ‗meta-theory of the good‘18 regarding the agentic relation 
to the good. And this is largely a privatizing conception; that is, a conception leading to the 
privatization of the good. Thus, what Rawls offers us is not only a principle of priority (and 
quasi-independence), but also a meta-theory of the good. And while for communitarians 
such a privatization of the good was untrue to the constitutive presence of the good for our 
identities and thus a failure as a meta-theory of the good, for liberals it was a sign of 
Rawls‘s ultimate inability to extricate his scheme of justice from idealization about the 
person vis-à-vis the good.19 On the other hand, one might argue that this constitutive 
presence of the good is precisely what causes Rawls to diligently circumscribe a domain of 
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priority and semi-independence for the right. What Rawls is trying to do is to save the right 
and its independent normativity from socio-cultural contingency and particularity. Even if 
the good is constitutive, it is a constitutive contingency tailored to particular allegiances at 
the personal or larger cultural level. To stay free from such conditionality, a procedural 
form of practical reasoning based on the priority of the right is held as decisive. What is 
deemed most important here is not the quality of the good one pursues, but the capacity to 
have a conception of the good.   
 
2.2. Reasonable Virtues 
  
Now, as can readily be seen from what has been said so far, Rawls‘s prioritization of 
the right over the good is not as neat as he wants it to be, and the relevant understanding of 
practical reason informing the whole enterprise incites suspicion regarding the feasibility of 
its objectives. Rawls‗s framework seems either to depend on grounds (circular beginnings) 
poorly acknowledged, or it is inconsistent with its own premises and unable to achieve its 
objectives. For my purposes, however, the main shortcoming of this endeavor lies with the 
ideal of practical reasoning informing this approach, mainly because it is crippling when it 
comes to taking account of what I call the aretaic depth of politics. Such principled 
insistence on keeping the good out and its attendant sources along procedural lines 
sterilizes ethico-political thinking against the fields and the profiles of virtues. One might 
argue that Rawls intentionally takes this as secondary to his more central purpose: a theory 
of justice and stability with special reference to the basic structure of society. But in many 
ways Rawls either presupposes or sometimes tries to attach dispositional qualities to ethico-
political agency.              
Parting from the tradition, Rawls at first takes justice not primarily as a virtue 
attributed to human agents, but as applying primarily to institutions (as ―the first virtue of 
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social institutions‖). Yet, later on, he specifies what he calls the sense of justice as 
indispensable for the citizens of a well-ordered polity. In this vein, Rawls quite often, but 
certainly in a more marked way in his later works, implies and assigns dispositional 
qualities to those who are to take part in his fair system of cooperation. Some of these 
dispositional qualities, like the sense of justice just mentioned, are more openly endorsed 
by the system, others less so and in a more subdued manner.  
Among all the qualities of mind and character that Rawls makes us want to see in the 
citizens of a just polity, what he calls reasonableness looms the largest. Although he 
associates this notion with ‗the sense of justice‘ he attributes to citizens along with ‗the 
conception of the good‘, and although he speaks of these two qualities as ‗capacities‘ and 
‗moral powers,‘ and not virtues, the way he elaborates the quality of reasonableness makes 
it appear like ―a kissing cousin of traditional theories of virtue,‖20 because reasonable 
citizens are those who are well-disposed to abide by fair terms of cooperation, even at the 
expense of their own interests. That is, they are able to achieve self-restraint, which is the 
underlying virtue in all the traditional visions of ethics. The capacity for reasonableness is 
indeed the pivotal disposition around which justice as fairness as a political conception 
revolves. It calls for some measure of self-sacrifice from citizens entering the public space 
of deliberation and appeals to the citizenry to abstain from raising controversial 
conceptions of the good in public political exchanges. Reasonableness here figures as a 
form of self-restraint, or even a form of self-abstinence. 
Respect constitutes another crucial element in what political liberalism hopes to see 
inculcated as a widespread disposition among the citizenry. Having such a venerable 
history behind it, it is not surprising to see respect among the cardinal political virtues 
political liberalism sanctions. This, one of the most seminal ideals of liberal modernity as a 
whole, finds one of its most profound elaborations, as so many others, in Kant. Kant‘s 
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second formulation of the categorical imperative, which requires that every human being be 
treated as an end in itself, and never merely a means, stands as Rawls‘s principal point of 
departure in delineating the notion of respect in his theory, according to which ‗self-
respect‘ constitutes the most important primary social good and the ―natural duty of mutual 
respect‖ as the key attitudinal basis of healthy societal relations. The crux of the matter is 
again ―abstaining from the exploitation of the contingencies of nature and social 
circumstance,‖ whereby ―persons express their respect for one another in the very 
constitution of their society.‖21 In the Kantian underpinning of this conception, the 
dispositional and self-restraining quality of respect is a major ingredient. The feeling of 
respect should enable us to vanquish inclinations, because ―an object of respect can only be 
… something that does not serve my inclination but, rather, outweighs it.‖22          
Reasonableness and respect as virtues figure on the affirmative side of Rawls‘s theory 
of justice, but there are also virtues entering the domain of justice through negation, that is, 
not through affirmation of certain virtues but rather through negation of certain vices. Envy 
is one such problematic motive, or, to use Rawls‘s terminology, ―special psychology,‖ in 
need of restraint. Envy, as a feeling of sorrow for the good of others, which can sometimes 
also surface as a feeling of joy for the misfortune of others, has always been among the 
(seven) deadly vices in traditional moralities. But after the decline, in principle, of inborn 
hierarchies and privileges of pre-modern times anchoring each in his proper place in the 
social cosmos, it appears in the more triggered form of ―democratic envy‖ and shows ―an 
exponential growth‖ permeating ―all levels of modern societies‖ and bordering on the brink 
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of ‗resentment.‘23 Rawls is alert about egalitarian and democratic dissimulations of envy 
and considers it as requiring the most emphatic kind of negation in the order of justice, so 
emphatic that it is ruled or factored out in the original position as inappropriate. 
Accordingly, although the system of justice does not foresee, as Dante did, the envious as 
destined for some sort of Purgatory, it purges rational actors in the original position of envy 
and of all other similar ―accidental contingencies.‖24 Prior to the derivation of the two 
principles of justice, Rawls rules out envy in the original position. After their derivation, he 
anticipates that the well-ordered and just society embodying the principles of justice will 
more or less preempt social conditions engendering envy or sufficiently moderate the social 
bases of envy, in which case any residual or emergent envy then arising does so as a matter 
of moral failure on the part of particular persons. 
Another way in which virtue figures through negation in Rawls is found in his 
rejection of ‗desert‘ as a criterion in justice-theoretic reasoning. Now, for those who are 
familiar with the place of the question of desert in the landscape of contemporary political 
philosophy, this contention might at first sound paradoxical, if not outright wrong. This is 
because what is distinctive in desert-based understandings of justice is their focus on the 
merits, achievements, and admirable qualities of responsible moral agents and their 
activities, which is quite at home with the vocabulary and tradition of virtue. The notion of 
desert is thus already well steeped in the idiom of virtue and any rejection of desert as a 
criterion might be considered as representing some break with the resources of this idiom. 
This is indeed one reason, according to MacIntyre, that non-desert theories of justice, like 
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the ones advanced by Rawls and Nozick, lack an important basis for judgments about 
virtue.25 However, the rejection of desert as it appears in justice as fairness seems intended 
to serve to the contrary, or so it could be argued. What Rawls invites us to accept in his 
rejection of desert as ―arbitrary from a moral point of view‖ is the capacity to refrain from 
our usual or commonsense propensities to expect to be treated differently or better, or be 
owed more, than others just because or as a result of what providence or good fortune 
provided us with as an initially undeserved gift, that is, our inborn talents or given social 
positions. One‘s natural talents and ―more favorable starting place in society‖ are not 
merited and should instead be seen ―as a common asset‖ to be shared for the common 
good.26 The morale of the argument is thus to persuade us to refrain from invoking desert-
based notions in moral reasoning about social order and, even more, to be content with and 
affirm a social order bent on modulating our contingent and thus undeserved advantages in 
the direction of equality and for the benefit of the less fortunate, all because the grounds of 
merit are not themselves merited.  
There is another way in which the notion of desert as ―antecedent moral worth‖ 
comes in. This time, though, desert is not negated, as Rawls normally would have it, but 
instead returns by the back door, when the stress is on the prospects of criminals and bad 
characters in the just and well-ordered society. In a sense, whereas, on the one hand, 
distributive justice voids desert as an unacceptable basis or factor in composing its 
principles, retributive justice, on the other hand, recycles it through the prism of failed 
moral agency. What Honig calls ―subjectivity failures‖ are treated as if they are justly 
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deserved or merited, and not put into examination in relation to contingent and thus morally 
arbitrary background conditions of misfortune. It is in this way that desert comes back in 
inverted form.27                                         
It must now be clear that Rawls‘s affirmations and negations involve a number of 
important character traits and, either by openly invoking certain virtues or by firmly ruling 
out certain vices, he attributes some key dispositional qualities to the fit members of his 
well-ordered society. Yet I would argue that the whole idiom of virtue still maintains a 
tantalizing presence and eludes any satisfactory grasp in this frame. But how exactly is this 
the case? Part of the problem is related to the range of the virtues in Rawls‘s account and 
part of it is related to their depth. In other words, the whole frame is inspired by only a 
narrow range of virtues, and it does not give virtues their distinctive aretaic depth. First of 
all, almost all the virtues crossing the range of Rawls‘s principal concerns are cooperative 
virtues; mainly, civility, mutual respect, and public reasonableness. Here, what are 
sometimes called the ―severe virtues‖28 of political existence, such as ‗courage‘ and the 
virtues of civic engagement, are markedly subdued . Although it is not a modus vivendi 
model, as a ―cooperative union of social unions,‖ in which concern for ‗political stability‘ 
is paramount, the just and well-ordered polity rests on the cooperative dispositions of 
citizens. These cooperative virtues are, in turn, modeled entirely in relation to reason-giving 
practices of citizens, that is, in terms of the kinds of reasons they could raise and the types 
of argumentation they could adopt in their public deliberations. Therefore, even though the 
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political liberal virtues do not merely ensoul the already established and conventional good 
manners of a ‗polite society‘, they are notably thin on aretaic grounds.29                 
That the distinctive aretaic depth of the virtues dissolves in the liberal political frame 
is certainly much more important, and it can be detected both in the way some key virtues 
are accounted for and in the overall conception of the status of the virtues. A remarkable 
instance of this problem is revealed in the way the virtue of respect is construed. As noted 
above, the idea of respect has a venerable history, finding its cues in some of the most 
important foundational texts of liberal philosophy. And, returning to Kant, as the most 
rigorous precursor of this whole idea, one may identify the roots of some of the recurring 
tensions in the liberal construal understanding of respect. For Kant attributes a distinctive 
and exceptional status to respect as a moral emotion with cognitive potency among all the 
other emotions. The moral status and the cognitive character of respect are derived, 
according to Kant, from its peculiar relation to the moral law. It is, in fact, our access to the 
moral law, to the unconditional demand of the categorical imperative on us. In other words, 
respect is the way the moral law or, to use a more contemporary idiom, the moral point of 
view, is disclosed to us, to our moral cognition. Characteristically moral demands seize us 
through our feeling of respect, because only in this way do we sense the sublime nature of 
the moral law. It is in this way that the power of the moral law commands us. What we feel 
when we are occupied by the feeling of respect is the unfathomable sublimity of the moral 
law irrespective of our inclinations to the contrary. Moral will, deprived of every other 
impulse, finds its ―determining ground‖ in respect. This really puts respect on an 
exceptional plane given Kant‘s characteristic skepticism about the ethico-epistemic potency 
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of emotions. In a critical footnote in the Groundwork he grapples with this and seeks to 
justify his position: 
There might be brought against me here an objection that I take refuge behind 
the word "respect" in an obscure feeling, instead of giving a clear answer to the 
question by means of a concept of reason. But even though respect is a feeling, 
it is not one received through any outside influence but is, rather, one that is 
self-produced by means of a rational concept; hence it is specifically different 
from all feelings of the first kind, which can all be reduced to inclination or 
fear. What I recognize immediately as a law for me, I recognize with respect; 
this means merely the consciousness of the subordination of my will to a law 
without the mediation of other influences upon my sense. The immediate 
determination of the will by the law, and the consciousness thereof, is called 
respect, which is hence regarded as the effect of the law upon the subject and 
not as the cause of the law. Respect is properly the representation of a worth 
that thwarts my self-love.30  
This passage well encapsulates all the critical aspects of the Kantian notion of 
respect: first, respect, though an emotion, is distinctive in being at the disposal of (pure 
practical) reason and it therefore signifies the capacity for the moral cognition of the law; 
and, secondly, respect is in essence respect for the law. Now in this second feature of the 
Kantian respect we find one tension in the liberal understanding of respect: respect here is 
fundamentally directed to the law or to the sublimity of the law, and not to another person 
in his or her concrete humanity. Now it would be fair to say that the kind of respect due to 
concrete others is thematized more in the second formulation of the categorical imperative, 
as noted above in relation to Rawls, rather than here in this more specific interpretation of 
respect as a moral emotion. But even then the object of respect is illustrated at the level of 
what Kant calls homo noumenon, as opposed to homo phaenomenon, that is, the object of 
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respect here is primarily man as a universal category, and not in its concrete particularity. 
The level of Kant‘s reflection on respect, then, has in its purview primarily the moral status 
of the human being as rational agency. By itself, this hardly poses a problem, because it is 
perfectly legitimate to reflect on the moral status of human beings as objects of respect 
from a universal point of view. One can even argue that in order to make sense of respect at 
the level of concrete particularity one needs to keep the ambit of reflection on a higher level 
of generality or at the level of universality, which would in turn justify or ground the moral 
duty of respect to be displayed at the level of concrete practice.31 However, if we are 
concerned more about how it is embodied and lived rather than its grounding, more about 
its flesh than its spirit, then this would certainly remain inadequate. And this Kant himself 
recognizes in his own way by depicting respect as a feeling or attitude operating from a 
distance, working through a distance, or putting between people a certain distance.32 In a 
sense, distance imparts to respect its particular shape, it gives respect its distinctive merit. It 
would not, then, be unfair to designate Kantian respect for moral agency as a virtue of 
disengagement.                                                                               
But do these lofty limitations apply to Rawls as well? Now, in good Kantian tradition, 
political liberalism stands alert to the ways in which one might treat the other as merely a 
means, that is, one might instrumentalize the other, violating the other‘s respect-standing. 
One way in which such violation occurs in civic and political life is to make others subject 
to policies and regulations that they do not reasonably consent to.   And on the contrary 
respect is also shown through abstaining in public deliberations from defending one‘s 
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views in the face of others on grounds not shared by them, by preserving a certain distance 
between our comprehensive commitments and others, and rightfully expecting from others 
the same provision of distance. Not exposing others to our comprehensive views and 
expecting from others the same refuge for us against exposure to theirs constitute the 
principal manifestation of respect in the political liberal political frame. It is not difficult to 
see that here respect here is construed with regard to practices of reciprocal reason-giving 
in public. What are hereby foregrounded are certain capacities, and quintessentially our 
capacity for free moral agency, or our capacity to form and revise plans of life without 
unjustified or unreasonable exposure to perspectives we give no assent. What is respected 
in Rawlsian respect, then, is the capacity for agency, and the primary course of such respect 
is some provision of distance.                              
Some precision is needed here, however. Even when construed as a virtue of distance, 
respect has its own distinctions. Distance can be protective; it may arise as a manifestation 
of attentiveness in many instances, as one can easily understand from the ordinary everyday 
implications of ―invasiveness‖ as an unpleasant attitude towards others. And when it comes 
to virtues, distance is certainly not necessarily an ethical shortcoming; on the contrary, 
sometimes virtues can only flourish across certain distances, across enabling distances 
between fellows, friends, and interlocutors. Distance might, therefore, work as the very 
condition for the maintenance of a dependable human moral context favorable to nurture 
sound human relations. On the other hand, as R. Sennet‘s33 more sociologically informed 
work on the prospects of mutual respect across unequal relations under contemporary social 
conditions shows, the provision of distance might turn out to be a baffling constraint, 
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sometimes accomplishing what is required of it, that is, showing respect in ways that would 
not be demeaning to the self-esteem of relevant others, yet at other times it undermines the 
very point of respect, transforming it into an easy virtue of detachment or indifference with 
little or no practical bite. Working across inequalities, that is, across actual or latent force 
lines of resentment, envy, or hatred, brings out some of the more delicate features of respect 
as an attitude. In contexts where inequality reigns sovereign, respect is in chronically short 
supply and its responsive character is impaired. An internal strain in attitudes or practices 
of respect is thus unveiled when we try to figure respect into complex situations of human 
encounters and respect-as-distance shows its dark side.34  
Now, Rawlsian respect is basically an elaboration of what is usually distinguished as 
recognition-respect, which is the kind of respect we owe each other as part of our mutual 
recognition in each other the ‗status‘ of equal citizens, quite independently of our actual 
evaluative considerations, or appraisal-respect, about each other. So conceived, respect is 
not contingent upon one or the other‘s merit or demerit, and it is thus a highly status-
oriented concept, as many other key concepts of deontology are. In a sense, it gives 
expression to the recognition of modern ‗categoric identities‘.35 As a status-oriented 
concept, Rawlsian respect will always have an eminent role to play in juridical type of 
political thinking. Respect here is the principle that the law wants to see as operative among 
the citizenry; or it is the way law thematizes inter-human relations; the way law addresses 
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us. But when it comes to seeing respect as a capacity to respond to other human beings in 
genuinely other-regarding ways, and when our focus is on how respect unfolds as a deed, 
Rawlsian respect inevitably seems ―a kind of rough-cut, partially self-regarding, giving-of-
space to the other.‖36      
But are we justified in demanding more than this? Is it fair and legitimate to demand 
a richer understanding of this or that virtue in such a framework? The answer may be 
affirmative, but only if your moral framework or view of the moral universe is amenable to 
it; and it is here that we see an important and perhaps more structural problem in Rawls‘s 
ethico-political philosophy that is pertinent to our question: namely, the problem of 
‗supererogation.‘ Supererogation is usually defined as what lies ‗beyond the call of duty,‘ 
beyond what could legitimately, that is, normatively, be expected from a moral agent. 
Either because the relevant attitude or deed is reasonably beyond the ordinary powers of the 
agent, or because no absolute or unconditional normative ground could be offered to hold 
the agent responsible for it, it is deemed supererogatory, literally, beyond one‘s debt. This 
notion was fairly important for medieval Christian ethics, and something closer or 
analogous to it can be discerned in other civilizations. In Muslim ethics and jurisprudence 
(fiqh), for instance, contrastive categories of action or deed like farz versus nafila, fatwa 
versus taqwa, or zaruri-haci-tahsini, capture something similar to what is indicated by the 
notion of supererogation. The point in all these categories is to specify a distinct domain of 
actions, attitudes, and conduct that are commendable yet outside the domain of what is 
enjoined as firmly obligatory with requisite sanctions, this-worldly or not. In this respect, it 
is quite critical for clarifying the virtue status of the virtues or the status of the virtues in an 
overall morality.    
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The notion in fact comes fairly close to our ordinary moral intuitions, particularly 
regarding the possibility of utterly altruistic, heroic, or saintly deeds.37 These are good, but 
not required, or recommended, but not required, in the normatively strict sense of the term. 
Almost no society or civilization is lacking a plethora of stories of such deeds and 
exemplary figures instantiating a number of them. But, although sympathetic to ordinary 
moral intuition, the notion of supererogation might well risk putting our cherished virtues 
on a normatively unstable footing because, once we centerstage what is obligatory, again in 
the strictly normative sense of the term, virtues risk losing their demanding power. 
Especially in moral frameworks where there is a strong urge to evaluate actions, deeds, and 
attitudes primarily from the perspective of distinctions between what is within and what is 
beyond the call of duty, virtues lose any robust positive determination as to their worth that 
could render them morally attractive or even relevant. Any moral framework thematizing 
the moral universe on the basis of some small number of evaluative principles may face this 
challenge, but this is especially the case for moral frameworks working from within a 
deontic orientation.38 This is because the priority in such frameworks is to establish a 
deontic level of consistency and unconditionality, but it is quite possible to obtain this at 
the expense of a robust place for virtues. Specifying the precise boundaries of duties 
requires treating acts beyond the call of duty as a special category irreducible to duty; 
otherwise two equally unpalatable prospects would loom large in our moral horizon: either 
the supererogatory would be forced into the moral system, rendering it unreasonably 
demanding, or the importance of anything beyond the obligatory would be inappropriately 
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toned down. Part of the problem, then, rests on the structuring terms of deontic thinking, 
such as rights, duties, and obligations, which are sometimes called the moral trinity of 
deontic logic. Once you try to conceive the whole ethical field as revolving around these 
terms or to fashion an evaluative vocabulary placing these terms center stage, it becomes 
hard to articulate the power of most admirable human qualities in a compelling way and to 
ascribe some moral force to them. As O‘Neill points out, in most cases, these qualities will 
be marked quite neutrally as ‗permissible,‘ without any account of their positive value or of 
why they are good or constitutive of the good, and, therefore, they will inevitably be 
classified as matters of ‗discretion.‘39 This means that the operational categories at hand do 
not allow for or at least resist a richer characterization of virtues. If it is neither duty, nor 
obligation, then it is bluntly designated as permissible.              
All this sheds some light on the question of why we feel puzzled over whether we are 
justified in demanding more regarding virtues in political liberalism. Rawls's entire 
framework is premised upon the same moral trinity, and virtues largely stand ancillary to it. 
We do not find a richer account of the virtues because the moral framework is skewed 
toward procedural consistency in the service of generating governing principles of a just 
society. And in order to come to terms with virtues, which are still accorded some 
relevance in this framework, he does not avoid evaluating their status within the reach of 
the question of supererogation. This is expressed when Rawls states: ―For once the 
principles of right and justice are on hand, they may be used to define the moral virtues just 
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as in any other theory. The virtues are sentiments, that is, related families of dispositions 
and propensities regulated by a higher-order desire.‖40  
What renders such an approach vulnerable is that most acts, attitudes, and feelings 
that normally figure in the aretaic depth of a particular virtue and thereby enhance and even 
partially constitute it, would turn out to be supererogatory in such a framework, because 
they could not reasonably be identified as more than a matter of good manners given the 
priorities endorsed. How would ‗tact,‘ for instance, which Aristotle cites among the virtues 
of social intercourse (or of conversation)41, and many others such as gentleness, kindness, 
and receptivity, which altogether work like a complex constellation of mutually qualifying 
and reinforcing sensibilities, be characterized here? More importantly, how could anything 
supererogatory as it is understood here infuse our practical investments? How could they be 
nurtured as virtues on which a just and stable society could flourish?  
Still, most political liberals writing in the footsteps of Rawls think that a modicum of 
virtues inculcated in the citizenry mainly through education would suffice to protect the 
polity from degeneration into undesirable forms of social-political intercourse. Indeed, 
most political theorists writing in this vein are fond of describing virtues along 
instrumentalist lines. But I think this only exacerbates the aretaic minimalism of their 
conception. Admittedly, instrumentalism has its own attractions. Mainly a question in the 
philosophy of science, instrumentalism in ethics seems to offer its adherents a means to rid 
themselves of unwanted normative burdens without mutilating or entirely eradicating their 
uses. In this respect instrumentalism in regard to virtues presents its adherents with the 
opportunity of benefiting from the promises of virtues without bearing the burden of 
thematizing their deeper underpinnings or their somewhat weightier requirements. As it 
seems to me, however, against a purely instrumentalist affirmation of virtues it would not 
be unfair to raise a question that is quite similar to the one usually raised with respect to 
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utilitarianism: Would it be desirable to stick with what Nozick calls ―experience 
machines‖42 designed to maximize pleasure and minimize pain, given the elemental status 
of these two feelings in the utilitarian moral psychology? This is no rhetorical question; on 
the contrary, it brings theoretical differences into sharp relief. And in the case of 
instrumentalism regarding virtues one could ask if we should seek other instruments that 
would work as functional equivalents of virtues given virtues‘ instrumental and dependent 
status, their being less than an intrinsic constituent of the human good.  
As it seems to me, from a virtue-oriented ethical perspective an instrumental 
understanding of the virtues prompts three questions. The first concerns what is called in 
the tradition the enkratic (self-controlled or continent) personality type, that is, the type of 
personality who follows the path of the virtues by self-pressure rather than as a 
manifestation of the relatively harmonious tempering of his or her character. Although the 
enkratic personality perhaps represents the most widely circulating character type in any 
given society, it is not idealized by the ethics of virtue.43 Secondly, in most cases 
instrumental (or instrumentally excellent) qualities are not necessarily virtues. Courage 
displayed in an unjust cause or in piracy, for instance, would not count as a virtue. As 
instrumental, any such quality can work for good or for ill, and to count as a genuine virtue 
it requires to be constitutive of a genuine good. This brings us to the third question: the 
question of the aretaic or non-aretaic value of goods toward which virtues aspire. In 
Swanton‘s helpful characterization, according to ―the thesis of non-aretaic value,‖44 there 
are some basic goods or values having independent worth on non-aretaic grounds and 
virtues are derived on the basis of these base level goods for which virtues are instrumental. 
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In other words, some goods have non-aretaic (or virtue-independent) value, but virtues are 
instrumental to them. But although the value of all the things attracting or deserving our 
virtuous responses does not depend on those virtuous responses themselves (nature, for 
instance), in the case of most other goods virtuous endorsement or acknowledgment of 
them constitutes an integral element of their worth as goods (pleasure and wealth, for 
instance). I think for most of the characteristically political goods we pursue (such as 
justice, stability, and order) the second condition applies. Their worth or goodness is 
conditional, fully or in part, upon their being achieved in ways that accord with the relevant 
virtues. Therefore, listing some ―primary goods‖ first and then postulating some virtues as 
instrumental to them does not quite capture this sort of a relation between virtues and 
goods. 
However, despite all the above criticisms, one might still find political liberalism in 
line with a broadly virtue-ethical stance in one important respect: the ‗domain-specificity‘ 
or ‗modularity‘ of the virtues.45 One might argue that the virtues are largely domain-specific 
qualities and, given that the interest of political liberalism lies primarily in the field of 
public political deliberation, it is broadly in accord with the ethics of virtue. Accordingly, 
from a virtue-ethical standpoint, Rawls might be taken as specifying some domain-specific 
virtues, relevant particularly in the field of public political engagements. Interestingly, 
Rawls, too, is using the notion of modularity in accounting for some possible ways in 
which a number of comprehensive views prevailing in liberal societies could converge on 
an overlapping consensus, on the political conception of justice, construed as a module.46  
Now, domain-specificity, if not taken to extremes or in too mechanical a way, is a 
plausible and an already well-recognized feature of the ethics of virtue. It expresses the 
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domain-relative tuning of the virtues. But does this really apply to Rawls‘s case? This all 
depends on what the Rawlsian module demands from us. On closer inspection, it is difficult 
to see what is entailed by the modular accommodation of comprehensive views as a 
domain-specific or modular fine-tuning of the virtues, or as a plea for ethico-political 
conduct matching the sensitivities of the domain in which one is acting. It is rather more 
like a prior stylization of one‘s own beliefs and opinions so as to conform to the 
overlapping consensus. It is one thing to recommend that people conduct themselves with 
care, responsibility, and respect in deliberating upon matters of common concern that 
involve diverse and conflicting points of view. It is quite another to call them to tailor their 
comprehensive views in advance to fit into an already specified module. To put the matter 
in terms of White‘s useful metaphor, in the latter case the question turns on what to carry 
where, but in the former it turns on how to carry it. This also renders political liberalism 
vulnerable to the charge that virtues here turn into rules of deliberation, or into 
―dispositions necessary to produce obedience to the rules of morality.‖47 Moreover, 
although virtue ethics (and the virtues) are sensitive to domain differentials, it is at least 
equally emphatic on the development of a relatively well-integrated character over time and 
across domains. Accordingly, most virtue ethicists also affirm some relatively domain-
neutral virtues, most notable among them being phronesis, which, as a cultivated ability to 
perceive and judge contingent particulars in the right way, constitutes the integrative core 
virtue in the life of the phronimos.48           
What we have seen so far makes it clear that even if we can grant that the political 
liberalism of Rawls endorses either from the outset or en route a range of virtues expected 
to be sustained by the just society, the virtue status of the virtues is heavily mortgaged by a 
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number of normative commitments underpinning the overall framework. Thus, the virtues 
pale in normative importance and leave us at the level of aretaic minimalism. And in this 
way the aretaic or Bildung character of the political field is minimized, too. But, then, what 
is this curious thing we call aretaic depth? In what sense is a depth dimension opened up in 
relation to virtues? Very briefly, it refers to three relatively common properties of any 
robust aretaic conception. In the first place, the virtues (and vices) are like complex 
semantic clusters. They are complex dispositions standing in intricate relations of 
reciprocity with each other, and not just theoretically so, that is, in our thinking of them, but 
practically and existentially, making each other possible, richer, brighter, or impossible, 
weaker, dim. Consider Aristotle‘s criticism of the Spartans, who, as he describes them and 
their constitution, had regard for virtue but only for one part of virtue, and ―their whole 
system of laws is directed to securing only a part of virtue, military prowess.‖49 In other 
words, they cultivate among all the (cardinal) virtues only courage, thereby leaving it 
unqualified by other virtues, and most importantly, by moderation. Consider, on the other 
hand, a modern-day virtue ethicist, MacIntyre, who establishes a similar sort of relationship 
between justice and generosity: ―A certain generosity beyond justice is required if justice is 
to be done,‖ and, ―there is no real justice when there is no generosity.‖50 In a similar manner 
I. Murdoch aptly notes. ―A list of virtues must establish not only a hierarchy, but also a 
sense of interpenetration. … Justice must make a pact with mercy.‖51 What is indicated here 
is that the virtues are virtues only along a range of various determinations and along this 
range a virtue might shade over into a vice and vice versa, which is today expressed in 
terms such as ―the fruitful ambiguity of the virtues‖ or ―the threshold conception of the 
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virtues.‖52 Put differently, the virtues are not discrete properties but, on the contrary, they 
distinctively figure only in tensional or friendly relation to a host of other virtues. In a 
sense, there is a certain magnetism among the virtues and they live and are kept alive (or 
not) in the vicinity of other virtues, which is perhaps the best we can gather from that 
notorious ancient idea of the ‗unity of virtues‘ in our times. This underpins our above 
misgivings about the virtue of respect as it is construed in some contemporary political 
theories. Respect is an expressively rich virtue that is wide open to ‗ambiguity‘ and it can 
be enlivened or deadened depending on its relation to other virtues and vices. The eclipse of 
aretaic depth in general becomes manifest also in the impoverished understandings of the 
distinctive aretaic depth of particular virtues.      
This first dimension of aretaic depth is sustained by a second one: the affective-
motivational texture of the virtues. We respond and react to situations, and relate to people 
and ourselves not only in reason but also in emotion. It is a familiar feature of virtue ethics 
to focus on the cultivation of fine inner sensibilities and emotional potentialities, and on the 
seasoning of desires so as to grow sensitive to the morally salient features of the world. 
Although the (quasi-)cognitive character of emotions has been a matter of debate in moral 
philosophy, and some strands of thought such as Stoicism were apprehensive of emotions 
due to their ecstatic character that is potentially disintegrative of the Stoic ideal of apathia, 
virtue ethics in general has seen emotion theory as integral to ethics, because the 
development and maturation of ethical feelings, or affective maturation, is deemed an 
important part of the development of ethical understanding.53 Aristotle gives expression to 
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this when he says, ―We ought to have been brought up in a particular way from our very 
youth, as Plato says, so as both to delight in and to be pained by the things that we ought; 
this is the right education.‖ The overall aim in virtue education is to ripen the potentiality to 
―feel them [emotions] at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the 
right people, with the right motive, and in the right way.‖54     To learn to be motivated by 
the right kind of desires and to foster emotions as part of our capacity for judgment is 
essential here. But this takes on a more ethico-political accent if we construe justice, for 
instance, as ―a complex set of passions to be cultivated, not an abstract set of principles to 
be formulated,‖ and as beginning with ―compassion and caring, not principles or 
opinions,‖, and involving ―right from the start, such ‗negative‘ emotions as envy, jealousy, 
indignation, anger, and resentment, a keen sense of having been personally cheated or 
neglected, and the desire to get even.‖55 Beneath some of the more rational-deliberative 
processes of our social and political life lies the magma of affective-motivational 
experiences, which, if properly worked upon, can be shaped up into more refined capacities 
for ethical discernment. More generally, all these of these factors and the affective-
motivational orientation of virtue ethics could be taken as gesturing toward a more 
‗transformative‘ (or self-transformative) perspective in ethics and politics.56                           
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Cultivated ethical discernment, however, is not reducible to healthy forms of moral 
affectivity and motivation, which are necessary but not sufficient for morals. They are 
supported and sustained by a particular working of reason captured in the notion of 
phronesis. Usually translated as practical wisdom, phronesis denotes the situated character 
of judgment, ethical decision making, and ethical conduct in general. It is an ―ethical 
finesse‖ in Hatab‘s words. Construed in this way it conforms well to the complexities and 
intricacies of aretaic depth mentioned above. Phronesis is at work in the warp and woof of 
everyday life, from relatively trivial difficulties to more complex ethical situations and 
predicaments where the norms, rules, or principles abstractly defined fall short of helping 
us conceive, let alone practice, fitting responses. It is at work in situations where, as 
Ricoeur notes, the choice is to be made not between right and wrong or good and bad but 
between bad and worse or sometimes between gray and gray.57 In this regard, phronesis, as 
part of our overall ethical bearing, signifies the ubiquity or pervasiveness of the ethical. 
Ethical life is not limited to certain moments and occasions. As Gadamer writes, ―It is not 
discretionary, but we are always already ethical,‖ and phronesis is ―the wakefulness of one 
who acts.‖         
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CHAPTER 3 
BEYOND MINIMALISM: TOWARD LIBERAL VIRTUES 
 
 
In the preceding chapter we saw in the case of political liberalism a complicated 
example of aretaic minimalism. In this chapter, I will focus on a number of attempts at 
improving upon political liberalism with respect to the question of virtues. Will Kymlicka1 
notes that current interest in the question of virtue derives from a wider concern with the 
question of citizenship. Differently put, the question of virtue in recent political theory 
emerged as a sub-topic of citizenship theory. At the heart of the question, then, lies an 
interest in the cultivation of good and responsible citizenship. But Kymlicka also presents 
this as a strategic move to continue debates over liberal justice in a more acceptable way. 
As I understand him, Kymlicka sees the rise of virtue-oriented thinking in political theory 
as a transfer of argument from a more controversial plane to a more amicable one. Instead 
of debating over the best form of liberal justice, political theorists of certain persuasions 
turned toward reflecting on the need for and the conditions of good citizenship as a 
necessary backdrop of liberal polity and culture. As far as I can see, however, although the 
strategic transfer of the argument or attempted changes in the terms of the debate is always 
understandable in political thinking, there is much more at stake than a merely strategic 
theory orientation. The whole debate is also a debate over the soul of liberalism or liberal 
politics. It is a kind of soul-searching in and for liberalism. Those who partake in this 
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search are either proposing to improve on current forms of liberal theory and politics by 
integrating an aretaic language and perspective into the moral vocabulary of liberalism,2 or 
trying to unearth a deep and unacknowledged flirtation of liberalism with virtue,3 or 
substantiating the aretaic dimension or resources of liberalism itself so as to render it more 
viable and normatively potent.4  
 
3.1. Relieving Liberal Embarrassment over Virtue: Berkowitz 
 
The sufficiency or insufficiency of liberalism in giving a satisfactory account of 
virtues and their place in social and political life is a growing concern for many students of 
contemporary political theory. The recent decade has indeed witnessed a number of 
attempts at framing a characteristically liberal discourse on virtues, best exemplified by the 
works of Galston and Macedo. Berkowitz‘s work is another attempt at confronting liberal 
political theory with the question of virtue. In doing this, however, Berkowitz does not 
merely pursue a debate in contemporary political theory, but also tries to reach out to the 
makers of modern liberalism, Hobbes, Locke, Kant, and Mill, in order to unearth some 
deep-seated tendencies within the liberal tradition regarding the question of virtue. 
Somewhat surprisingly, he reads all these thinkers almost as virtue thinkers. Contrary to 
today‘s prevailing liberal habits, Berkowitz traces in these thinkers a continuous line of 
interest in the importance, or even necessity, of certain virtues in the formation and survival 
of liberal society and the state. 
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As Berkowitz5 tries to show, the revival of interest in virtue today is no longer 
restricted to a certain school of moral philosophy or to a certain line of political theory. 
Interest in virtue can be identified in many different circles of political theory, from liberals 
to deliberative democrats, from communitarians to feminist thinkers, and from neo-
Aristotelians to natural law theorists. However, the same revival also elicits, usually on the 
part of some liberals, certain discomforts. Berkowitz observes or identifies five main 
reasons behind discontent about the revival of interest in virtue: a) concentration on virtues 
leads or may lead to the invocation of traditional notions of moral decency and propriety 
and a Victorian-style morality; b) the whole tradition of virtue is inextricably tied to certain 
metaphysical doctrines no longer acceptable today; c) virtues are inseparable from the 
martial ethic and chauvinistic morale of classical republicanism; d) virtue-centered 
conceptions of life and morality are inherently religious, meaning that they are inherently 
divisive; and e) cultivation of virtues brings about the risk of conformity at the expense of 
free experiments in self-creation. 
Despite all these suspicions about the virtue tradition, however, liberalism still has its 
own characteristic enthusiasm for virtue, according to Berkowitz. In other words, there are 
liberal reasons to seek virtues. As very well put by Berkowitz, the liberal enthusiasm for 
virtue stems from a growing awareness regarding the nature of the principal, core theme, or 
concern of the liberal tradition, namely, the growing awareness that ―liberty, as a way of 
life, is an achievement.‖ This achievement requires certain virtues, which, in turn, develop 
out of education and cultivation, rather than spontaneously. The virtues Berkowitz 
mentions at this point are reflective judgment, sympathetic imagination, self-restraint, the 
ability to cooperate, and toleration. Another reason for the liberal rapprochement with 
virtue, according to Berkowitz, is the need of a liberal state and society for a certain sort of 
citizen for the healthy functioning, perhaps even the very survival, of key liberal 
institutions and practices.  
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In Berkowitz‘s presentation liberalism appears as caught between two contradictory 
tendencies: aversion to and enthusiasm for virtues. Yet, as he argues, a certain measure of 
reluctance to internalize virtues is a mark of ―sobriety and vitality‖ in the liberal spirit. ―A 
certain restraint in connection to virtue‖ seems to be the ideal stand on the question. This is 
because ―every attempt to deny or to resolve the problem of virtue within liberalism 
suppresses an important dimension of the liberal spirit and deprives liberal practice of 
flexibility and strength.‖ Therefore, some ―ambivalence in regard to virtue‖ is a sign of 
vitality in liberal life. This vitality, however, does not obviate the ultimate dilemma facing 
liberalism when it comes to the question of virtues. As Berkowitz writes, ―Liberalism 
depends on virtues that it does not readily summon and which it may even stunt or stifle.‖ 
This point is in fact stressed by a variety of political theorists. Berkowitz articulates this 
problem around four major theses. First of all, both the logic of liberalism and its 
representative thinkers support the idea that both rulers and citizens need a range of virtues 
for the genuine actualization of key liberal ideals, which is, in Berkowitz‘s words, ―the 
natural freedom and equality of all human beings‖. Secondly, historically speaking, 
liberalism held certain extra-liberal institutions, in particular, family, private education, and 
voluntary associations, as responsible for the cultivation of virtues. Differently put, 
classical liberal thinkers have traditionally taken these extra-liberal institutions for granted 
as the relatively secure bases fostering virtues. Thirdly, the liberal tendency to take liberal 
principles to the extreme risks causing the deterioration of these very institutions that are 
necessary for the vitality of liberal society. Here Berkowitz notes that this impulse toward 
the extreme is not peculiar to liberalism and that almost any type of regime might have the 
propensity to take its guiding principle to the extreme. In fleshing out this contention he 
relies on the works of Plato and Aristotle. Fourthly, and accordingly, for a possible renewal 
or revitalization of liberalism the strengthening of these institutions is a necessity.  
Berkowitz acknowledges that the liberal tradition is essentially preoccupied with the 
promotion of freedom and the development of personal freedom as the prime task of 
politics. Freedom is considered more attainable and more just in comparison with virtue. 
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But this priority accorded to freedom cannot be translated into a full repudiation of the very 
idea of virtue, because ―it is the logic of politics that makes virtue the permanent issue for 
every regime.‖ Despite this, however, today, even if not in classical liberal times, the 
characteristic liberal attitude is one of hesitance in embracing the perspective of virtue, 
stemming from the liberal suspicions about notions of human excellence, perfection, and 
goodness. In order to counteract these suspicions Berkowitz gives an interesting 
interpretation of Aristotle, according to which the latter has, on the one hand, a generic-
formal definition or understanding of virtue that is not necessarily subordinate to notions of 
human excellence, perfection, or goodness, and, on the other hand, what we might call a 
more substantive or comprehensive understanding of virtue. This distinction is meant to 
suggest that one can embrace the idea of virtue (as a formal-generic notion at the very least) 
without subscribing to a comprehensive conception of human excellence, perfection or the 
good life. Seen this way, virtue is a necessary dimension of any human activity, including 
political life. Put in quasi-Aristotelian language, virtue is a matter not only of the highest 
end of human life but also of lesser or intermediate ends. Any human achievement or goal 
hinges on some virtues. Accordingly, freedom, as a liberal ideal, is truly achievable only 
when it is underpinned by virtues conducive to it. Moreover, Berkowitz argues, for 
Aristotle the aim of the political life is not the promotion of human excellence and 
perfection as many ascribed to him, but is rather the maintenance of ―actual imperfect 
regimes‖ by furnishing citizens with skills, abilities, and readiness against the destructive 
tendencies of their regime. The underlying aim was to tame harmful proclivities in regimes, 
not to transform imperfect regimes into perfect ones devoted to human excellence.               
Disembedding a formal-generic notion of virtue and an understanding of virtue and 
politics geared toward preserving actual regimes from self-destruction, from deeper notions 
of ultimate end, human perfection, and the good life seems problematic in the case of 
Aristotle. Aware of this, Berkowitz does not neglect to add, ―From an Aristotelian 
perspective, the student of politics must take into account the virtues relative to the 
maintenance of the specific regime in question as well as the virtues relative to a human 
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being‘s final end or perfection‖. Therefore, the ultimate end is inevitably a part of the 
Aristotelian framework. Yet, what Berkowitz tries to affirm is that inquiries into our telos 
do ―not exhaust the inquiry into virtue.‖ It might be said that by developing a somewhat 
attenuated conception of virtue Berkowitz is attempting to open a way to reach out to 
liberal sensibilities. He pursues a similar strategy in treating the metaphysical biology and 
cosmology of Aristotle. In line with some other moral and political theorists, Berkowitz 
argues that Aristotle‘s ethics and politics are not that heavily implicated in his metaphysics 
and cosmology. On the contrary, Aristotle‘s general method in ethics and politics is to 
analyze the ordinary language of moral life and refine the concepts in that language in order 
to arrive at a better and studied understanding of them. This we could do today, as well, 
according to Berkowitz. This way we can save our inquiries into virtue from speculative 
conceptions about human nature and order of the world.  
It must be noted here that Berkowitz seems to feel some uneasiness about this 
purification of virtue from comprehensive conceptions, because, he says, ―In the long run, a 
complete understanding of virtue does require an account of first principles and a defense 
of controversial opinions about human nature and the cosmos.‖ Then why does he 
deliberately disengage from these questions? It is because of the anti-foundationalist, 
pragmatic, and post-metaphysical currents of today. If, as he remarks, the majority of 
academic political theorists think that it is possible to philosophize about justice, equality, 
and freedom without invoking foundational or fist principles, why must we put virtue into a 
more demanding process of inquiry? It is possible to make considerable progress in 
inquiring into virtue without appealing to first principles and foundations. In endorsing 
such a way of proceeding Berkowitz might seem to conform to the prevailing currents in 
contemporary thought. But, on the contrary, part of his goal is to expose the limitations and 
problems of contemporary perspectives, and this is one of the most interesting parts of his 
work. Berkowitz singles out three schools of political theory, deliberative democracy, 
feminism, and post-modernism, which he presents as ―liberalism‘s children.‖ Each of the 
three ―has a liberal root that leading proponents tend to suppress‖ (usually radicalizing a 
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basic liberal concern); each is dependent on virtue but their proponents fail to acknowledge 
this; and each is incognizant of the vices their guiding principle generates. Deliberative 
democrats take a key liberal principle, consent, and seek to enhance and enlarge the 
consensual character of politics, but they overlook the significance of certain qualities of 
character for the growth of responsible consent. They also ignore the vices that emphasis on 
dialogue or deliberation might engender. Feminists rely on the liberal principle of natural 
equality and seek to substantiate it with more robust forms of egalitarian life between the 
sexes, but they usually do not attend to the need for character traits that would nurture an 
attitude of respect for equality. Postmodern approaches are usually inclined to focus on the 
liberal principle of individuality and celebrate self-development, or self-experimentation, 
but do not show sufficient care for the role of a ―demanding education‖ that would foster 
self-restriction for the very development and maturation of one‘s capacities for self-
formation and self-experimentation. In the end, all three, says Berkowitz, are ―marked by a 
dialectic of extravagance‖ and, in each, ―neglect, as a favored principle, enthusiastically 
carried to an extreme, works to obscure and sometimes undermines the preconditions for its 
actualization.‖ 
 
3.2. A Purposive Liberalism: Galston 
 
Galston‘s Liberal Purposes6 is mainly an intervention in the recurring controversies 
in contemporary political theory on the character of liberal societies, and on the 
possibilities and limitations of liberal thought. In these controversies during recent decades 
a number of topics or questions stand out: whether liberalism embarks upon a particular 
conception of the good, whether liberal societies are purely based upon neutral procedures 
of decision making so as to guarantee diversity that is characteristic of them, and whether 
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these societies and their underlying liberal thinking obviate the flourishing of personal 
moral virtues, closely-knit communities, and enduring traditions.       
Throughout the book Galston develops the themes, or sketches the contours of, what 
we might call a liberal politics of affirmation, relying on the thesis that the modern liberal 
state aims at a distinctive set of public purposes, bound up with the practice of a distinctive 
set of virtues (liberal virtues) and with an underlying public culture. Liberal purposes here 
constitute the unity grounding the very diversity of liberal societies. This affirmative 
position is set against a number of negations: the liberal state is not a purposeless civil 
association shaped by adverbial rules (Oakeshott); it is not a neutral structure but embraces 
a certain vision of the good, leaning toward some forms of life instead of others; and it is 
also not an unbounded sphere of differences, but a zone of diversity circumscribed by a 
certain unity. What Galston calls ―purposive liberalism‖ is concerned with neutrality, civil 
association, and difference, yet this concern is fleshed out by allowing a vast arena for 
individual and collective choice in liberal societies. This does not mean, however, that 
liberalism is silent on what ―citizens must publicly affirm.‖  
Galston is idealizing a more purposive and substantive, and less formal and 
procedural, form of liberalism. For him the fundamental error of neutrality theorists stems 
from their confining of political possibilities to two extreme positions: either neutrality or 
(partisan) perfectionism. But, as Galston argues, ―the good is a continuum‖ in which milder 
forms of both positions might be found. As he says, ―There is a vast – and vitally important 
– terrain between Plato and Ronald Dworkin.‖ One can espouse ―a robust understanding of 
goods and virtues‖ and at the same time continue to preserve the principal achievements 
and insights of the liberal tradition. This is because the liberal conception of the good is 
compatible with pluralism; it allows for a wide variety of ways of life, but it is not 
unconstrained in an absolute sense. Particularly in terms of individual preferences, 
liberalism has a capacious outlook, carefully minimizing coercion against individuals, but 
separating this from legitimate restraints and coercion for, or in the name of, public 
purposes. Liberal conceptions of the good and liberal accounts of public purposes are 
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different from the perfectionism of classical antiquity. No summum bonum, no ideal way of 
life, is proposed by liberalism, which relies not only on images of perfection, but also on 
―experiences of deprivation and evil,‖ and thus ―adumbrates a small number of basic goods 
held to be worthy of special attention in individual and collective deliberation.‖ This, 
according to Galston, suffices to inform our judgments for attaining public goods. 
Before presenting his substantive ideas in more detail, Galston elaborates upon 
certain methodological quandaries in recent political theory. Two methodological 
tendencies might be identified as central in recent political thought. The first is ―deep 
description,‖ that is, ―the elucidation of basic structures of moral belief in a certain culture,‖ 
which Galston sees as a sort of pragmatism. The second is ―wide justification,‖ that is, in 
line with traditional philosophy, to examine the premises of a (political) culture ―in light of 
(the possibility of) transcultural standards.‖ Although Galston tries to strike a balance 
between the two, he is self-professedly more inclined toward the latter approach. Yet he 
emphatically puts the emphasis on deep description. Socratic moral-political thinking, with 
which he identifies, deems this sort of deep description vital in order to uncover the 
inconsistencies and weaknesses possibly residing in one‘s implicit assumptions.  
What some would call the ―deflationary‖7 character of much recent political 
philosophy seems troubling for Galston as well. According to him, Bernstein‘s book's title, 
Beyond Objectivism and Relativism, captures the quandary besetting contemporary political 
thinking. As Galston explains, one characteristic of our Zeitgeist is seen as the drive to 
exorcize the impulse to transcendence, an attempt ―rooted in Wittgenstein and Heidegger.‖ 
Under the impact and pressure of this drive, most recent political theorists have turned 
toward situating reason or rationality, or philosophy in general, within particular social and 
discursive communities as a response to the challenges of both objectivism and relativism. 
But for Galston this response overlooks what we might call intra-discursive or intra-
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communal differences, and it counts as significant only those differences that are found 
across boundaries. It falsely regards communities as spheres having coherent agreements. 
Galston is trying to drive the argument toward an awareness of the fact that discursive 
communities do not by themselves provide coherent bases of normative resolution, at least 
not necessarily. The embrace of what Galston calls a ―bedrock morality‖ by most recent 
theories testifies to the limits of particularism. Walzer‘s ―minimal code‖ and H.L.A. Hart‘s 
―minimum content of natural law‖ display a kind of minimal universalism, according to 
Galston. Importantly, these bedrock moralities are not defended metaphysically, but are 
adduced from ―the general features of human beings and of the circumstances in which they 
are ordinarily placed.‖ Indeed, Galston thinks that in two circumstances political 
philosophy is impossible: a society with no inner contradiction at all (as in a Marxist 
utopia), and a society whose members are indifferent to contradictions and thus are not 
interested in ―the criteria of formal rationality‖ to resolve contradictions. The latter one, as 
Galston says, ―amounts to a fundamental change in the meaning of being human,‖ but ―this 
is what the call for the exorcism of the metaphysical impulse reduces to.‖ It therefore seems 
that Galston concurs with the idea that foundational claims to ground ethics-politics are 
untenable, yet against the notions of situated rationality and a moral-political theory 
embedded in a particular discursive community or tradition, he points to the internal 
contradictions inevitably operating in any such community or tradition. Thus he is skeptical 
of both foundationalism, objectivism, and universalism, on the one hand, and particularism 
and localism, on the other. 
Galston identifies three types of responses to cope with contradictions internal to 
liberal society. One is affirming the multiplicity of relevant considerations and denying 
general validity to any single one of them. Instead, the question at hand must be decided in 
terms of the conditions or requirements of the particular situation; in other words, striking a 
balance among the relevant considerations according to the needs of the particular situation. 
This is closest to our pre-reflective consciousness on Galston‘s view. As it seems to me, he 
is alluding to the notions of phronesis, prudence, practical judgment, or, in general, the 
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interpretive-hermeneutic approach. The second type of response is endorsing a privileged 
principle above and beyond others. This is exemplified by notions such as the summum 
bonum, lexical priority, and rights as trumps. The third is a kind of dialectical thinking in a 
Platonic-Hegelian vein. According to this, competing and contradictory views are partial 
and incomplete approximations of a more comprehensive truth. Galston claims that each of 
these responses ―represents a break from ordinary consciousness.‖ Each takes our ordinary 
world as a Platonic cave and ―embraces some distinction between opinion and knowledge.‖ 
However, the Socratic-Platonic distinction between opinion and truth does not denigrate 
opinion, but actually takes opinion as its starting point. Especially in the realms of ethics 
and politics opinions are crucial points of departure for thinking. This is in contrast to the 
Cartesian model of mathematical certainty as the paradigm case of true knowledge or truth. 
Galston is trying to reach a conclusion in which this sort of a Socratic thinking makes it 
possible to reject Cartesian foundationalism together with the distinction between opinion 
and knowledge. Galston cites Rawls‘s idea that we can do moral philosophy without 
recourse to the theory of meaning, epistemology, philosophy of mind, or metaphysics, with 
some reservations. He welcomes the idea that moral theory or epistemology starts from our 
substantive moral considerations, but does not accept the idea that moral and political 
thought might be disentangled from other branches of philosophy. Social philosophy might 
be beyond foundationalism, but it is not a self-enclosed activity. 
Although at some points he seems ambivalent or vague, Galston seeks the possibility 
of coherence in moral and political thinking, a coherence obtained with recourse neither to 
foundational premises, nor to local or parochial enclaves. Out of our substantive moral 
considerations we might strive to achieve the maximum possible coherence in our account 
of morality without falling back upon the naive idea that we will somehow find an 
overarching general principle capable of rendering all our goods commensurable with each 
other. We might come up with a plausible ranking of the goods we espouse, and we might 
formulate principles about when and where, or under what conditions, we can discount 
some goods for the sake of others. None of them commits us to objectivism. Yet, through 
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the dialectical movement of thinking we need to attain the most coherent articulation. 
Galston‘s approach seems akin to a kind of pragmatic hermeneutics, carefully open to the 
possibility and promise of transcultural values. It is thus easy to see where he is trying to 
take us: beyond universalism and particularism (or parochialism), beyond foundationalism 
and relativism, and beyond intuitionism and ―rigorism.‖ However, the road going beyond 
these dichotomies is not sufficiently clarified, apparently because he does not undertake a 
sustained methodological exploration.  
Before elaborating on his account of liberal virtues, Galston also examines a number 
of prominent critics of liberalism. As a general remark he first points out that today‘s critics 
take their bearings not from dormant ideas of the past, but from currently valid and potent 
aspirations of liberal society, such as community, democracy, equality, and virtue. But, 
contrary to its critics' claims, liberalism does not undermine community. Rather, it is itself a 
form of community. It does not refuse virtues, but, despite the utter disregard on the part of 
prominent liberals, liberalism requires many virtues to remain alive. Restating his case, 
Galston stresses the need for ―a non-neutral, substantive liberalism committed to its own 
conception of the good, broadly (though not boundlessly) respectful of diversity, and 
supported by its own cannon of the virtues.‖ 
One of Galston‘s characteristic arguments is that liberal theory and practice contains 
a range of virtues essential to it. Before advancing this argument, however, he needs to 
come to terms with the scholarly literature on the subject in the recent past. As he 
acknowledges, for at least two generations of scholars, liberalism has been thought to have 
shied away from any concern with virtue. This idea has rested partly on the conviction that 
the functioning of the liberal order does not necessarily need individual virtues. The liberal 
order was something like a peace treaty among self-interested individuals allowing them to 
live under the roof of a single polity. There were variations on this theme and on 
conceptions of virtue. But that liberalism has fundamentally cut its ties with the notion of 
virtue went undisputed. For Strauss, says Galston, ―Liberalism placed in jeopardy both the 
restraints on passion that should govern the daily life of the many and the striving for 
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excellence that should guide the activities of the few.‖ For Pocock, liberalism stands for the 
decay of republican virtue, which means subordinating personal interests to the common 
good. According to C. Taylor, the liberal undermining of the possibility of community 
weakens the significance of the virtues, which are in fact habits vital for nurturing a 
common life. For most of these authors, any existing virtue in liberal societies is a remnant 
of past traditions, to which the underlying tendencies of liberalism are not hospitable. Apart 
from these figures in contemporary political philosophy, Galston cites a number of 
significant examples testifying to the steady marginalization of the virtues in political 
thought. Kant, the Federalist Papers, and A. Hirscmann‘s famous work on Passions and 
Interests all attest in varying ways to the gradual turning away from the virtues in politics 
to the question of ―the proper configuration of rational self-interest.‖  
Nevertheless, as Galston sees it, this near-consensus has started to change in recent 
years. He mentions a dozen scholars trying to flesh out the place of the virtues within the 
liberal tradition. For Galston the question centers on the fact that the liberal state must be 
inclusive of diversity but cannot be entirely indifferent to the character of its citizens. What 
is needed is an account of the individual virtues supportive of liberal institutions without 
jeopardizing a widely held tolerance for diversity. For his part, Galston tries to offer a 
deliberately modern virtue-based liberalism. This is the claim central to his project: the 
operation of liberal institutions and society is seriously affected by the character of its 
citizens, and, hence, any split between liberalism and the virtues would have fateful 
consequences for the survival of liberal orders, no matter how perfectly designed its 
mechanisms and procedures might be. Liberal virtues are immanent within liberal theory 
and practice in Galston‘s view. More interestingly, he argues that the undeniable tension 
between virtue and self-interest is not a tension between liberalism and any other tradition, 
but one within the liberal tradition itself.8 Two lines are identified in the liberal tradition in 
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terms of their approach to virtue. One is represented by J.S. Mill, who retains a place for 
the Aristotelian conception of virtue as an intrinsic good. The other line finds its expression 
in Hobbes, for whom the virtues were purely instrumental to the non-moral aims of the 
political life. These two attitudes can be traced up to our own time, according to Galston.9 
But, in any case, what Galston calls the liberal virtues are significantly different from the 
classical ones. ―The liberal virtues demand less self-discipline and sacrifice than do the 
virtues of classical antiquity, of civic republicanism, or of Christianity,‖ he says, adding 
that they ―do not presuppose a specific moral psychology.‖ 
Galston first gives a sketch of the instrumental virtues, which are supposed to 
facilitate the healthy functioning of liberal institutions. Importantly, he states that these are 
not ―logical entailments within liberal theory but, rather … empirical hypotheses 
concerning the relation between social institutions and individual character.‖ Courage, law-
abidingness, and loyalty are the instrumental virtues Galston counts. These are in fact the 
virtues any society might need in order to survive. But there are some virtues specific to 
liberal societies. There are two key characteristics of liberal societies to which correspond 
again two virtues: individualism and the virtue of independence, and diversity and the 
virtue of tolerance. Independence is the ability to take responsibility for oneself, and avoid 
becoming dependent on others. Yet this very independence requires other virtues and a 
favorable environment to flourish. For the development of an independent personality, 
parental care and support is vital, and this is why independence ―rests on self-restraint and 
self-transcendence -- the virtues of family solidarity.‖ The virtue of tolerance is the second 
characteristic virtue in liberal societies. It is usually relegated to some sort of relativism 
with respect to different ways of life. But Galston thinks that tolerance is not incompatible 
with the ranking of different forms of life. The issue is that this ranking cannot be turned 
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into a medium of coercion. A better course is expected to emerge out of education and 
persuasion.10 
Along with instrumental liberal virtues, there are individual liberal excellences held 
to be intrinsically good. Such a conception can be traced to a number of thinkers in the 
liberal tradition. The first excellence is Lockean rational liberty, or self-direction. The 
second is Kantian autonomy, or the capacity to act according to the requirements of duty 
(or moral law). The third is the ―full flowering of individuality,‖ a notion that might be 
traced back to Romanticism, J.S. Mill, Emerson, Thoreau, and Whitman. These 
intrinsically valued excellences articulated by various liberal thinkers can to some extent 
cohere into a unified view. Individual responsibility, individual dignity, mutual respect, and 
excellence as an activity constitute the common core of these excellences. Still, tensions 
can potentially emerge in numerous ways. But the more interesting question is whether 
liberal accommodation of instrumental and intrinsic virtues leads to the affirmation that the 
good man is identical to the good citizen. Galston thinks it is not. Personal perfection may 
not go hand in hand with solidarity. This is the point where one of the most enduring and 
agonizing flash points of liberal politics shows up: namely, the tension between the 
requirements of liberal citizenship and the appeals to liberal excellence (or, alternatively, 
between means and ends). 
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 Besides these virtues Galston introduces the virtues of the liberal economy and the virtues of liberal 
politics. The latter are then divided into three: the virtues of citizenship, which include respect for the rights of 
others, the capacity to evaluate the merits and talents of the candidates for office, moderation in demands, and 
self-discipline to adapt to necessary measures; the virtues of leadership, which consist of patience, ability to 
forge a sense of common purpose, ability to resist desire for popularity (not to pursue populist policies), the 
ability to balance and reconcile popular expectations with wise actions; and lastly general political virtues, 
which include the capacity and disposition to engage in public deliberation, and the disposition to close the 
gap between liberal theory and practice. 
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3.3. Liberal Virtues: Macedo 
 
Macedo‘s Liberal Virtues11 is another important attempt at substantiating the thesis 
that liberal theory can offer an attractive vision of virtue and community without 
necessarily sacrificing its fundamental principles of freedom and justice. Just like Galston, 
Macedo stands against reducing liberalism to a matter of coexistence, and relates the 
predominance of this concern within the history of the liberal tradition to what he calls 
liberalism‘s ―primitive moments,‖ when it emerged out of religious strife and sectarian 
divisions. Yet, minimal conditions of liberal coexistence and the primitive moments of 
liberalism do not exhaust liberal possibilities. Liberal justice is, in essence, a public 
morality that is supposed to be affirmed by citizens as a supreme moral commitment. 
Liberal citizens are supposed to subordinate their personal interests to public moral 
principles. This suggests that, implicit in the practice of liberal justice, liberal institutions, 
public justification, and constitutional citizenship, there are certain character traits and 
virtues and a liberal form of personal excellence.12 
Macedo takes aim at certain common characterizations of liberalism in terms of 
disagreement and conflict, neutrality and impartiality, and toleration and the spirit of 
accommodation. Although the permanent fact of pluralism is crucial for any articulation of 
liberal theory, all these concerns are not definitive of liberalism in any strong sense. 
Identifying liberalism with these questions underdescribes liberal theory and conceals its 
own positive values embodied in and sustained by liberal institutions and practices that 
significantly shape or at least put powerful moral demands upon liberal citizens‘ lives and 
characters. In this regard, liberalism cannot be neutral regarding public values. The values it 
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 Stephen Macedo, Liberal Virtues: Citizenship, Virtue, and Community in Liberal Constitutionalism. 
12
 Macedo argues that certain processes and developments associated with modernization, such as 
urbanization, industrialization, and open mass markets, may support liberal virtues.  
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affirms are ―individual liberty and responsibility, tolerance of change and diversity, [and] 
respect for the rights of those who respect liberal values.‖ 
In order to substantiate his thesis that there is a distinctively liberal character and way 
of personal excellence, Macedo brings up a number of liberal notions. One of them is the 
well-known public-private distinction. Macedo contends that, insofar as this distinction 
points to limitations on the state‘s coercive power in a liberal regime, it is useful in 
identifying the outstanding features of liberal politics. However, the same distinction might 
be misleading if it leads us to think that ―the influence of public values on private life and 
personal character is neutral, or merely negative or external.‖ On the contrary, even the 
most intimate relations, such as familial relations, are subject to and structured by public 
values. Liberal norms require interventions in the most intimate spheres of life: domestic 
violence, domestic rape, limits on parental authority over children, etc. ―For liberals, the 
ends of politics are properly limited but pervasive at the same time,‖ Macedo says, adding 
that they are also pervasive in the sense that ―public reasons and liberal norms of respect for 
the rights of others override competing commitments and claim authority in every sphere of 
our lives.‖ Therefore, liberal society and politics embark on the inculcation of certain 
character traits and attitudes. 
Crucial to liberal aspirations, however, is that these character traits and liberal virtues 
are not enforced through the force of law. For Macedo, the enforcement of liberal justice 
does not necessitate liberal virtues. In fact, for him a society simply governed by liberal 
justice is not equal to a society flourishing in a distinctively liberal way. Yet, the 
preponderance of liberal virtues in a society makes it ―a community flourishing in a 
distinctively liberal way.‖ Respect for the rights of others, tolerance, the subordination of 
personal plans and commitments to impartial rules of law, having broad sympathies in the 
face of divergent ways of life, instilling the habit and attitude of self-criticism, reflective 
distance from one‘s loyalties, and openness to self-revision are all distinctively liberal 
virtues. 
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Now Macedo here acknowledges that these liberal virtues augment one‘s feelings of 
vulnerability and contingency regarding one‘s commitments and loyalties, attenuate one‘s 
pre-liberal allegiances, and interpose a measure of distance between the self and any good 
the self devotes itself to. ―Liberal personality thrives not on a harmonious inner life, but on 
both internal and external value plurality, and a consequent unease and dissatisfaction.‖ 
Moreover, the liberal age might have obviated other, deeper ways of attachment. But far 
from being a cause of worry for liberals, this dissatisfaction indicates the achievements of 
liberal modernity. Contrary to communitarian arguments, the liberal self is fully at home in 
a pluralistic society. It is not necessarily detached from all commitments, but ―not 
inevitably, indissolubly, or unreflectively identified with any.‖ Liberalism does not require 
unencumbered selves, emptied of all attachments, but rather selves who preserve a self-
critical and reflective distance from their encumbrances. It is not ultimately a loss, but an 
achievement that ―liberal affections will be broader but less intense or deep than pre-liberal 
ones.‖ Here the principle of autonomy stands out. For Macedo autonomy is an important 
liberal virtue and it implies the possession of ‗executive virtues.‘ Although he abstains from 
seeing the promotion of autonomy as a good liberal ground for government action, he 
affirms autonomy as an integral feature of a flourishing liberal life. He says, ―The 
autonomous character is capable of affirming rather than bemoaning liberal modernity, with 
its many possible ways of life, the openness of all choices, and its protean ideal.‖13 But then 
                                                          
13
 Macedo‘s identification of autonomy with the affirmation of liberal modernity seems somewhat excessive. 
This gives the impression that he lacks sensitivity to various substantive critiques launched against liberal 
modernity from a variety of perspectives throughout the last two centuries. Even when he acknowledges some 
possible limitations of liberal modernity, such as ―a degree of superficiality in social relations, lack of depth in 
commitments, eccentricity, self-absorption and even narcissism,‖ he hastily reads these limitations ultimately 
as liberal achievements against some undesirable features of past or alternative conceptions of the good life. 
While he admits that there might indeed be forms of the good life that are simply lost or unavailable within 
liberal modernity, his mention of those life forms is usually framed in an apathetic tone. One cannot resist 
asking if this attitude is somehow related to the historical context of Macedo‘s writing -- namely, the end of 
the Cold War and the successive triumphal manner in many liberal circles. Indeed, at one point Macedo refers 
to a number of thinkers (Hayek, Habermas, Kristol) who, despite varying in their philosophico-political 
appeals, converge on the idea that liberal regimes are experiencing a legitimacy crisis, but he regards this 
claim as ―far-fetched‖ given ―the resurgence of liberal capitalism in the 1980s and the sudden collapse of 
communism.‖ In general, Macedo‘s posture recalls Taylor‘s ―boosters of modernity‖. 
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he tries to strike a balance between this stress on what he calls the ―atomistic virtues‖ and 
the role of the shared values, traditions, and social practices within which autonomy arises. 
Thus, even for the development of autonomy and individuality one needs to be steeped in 
the shared values and norms of a pluralistic and tolerant culture.14 Apparently, this is why 
Macedo trusts that the virtues contributing to human-individual flourishing are the same as 
the virtues contributing to the performance of civic duties. ―Liberal virtues are both civic 
and personal virtues,‖ he says, because central to the liberal project is the ―aspiration to act 
in a manner that can be publicly justified to ourselves and to our reasonable fellow 
creatures.‖15 
The idea of liberal virtues might be considered an advance in liberal discourse. Yet, 
the whole argument for liberal virtues is beset by the absence of a certain depth-dimension. 
The point might be put this way: The project of liberal virtues lacks attention to what some 
would call the expressive-affective dimension in our ethical and political life. It is too 
minimalist to live up to the increasingly felt significance and relevance of character and the 
quality of personhood in our political life. In his own way, Connolly seems to express a 
similar concern when he says, ―Liberal virtues are often defined as if they find full 
expression on the highest intellectual register, as if repetition, image processing, and ritual 
performance are not important to their very composition and maintenance.‖ It seems that 
the concern with virtue is much more diversified today. Connolly‘s articulation of his latest 
                                                          
14
 In his invocation of tradition and practice and the role of the larger culture-framework within which 
individuality and autonomy is achieved, Macedo comes close to certain communitarians. But  in envisioning 
liberal politics in terms of these aspects of the question, he prefers to refer and takes his bearings, 
interestingly, from Oakeshott and Durkheim.    
15
 This emphasis on public justification seems questionable to some degree. Liberal demand for public 
justification pertains to public issues and relations to the other. In terms of the individual‘s choices regarding 
his own life, liberalism hardly expects any public justification. It seems to me that in order to counter 
criticisms of the liberal self as unencumbered, disembodied, or disengaged, Macedo puts forward public 
demands on individuals in liberal societies. But again, in terms of self-regarding choices, liberalism remains 
largely silent. On the other hand, as Taylor rightly points out, one needs to be careful about this talk of choice 
in order to avoid falling prey to a naive moral psychology. We have to attend to whether choices are really 
choices.   
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ideas in terms of the notion of civic virtue is an interesting case in point. Similarly, recent 
studies on the importance of ―working on affective registers of experience,‖ altering moods 
and gut feelings as a way of altering one‘s politics,16 might be conceived as novel and 
surprising appearances of virtue thinking. This seems to derive us toward what we might 
call a micropolitics of virtue. 
 
3.4. Aristotelian Liberalism: Beiner 
 
As Galston‘s and Macedo‘s works testify, attempts to salvage liberalism on the 
battlefield of virtues depending primarily on its own resources are legion. However, the 
question of whether or not liberalism can animate or revitalize an aretaic ethos on its own 
resources is still a matter of debate. Despairing of such a prospect, other political theorists 
embarked on a neo-Aristotelian reconstruction of liberalism. Beiner‘s work What is the 
Matter with Liberalism?17 is a case in point. Rather than launching a particularly 
communitarian reading and critique of liberalism, he presents a neo-Aristotelian 
perspective to strengthen liberal theory and practice. This is indeed the principal thesis of 
the work. In Beiner‘s view, the moral horizons of liberalism can be enlarged with a shift 
from a Kantian discourse of rights and autonomy to an Aristotelian discourse of virtue and 
character formation. In this regard, he praises Galston‘s work. 
Beiner is particularly dissatisfied with a couple of liberal themes. These are the 
discourses of values, rights, and individual autonomy for a rational plan of life. The major 
drawback of ‗values talk‘ is its ultimately subjectivizing character, rendering the good as a 
possession and determination of our subjectivity. The good thus becomes inconceivable as 
                                                          
16
 See The Politics of Moralizing by J. Bennett and M. J. Shapiro (eds.), Routledge: 2002. 
17
 Ronald Beiner, What is the Matter with Liberalism (University of California Press, 1992).  
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something we find independently of us and attach ourselves to. It becomes a possession and 
property of our subjectivity. Such a reductive notion brings another trouble, however, 
which manifests itself in the fact-value dichotomy. The discourse of values ultimately falls 
prey to this misleading dichotomy because it posits a world or reality deprived of intrinsic 
worth and goodness, on the one hand, and a subject conferring value upon things, on the 
other. Hence, the fact-value bifurcation is an inevitable outcome of value talk.  
The primacy of the rights discourse in liberal societies has its own pitfalls. It creates 
an adversarial public culture and supports a self-assertive mode of social intercourse. The 
articulation of social and interpersonal questions in terms of rights paves the way for a 
litigious social life. The problem with the liberal celebration of individual autonomy, on the 
other hand, is that it does not represent the actual working of any society. We are already 
socialized into existing practices made available by our membership in a society and 
activities and choices are in fact ranked by any society, all making the liberal idea of 
unlimited individual choice regarding life styles untenable. Moreover, despite the surface 
pluralism of liberal societies, the actual substance of autonomy and diversity is hardly 
credible in those societies. Here Beiner affirmatively retrieves MacIntyre‘s trio: the 
aesthete, the manager, and the therapist. The question is not the liberal celebration of 
pluralism, diversity, individuality and toleration, but the fact that the kinds of individuality 
and plurality actually fostered in liberal societies are too often ―phony,‖ a fact to which 
liberals are not sufficiently sensitive. 
After an overview and general critique of certain liberal notions, Beiner takes up the 
alternative view he endorses, which is neo-Aristotelianism. What this outlook basically 
holds, according to him, is that moral life is best characterized not in relation to principles 
distilled through the procedures of detached rationality, but in terms of concrete 
embodiment of certain human capacities as constitutive of a desirable life. The Greek word 
ethos encapsulates characteristic themes of the Aristotelian perspective: character 
formation, habituation to good character, and a social milieu favorable to good character 
and proper habituation. The idea of virtue in this schema hinges on the postulate of a 
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human good that is beyond human control and design. The human good is not simply 
apprehended by reason alone, but ―rises to self-consciousness in the embodied praxis of a 
moral agent who makes good choices and is pleased by activities that confer worthy 
pleasures.‖ Such an understanding of the human good offers criteria and possibilities for 
moral judgment. 
This Aristotelian conception of morality, however, is untenable for liberals, primarily 
because the idea of an objective human good or telos is ultimately a sort of monism 
threatening diversity and pluralism. The notion of the summum bonum, the idea of the unity 
of virtues, the central role of prudence as the ruling virtue, and the endorsement of politics 
as the architectonic science are all, in Beiner‘s portrayal, reasons for liberals to remain 
suspicious of Aristotelianism. But Beiner nevertheless defends all of the above. In arguing 
that summum bonum and a happy life as the telos of human activities is not monistic, 
Beiner turns to art as an exemplary human concern. Every artistic creation strives for 
beauty, and within a certain canon one can find intelligible criteria of beauty, yet these do 
not necessitate or postulate any one form as the only legitimate or acceptable form of 
beauty. Not all good art works actualize beauty in the same way. Likewise, in our ethical 
life we seek happiness, but no single pattern is posited as the happy life. Yet, there are 
―patterns of coherence‖ and ―goods not our own making‖ that are revealed through 
―embodied judgment.‖ 
Beiner argues that Aristotle in fact does not start by assuming a moral consensus, but, 
on the contrary, he refers to the fact of moral disagreement. Yet Aristotle thinks that 
underlying our moral disagreements we have a common quest: the life of eudaimonia. So 
Aristotelians are not unaware of moral conflicts, as liberals charge, but they move to 
patterns of coherence beyond or beneath our moral striving and conflicts. Furthermore, if 
liberals tend to view our moral ends as different in an absolute and ultimate sense, then this 
is not ‗disagreement,‘ contends Beiner, but ―something more like the habitation of separate 
moral universes.‖ The Aristotelian schema does not negate the plurality of moral attractions 
impacting on us, nor does teleology commit us to a single form of the embodied life of 
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eudaimonia for every single human being. For Beiner, the central role of prudence in 
Aristotelian practical philosophy acknowledges the existence of conflicting goods in human 
life and affirms the resulting need to make sound judgments in the face of these conflicts. 
Thus, neither the Aristotelian search for harmony nor the concept of teleology necessarily 
commits us to a monist perspective. 
After first recapitulating the overall contours of Aristotelian ethics and responding to 
some of its critics, Beiner then considers more directly the political challenges to 
Aristotelianism. These challenges, mostly liberal, are usually articulated through the 
notions of diversity, neutrality, or impartiality. The basic aim is to avoid the clash of rival 
moralities and world views. However, despite much lip service to diversity in liberal 
societies, a certain conception of the good is actually privileged: namely, ―the maximization 
of individual autonomy and choice making.‖ This is now admitted even by prominent 
liberal theorists such as Rawls and Larmore. The classical liberal ideal was still too 
metaphysically ambitious in its espousal of a certain understanding of persons and 
autonomy that was inconsistent with the principle of neutrality. But why, asks Beiner, then 
not give up the neutrality principle rather than refrain from autonomy and agency? In order 
to avoid metaphysics, liberalism sticks to more hard-headed thinking.18 Beiner‘s major 
target is Larmore at this point. Against Larmore‘s invocation of equal respect as the basis 
of neutrality, Beiner asks why we should respect, say, unreflective forms of life. Without 
examining and engaging them, one cannot discern the merits and demerits of varying forms 
of life. Political liberalism as propounded by Rawls and Larmore confines our politics to a 
narrow concern with modus vivendi and with mutual political accommodation, or, 
―agreeing to disagree.‖ Moreover, by accusing critics of liberal society of moralism, liberal 
thinkers misdirect the debate and, for instance, fall into difficulties making sense of 
MacIntyre‘s challenge to liberalism. The question is not deciding between monism and 
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 Beiner regards the great classical liberals like Kant as much more honest in this regard, especially in the 
latter‘s affirmation of the necessity of a fairly ambitious philosophical anthropology in order to make 
advances in moral theory.   
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pluralism; it is not about sticking to nostalgia and pre-modern life forms or realistically 
embracing the inherent requirements of late modern society. It is a confrontation between 
two rival empirical depictions of liberal society. MacIntyre makes certain empirical claims 
about the current state of liberal societies, and although they are not by themselves true, 
they require critical examination and need to be taken seriously. These claims are mostly 
suspicions about the modern liberal state -- ―its capacity to socialize its citizens to humanly 
worthwhile practices,‖ ―its ability to elicit sacrifices from its citizens,‖ and ―its 
vulnerability to social crises.‖ Beiner says, ―Empirically the evidence is not sufficient either 
to validate the worst fears of the critics of liberalism or to rule out these fears entirely.‖ 
The principle of neutrality stands as the fundamental point of contention in all these 
arguments. Beiner criticizes Larmore‘s claim that it is possible to sustain character 
formation, socialization into substantive forms of life, cultivating or keeping constitutive 
attachments, and, more generally, Sittlickheit, in a political public life of neutrality and 
agnosticism. ―When the official philosophy of the society is morally agnostic,‖ Beiner sees 
no compelling or good ground for our habituation to forms of virtue. Furthermore, it seems 
very implausible to suggest that liberal society has no ordering principles.19 This 
misrepresents the character of liberal society, because it is ―more organic and less neutral 
than liberals profess.‖ In addition, the state will ultimately find itself obliged to pursue a 
moral hierarchy.20 Even in the case of abortion, which necessitates a modus vivendi 
approach according to Beiner, neutrality would not be much more helpful. In such an 
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 Beiner refers to Shklar‘s (Ordinary Vices) affirmation that liberalism does indeed have a moral ranking, but 
a negative ranking of vices to be avoided rather than a positive ranking of virtues to be sought. For Beiner, 
however, a negative ranking of vices might be read inversely so as to get a corresponding positive ranking. of 
virtues, tolerance being at the summit for liberal theory.     
20
 Larmore‘s political liberalism, too, contains a moral ranking according to Beiner. The virtue of tolerance, or 
decency or civility, stands above in the ranking of virtues, ―as all liberal political philosophers cannot help 
doing‖. Beiner then draws the conclusion, ―Even liberal philosophy, as anti-Aristotelian as it tries to be, fits 
within an Aristotelian meta-ethic of ranking of excellences, or hierarchies of virtue‖. Beiner‘s principal 
objection to Larmore and other liberals is their putting ―intolerable constraints on the exercise of political 
judgement‖.    
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intense and passionate controversy, it might be more promising to recast the ―moral fabric 
of the terms in which the issue is debated,‖ instead of ―pretending to a spurious neutrality.‖ 
Kymlicka‘s defense of neutrality based on the state-society distinction has similar 
shortcomings in Beiner 's eyes. Having a neutral state on top of a non-neutral society seems 
pretentious. ―The liberal state is governed by the same principles of bureaucratic social 
organization, technocratic management, and pursuit of higher productivity that drive liberal 
society.‖ Beiner thinks the principle of neutrality not only not possible for any society to 
actualize, but also not desirable, simply because the state‘s neutrality, for instance, between 
a self-indulgent conception of life, on the one hand, and a socially responsible and 
constructive, one on the other, is self-destructive.21 
In conclusion, the Aristotelian language of human flourishing is more promising than 
its liberal neutralist rivals on many levels of life. However, Beiner endorses this language 
not for its specific content regarding political choices, but for its offering of a distinctive, 
paradigmatic moral vocabulary to reflect on a range of political alternatives. He brings up 
Aristotle‘s critique of Plato‘s attempt at reducing all goods into a singular form of 'the 
Good‘ as evidence for the possibility, held open by Aristotle himself, of construing the 
human telos and good in non-unitary ways. But a reasonable pluralism for Beiner requires 
that there be a number of life forms, liberalism being only one among others, and the 
relative strengths and weaknesses of these alternatives are always open to comparison and 
criticism. Assuming liberalism as ―a kind of ‗meta-’ way of life‖ above criticism is 
unacceptable. 
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 Beiner notes that Rawls avoids using neutrality terminology because it conflates ‗neutrality of aims‘ (state‘s 
intentions) with ‗neutrality of effects‘ (actual policy results). As he notes,  is Rawls not sympathetic to modus 
vivendi terminology because it implies an instrumentalist relation to political community rather than a moral 
commitment based on moral grounds.  
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CHAPTER 4 
RESTORING THE TRADITION OF THE VIRTUES: MACINTYRE 
 
 
In the preceding chapters our focus was first on aretaic minimalism and then on a 
number of attempts at transcending such minimalism by liberal means. Most of these 
attempts remain largely within the contours of a broadly liberal tradition of political 
philosophy. In this chapter I will turn to a post-liberal or, perhaps more accurately, an anti-
liberal account of the virtues in ethics and politics in the case of Alasdair MacIntyre. I will 
first reconstruct the way MacIntyre strives to restore the ‗tradition of the virtues,‘ and then 
examine a number of implications of his aretaic ethico-political project.                
 
4.1. Enlightened Roots of an Emotivist Babel 
 
MacIntyre‘s opening salvo against modernity right at the beginning of his sweeping 
moral narrative in After Virtue sets the tone for the bulk of the book. We are first invited to 
consider a ―disquieting suggestion,‖ stylized as an imaginary thought-experiment, 
according to which, due to a cataclysmic disaster, the intellectual and material bases of 
science are irretrievably lost, leaving at hand only fragments of previous scientific 
practices, which are no longer capable of being restored as a coherent edifice. With no sign 
of hesitation MacIntyre then immediately contends that what is suggested in this imaginary 
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world of fragmented science represents the actual moral situation of contemporary liberal 
modernity. Deprived of their original contexts of significance and meaning, the moral 
concepts and language we use constitute no more than some Babel of tongues keeping for 
us only a ―simulacra of morality.‖  
How can such a moral apocalypse be rendered intelligible? In order to reveal the 
scope of moral fragmentation today, MacIntyre points to what he sees as the three major 
features of contemporary moral discourse largely displayed in some of the leading moral 
debates of our time. The first is the conceptual ‗incommensurability‘ between rival points 
of view making moral debate among them ultimately interminable, a situation which is, as 
MacIntyre sees it, even dignified as pluralism. The second is the multiplicity and 
heterogeneity of philosophical perspectives underpinning these debates bent on continuous 
dissensus. And the third is the widespread recourse to apparently impersonal yet, in fact, 
not so impersonal maxims in moral deliberation or, put differently, pretension to 
impersonality. But taken together these three features of the contemporary moral situation 
amount to a moral philosophy in its own right: namely, emotivism, which is a body of 
moral theory that reduces all evaluative or, more particularly, moral judgments into 
―expressions of preference, expressions of attitude and feeling,‖ barring rational 
deliberation, let alone resolution, and thereby removing any considerable difference 
between manipulative and non-manipulative social relations. In other words, these features 
not only constitute a natural abode for contemporary emotivist culture, but also set the 
parameters for an emotivist moral philosophy advocated particularly by a number of 
analytical moral philosophers of the age. 
MacIntyre locates emotivism at the center of his diagnostic purposes in his sociology 
of morality, interpreting it as the culmination of a long process of socio-moral 
disintegration. Scattered throughout contemporary emotivist culture are the fragments of 
earlier and originally relatively coherent moralities; and emotivism as a moral doctrine is 
what is philosophically distilled out of this very same culture. This is a reflection of 
MacIntyre‘s general dictum that every morality or moral philosophy presupposes a 
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sociology.   But how exactly is emotivism a culture in general, being besides rather than 
simply a particular moral doctrine? It amounts to a general culture because it is embodied 
in the ―moral representatives‖ or ―stock characters‖ of contemporary culture: who are the 
aesthete, who indulges in self-satisfaction; the manager, who seeks bureaucratic efficiency; 
and the therapist, who is involved in the manipulation of psychic-personal lives. These are 
stock characters, because they are now immediately recognizable to any audience of the 
social context of modernity, and they are at bottom emotive in character because each in his 
or her own particular context reproduces the blurring or even complete obliteration of the 
distinction between manipulative and non-manipulative human relations. 
As already noted, this situation is the culmination of a long line of transformations 
going all the way back to that major transformation called the Enlightenment, which, 
especially in its penchant for grounding morality on a new, non-traditional, and 
independent basis, constitutes the social and intellectual contours of the ―predecessor 
culture.‖ At this point, MacIntyre‘s sociological-cum-philosophical analysis starts to take 
on a tone more akin to that of an intellectual historian. By way of a backward narrative he 
seeks to identify the points of escalation on the way to emotivism. The first protagonist 
here is Kierkegaard, whose viewpoint recognizes no independent reason relating us to the 
ethical unless our own choosing binds us to it. In other words, an ethical way of life is an 
ethical way of life only if it is endorsed by a radical choice or decision. Such ethical 
decisionism, which gives rise to a new literary-expressive form in the ―mode of 
presentation‖ of Kierkegaard‘s Either-Or, where the author ―wears a number of masks‖ and 
figures in a number of guises, however, leaves the ethical in contradiction: ―How can that 
which we adopt for no reason have any authority over us?‖ In Kierkegaard, moral 
commitment is broken apart from any independent motive and laid to rest on subjective 
choice among incommensurable ways of life (in particular, between the ethical and the 
aesthetic).  
Ethical decisionism, however, was only a response to an earlier moral feat associated 
with the towering figure of the Enlightenment, namely, Kant, whose stark dissociation of 
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rational morality or a priori moral imperatives from desires and inclinations deprived 
morality of substantive content. More specifically, Kant‘s attempts at deriving the 
categorical imperative on purely logical-rational premises and without recourse to 
traditional touchstones such as ‗happiness‘ or ‗divine will‘ pressed him into logical 
inconsistencies and into a moral framework devoid of content. On the other hand, when the 
categorical imperative was given some content, as in the case of its second formulation 
(treating every human being as an end in itself), this time the whole moral framework 
lapsed into what it was avoiding at the outset: a prudential reference to happiness. What is 
manifest here according to MacIntyre is the ultimate failure of attempts at justifying 
morality on the basis of reason, which recognizes ―no criterion external to itself,‖ a failure 
Kant personified with great accomplishment.1 Kierkegaard inherits this failed attempt at 
justifying morality on the basis of reason, together with traditional maxims of ethics. In 
fact, he shared with Kant the same traditional moral principles, principles embraced by any 
plain person, like promise keeping and not lying, though without resolution as to their 
ultimate philosophical grounding. Against this background, Kierkegaard‘s contrast between 
the ethical and the aesthetic largely reincarnates Kant‘s segregation between the sphere of 
morality and the sphere of happiness, or between self-determination and self-gratification, 
respectively, by relocating the basis of the ethical from reason to radical decision, where 
―Kierkegaardian choice [is] a surrogate for Kantian reason.‖2 Kant‘s moral philosophy, in 
turn, clearly did not emerge in a vacuum; it was largely inflamed against attempts at 
grounding morality in passions and sentiments by a host of thinkers, from Diderot to Hume, 
whose meticulous distinctions between enlightened and unenlightened, or between long-
term and short-term interests and desires were of no avail, because by discriminating 
between desires they were undermining their own attempts at vindicating morality on the 
basis of human physiological nature.  
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 MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 45. 
2
 MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 47. 
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Now, according to this narrative, from Kierkegaard back to Diderot all the prominent 
figures of the predecessor culture are linked up through a chain of responses to preceding 
failures in grounding morality; the failure of the last protagonist thereby reflecting the 
failure of the first, and the failure of them all reflecting the failure of the predecessor 
culture at large. Following this general indictment, MacIntyre draws closer attention to 
some problematic aspects of the Enlightenment legacy in order to show why its project of 
justifying morality ―had to fail.‖ On his account, despite their differences of emphasis, all 
the Enlightenment thinkers shared the same structure of argument in their justification of 
morality. All moved from what they understood as the relevant feature of human nature to 
the same moral precepts available to any plain person. For Diderot and Hume the relevant 
feature of human nature was the passions, for Kant it was reason, and moral philosophy 
basically consisted in justifying morality by establishing the relation between the relevant 
feature and the precepts of morality. The structure of the argument, then, was largely shared 
among these philosophers. However, this argument structure lacked certain crucial 
concepts, which were characteristic of the broadly Aristotelian moral framework that was 
the historical ancestor to Enlightenment philosophies. What stands out as the most critical 
feature of the classical Aristotelian framework is the teleological understanding of man and 
reason. Moral life, from this perspective, was conceived as structured in terms of the 
natural ends or telos of man, which were in principal transparent to human reason and 
understanding. Moral life was governed by natural ends, establishing an axiological 
distance between ‗man-as-he-happens-to-be‘ and ‗man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realized-his-
essential-nature,‘ and human reason was capable of grasping those ends. In this regard, the 
classical legacy did not regard untutored human nature as definitive in moral thinking 
unless its natural potentialities were taken into consideration. As a social corollary to this, 
‗man‘ in this framework was mainly a teleological concept designating a set of roles for 
each and every person according to his or her station in life. On the other hand, seen from 
within the horizon shared by the Enlightenment thinkers, such an account of reason and 
teleology was already discredited. The ends of man were opaque to reason, and human 
nature was set loose from teleological considerations. In such a state of affairs the task of 
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moral philosopher was to establish a grounding relation between human nature and abstract 
moral precepts. But if reason is incapable of conceiving ends it turns purely instrumental, 
and if human nature is devoid of its teleological context, moral thinking falls back upon the 
problem of the ‗naturalistic fallacy‘ of deriving ‗ought‘ from ‗is.‘ And even when the 
notion of teleology in the form of ‗a presupposition of pure practical reason‘ was accorded 
some space by Kant, this partial move was later considered by his followers, the neo-
Kantians, as an unjustifiable compromise.3 Hence the abortive character of the 
Enlightenment project.                                                               
 
4.2. Epochal Options: Nietzsche or Aristotle 
 
Now, what are we to make of this? Where are we in our moral itinerary today? In 
providing a response to these questions, MacIntyre offers another disquieting suggestion, 
notoriously comparing the present-day condition of modern normative concepts such as 
good, right, and obligatory and modern moral imperatives, some of them being particularly 
cherished by the moderns, like ―human rights,‖ to Polynesian ‗taboo‘ rules. Even though 
this might at first seem to be going a bit too far, soon we discover that the moral of the 
analogy is to reiterate, surely with some measure of provocation, the portrayal of the 
situation of contemporary moral culture suggested at the outset: various moral concepts and 
ideas from past moralities existing side by side as fragments without coming into a 
coherent form. Just like the taboo rules, broken off from from their underlying, most likely 
ancient, rationale that once made them constitutive of an intelligible totality, stood as 
survivals from a bygone age with no connection to a context of significance until some 
Kamehameha II came and eventually expunged them, modern moral imperatives are shorn 
of any rationally defensible structure of coherence, a fact ultimately exposed by the 
                                                          
3
 MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 56. 
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subversive revelations of Nietzsche. At this point, MacIntyre asks why we shouldn't see 
Nietzsche, who had after all ventured with such vehemence to repudiate the values of 
liberal modernity, as the Kamehameha of the European tradition. Nietzsche‘s achievement 
lies not only in having exposed ―that what purported to be appeals to objectivity were in 
fact expressions of subjective will‖ but also in pursuing this problem until he was able to 
draw its fateful implications for the morals of the modern age: ―If there is nothing to 
morality but expressions of will, my morality can only be what my will creates, [and] there 
can be no place for such fictions as natural rights, utility, the greatest happiness of the 
greatest number.‖4 Nietzsche is ―the moral philosopher of the present age,‖ epitomizing in 
his prophetic pronouncements the age's drift toward a moral wilderness under the sway of 
emotivism and bureaucratic-managerial relations.
5
  
But if Nietzsche represents the culmination of the present age (or modernity), 
Aristotle, by having been repudiated by the age of which Nietzsche is the philosophical 
culmination, represents the only possible option in morals today. After a chain reaction of 
moral failures we come full circle to the classical way of posing the ethical problematic, for 
perhaps the initial repudiation of the Aristotelian tradition was mistaken in the first place. 
In MacIntyre‘s words: 
It was because a moral tradition of which Aristotle‘s thought was the 
intellectual core was repudiated during the transitions of the fifteenth to 
seventeenth centuries that the Enlightenment project of discovering new 
rational secular foundations for morality had to be undertaken. And it was 
because that project failed, because the views advanced by its most 
intellectually powerful protagonists, and more especially by Kant, could not be 
sustained in the face of rational criticism that Nietzsche and all his existentialist 
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 MacIntyre, After Virtue, pp. 113-4 
5
 As a sociological counterpart to Nietzsche‘s revelations about the present age, MacIntyre gives primary 
focus to Weberian sociology and, to a lesser extent, Goffman‘s sociology of everyday life. The latter provides 
an account of small-scale counterparts, ―in the mundane transactions of everyday life,‖ to Nietzsche‘s and 
Weber‘s large-scale theoretical articulations of modernity.  
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and emotivist successors were able to mount their apparently successful 
critique of all previous morality.
6 
Such an account of the history of morals would, according to MacIntyre, by itself 
suffice to cast doubt on the validity of the initial discrediting of the Aristotelian tradition 
and would lend credence to attempts at recapturing the fundamental insights of that 
tradition. Indeed, there is no third alternative, or live option: ―Either one must follow 
through the aspirations and collapse of the different versions of the Enlightenment until 
there remains only the Nietzschean problematic, or one must hold that the Enlightenment 
project was not only mistaken, but should never have been commenced in the first place. 
There is no third alternative.‖7 
Now it is clear that MacIntyre is in agreement with Nietzsche so far as the latter 
unmasks modern morality, for he sees the Nietzschean unmasking of the Enlightenment 
heritage as a warrant for rehearsing the classical concerns of ethics and politics. There is 
even agreement on the central terms in which the ethical problematic should be defined: the 
question of the good life. Therefore, both in what is sometimes called the ‗unmasking 
business‘ and in recentering the ethical problematic on the question of the good life, 
MacIntyre goes some considerable distance alongside Nietzsche. In fact, he goes along with 
Nietzsche to such an extent led some commentators contend that Macintyre in many ways, 
though unwittingly, propagates Nietzsche, showing the cogency of the latter‘s perspective.8  
MacIntyre is famous, or perhaps notorious, for framing and inserting surprising 
juxtapositions at crucial moments in his narrative, heightening the overall dramatic effect: 
Nietzsche or Aristotle; Trotsky or St. Benedict; Nietzsche and Kamehameha II. But 
juxtaposing Nietzsche (and post-Nietzscheans) with emotivism (and emotivists) is a 
                                                          
6
 MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 117. 
7
 MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 118. 
8
 Richard Bernstein, ―Nietzsche or Aristotle? Reflections on Alasdair MacIntyre‘s After Virtue,‖ Soundings 
67 (1984), pp. 6-29.  
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relatively persistent feature of MacIntyre‘s works. He seems to present emotivism, as a 
moral doctrine, as the analytical counterpart to post-Nietzschean currents of thought. But, 
more than that, he presents emotivism, as a widespread cultural attitude or mood, as the 
social embodiment and therefore the vindication of Nietzschean insights into the spirit of 
modern morals. This might still mislead one to consider such juxtaposition an instance of 
equal treatment and to therefore judge it unfair due to its failure to distinguish the dissimilar 
in the similar, which is one of the golden rules of the Aristotelian conception of justice. 
This is not the case, however, because MacIntyre specifies two crucial differences between 
these two moral visions. One major difference consists in the divergent conclusions each 
draws from their underlying agreement regarding the truth of morality. Although they are 
in agreement in seeing morality and its appeal to impersonality as an ensemble of personal 
attitudes and preferences in disguise, the emotivist sees no reason for abandoning the 
project of morality as it currently works, whereas the post-Nietzschean believes and affirms 
that anyone awakened to the truth of morality cannot help but ultimately renounce it. 
Secondly, and more pointedly, whereas the emotivist stands, for the most part, on a line that 
can be traced back to Hume, that is, the moral doctrine of passions and sentiments, the post-
Nietzschean comprehends morality in the register of ―the psychology and sociology of 
resentment, frustration, and distortion,‖ thereby considering any philosophy that leaves 
morality as it is both in complicity with the very same conditions of resentment and blinded 
by their reign.
9
 Therefore, their juxtaposition does not mean giving equal consideration to 
these two standpoints. On the contrary and more importantly, MacIntyre treats ‗genealogy‘ 
as a rival tradition to the Aristotelian one along with the Enlightenment tradition; but 
approaches emotivism only for diagnostic purposes, for a diagnosis of the modern moral 
Zeitgeist. All this might lend some credence to Bernstein‘s contention about MacIntyre‘s 
relation to Nietzsche. But, then, against all this background, MacIntyre initiates his 
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 MacIntyre, ―Moral Philosophy and Contemporary Social Practice,‖ in The Tasks of Philosophy (Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), pp. 105-22. 
86 
 
principal project of retrieving and calrifying the Aristotelian moral framework or the 
tradition of the virtues in general.                                                       
 
4.3. Reconstruction of the Virtue Tradition 
 
The virtue tradition consists in a highly layered and extended stream of ideas, 
practices, and concepts covering a multiplicity of periods and civilizations. In retrieving 
this tradition, MacIntyre tries to do justice to its layered and complex character and 
recounts the story of the virtues as it distinctively evolved from Homeric times through the 
archaic and the classical periods down to the Middle Ages.  
The social world of ―heroic societies‖ depicted in the Homeric epic poems rested on a 
structure of kinship relations according each member of the community some specific roles 
in the maintenance of the community and the heroic excellence of its members. In such a 
social context the vocabulary of the virtues was also unambiguously tied to the role 
structure of the community, with each role signifying relevant actions and performances 
expected of it and open to judgment in terms of their excellence in occupying the role in 
question. Among the constellation of virtues prevailing at the time, the virtue of courage 
was given pride of place due to the warrior ethos of Homeric times. The Homeric ethic was 
an instance of the warrior ethic centering on the virtue of courage and the related virtues of 
loyalty and comradeship. But courage and the related virtues, such as strength, were the 
order of the day not only because of their, say, martial importance, but also because of their 
larger cosmic human implications, that is, their meaning and importance for man in the face 
of fate and in view of every man‘s nemesis, death. In this respect, perhaps the Homeric 
virtues are better seen as virtu in the face of fortuna.  
87 
 
Given the profile of the Homeric age and society as a warrior society structured along 
kinship lines of solidarity,10 one could regard its promises for any broadening or 
improvement of our understanding of the virtues with suspicion. Yet according to 
MacIntyre the whole picture offers us glimpses of two important features of any viable 
ethics: the situatedness of any livable morality in local or particular contexts and the 
crucial, even indispensable, role of tradition as the wellspring of the virtues. In MacInyre‘s 
words, ―All morality is always to some degree tied to the socially local and particular.‖ He 
adds, ―There is no way to possess the virtues except as part of a tradition in which we 
inherit them and our understanding of them from a series of predecessors, in which series 
heroic societies hold first place.‖  
The understanding of the virtues as excellences in Homeric societies does not allow 
any distance between social structure and morality, because the demands of morality 
conform to the demands of social structure. In this regard, Homeric society represents 
another example of the partial or restricted understanding of the virtues we ascribed, with 
reference to Aristotle, to the Spartans in the previous chapter. Virtues as excellences 
revolve around the heroic code of the warrior ethic and thus breed mainly the heroic 
virtues, exalting fame, glory, and the immortality that these only could bestow on man.  
But by the time of classical Athens, the tradition of the virtues had already started to 
expand, increasingly branching out toward divergent versions. In classical Athens four 
different schools of thought were already arguing with each other as to the nature of the 
virtues: the Sophists, the tragedians, Plato, and Aristotle. Yet this four-fold diversification 
was still sustained by the relatively unifying world of the polis. In the Sophist 
understanding, analogous to modern day emotivism, the virtues primarily figured within the 
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 In his account of Homeric ethics MacIntyre largely draws upon the work of Moses Finley, who, in his 
history and sociology of the Homeric period, stresses the centrality of the ―heroic code,‖ completely and 
unambiguously constituting the moral framework of the people of the Homeric age. On the other hand, 
Finley‘s description has been criticized as overemphasizing the import of the heroic code at the expense of 
other codes emergent or even already at play in the Homeric society. For a discussion, see Carey Seal, 
―MacIntyre and the Polis,‖ Analyse & Kritik 30 (2008), pp. 5-16.  
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terms of an ethics of personal success, self-gratification, and self-interest. With Plato and 
the tragedians, on the other hand, the virtues and one‘s ethical standing in the world started 
to be seen in terms of correspondences between psychic and cosmic orders; Plato 
articulating in the main a compatibilist account, whereas the tragedians for the most part 
gave voice to experiences of discord and strife among equally compelling virtues and 
goods.  
It is in Aristotle that the tradition of the virtues finds its most elaborate spokesman 
during the classical period, establishing its influence as a benchmark for almost all the 
subsequent literature on ethics throughout much of medieval times up until the early 
modern period. But this millennial influence harbors subtle twists and turns and certain 
inner transformations in conceptions of the virtues. Aristotle‘s ethics revolves around two 
key elements: human nature and the telos of a characteristically human form of life, which 
is referred to in the tradition as eudaimonia. The meaning and role of the virtues are 
intelligible only given these key features of human existence. The virtues are required in 
order to proceed well in the way of attaining this distinctive human telos, or eudaimonia, 
which, however, does not mean that the virtues are instrumental to the attainment of 
eudaimonia, but rather that they are constitutive of such state of ―being-well and doing 
well.‖ Proceeding well in this domain means gradual seasoning or habituation of human 
character, or character formation, a process that does not consist merely in initiation into 
given conventions or entrenched habits but, on the contrary, involves the cultivation and 
sharpening of the deliberative faculties and powers. Although the life of the polis provided 
an indispensable abode or concrete context for such ethical formation, such situated 
character-formation did not negate, but required deliberative choice.  
Because MacIntyre is a self-avowed Aristotelian and has contributed a great deal to 
the revival of neo-Aristotelian ethics and politics, the way he critically appropriates 
Aristotle and the ways in which he finds Aristotle promising and wanting are worth 
focusing on. Although MacIntyre is an Aristotelian through and through, he finds 
Aristotle's views lacking in some crucial respects. First of all, the notion of the unity of the 
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virtues Aristotle receives from his mentor Plato is untenable in any of its strong forms. Yet 
there is still some plausible core to this idea, particularly if we consider the interrelationship 
or reversibility of the virtues we mentioned in the previous chapter. What is more important 
and problematic in relation to the Aristotelian notion of the unity of the virtues, however, is 
its lack of sensitivity to the tragic in human life. In the broadly Platonic-Aristotelian vision, 
the order of the city and the order of the soul (or character) are strongly connected to the 
unity of the virtues, and accordingly the lack of such unity is attributed either to wrong 
political arrangements or to character flaws. But, if this is the case, the tragic dimension of 
the human condition is ignored or at least explained away. ―The agon has been displaced 
from its Homeric centrality.‖ ―The conflict of good with good,‖ prior to any character 
formation, is lost from view in such an ethical understanding, thereby depriving its holders 
of an important resource and milieu for the practice and formation of the virtues, because it 
is sometimes only through conflict and contestation that one can get a clear grasp of the 
ends towards which one‘s ethical strivings are directed.11 This exclusion of the tragic was 
only aggravated by Aristotle‘s profiling of certain sorts of human beings and of certain 
kinds of human activities outside the landscape of the virtues. Aristotle considered slaves 
and barbarians incapable of cultivating the virtues and achieving the human good. He also 
saw craftsmanship and manual labor as inferior activities the excellences of which did not 
figure into his compendium of the virtues. Here MacIntyre identifies and underlines 
Aristotle‘s postulation or stipulation of freedom as the ―presupposition of the exercise of 
the virtues and the achievement of the good.‖ The virtues and the human good are available 
only to free man in their free activities. But this stipulation is severely constrained by 
Aristotle‘s ahistorical understanding of human nature (and human telos) as fixed with 
respect to one‘s position in the dominant forms of social and cultural hierarchies of the 
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 MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 157-64. The question of agon in Aristotle‘s politics has recently been revived in 
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time. This ahistorical conception with an aristocratic tinge prevailing in the tradition of the 
virtues as it culminated in Aristotle during the classical period did not undergo any major 
alteration until its medieval encounters with religion.                              
The Middle Ages represent the time period during which the virtue tradition 
underwent a host of transformations in response not only to monotheistic religion, but also 
to the pagan cultures of Europe. Although these pre-Christian cultures were later 
Christianized, their warrior ethic survived in a new cultural milieu, wrapping the pagan 
warrior king in the persona of the Christian knight. What is interesting here is that the 
heroic code, which was once superseded or given a secondary role in the tradition, now 
reemerged in Christianized form, giving to the heroic code sort of a ―double presence‖ in 
the tradition of the virtues. However, the main drama in the history of medieval ethics in 
this context is the encounter between classical Aristotelian thought and religious visions 
and theology, an encounter which is in fact part of the larger story of the encounter between 
Jerusalem and Athens. This encounter constituted a highly favorable ground for cross-
fertilization between the two traditions but, specifically for the tradition of the virtues, 
theology or the Abrahamic religions in general  meant a broadening both in the catalogue of 
the virtues and of its thematic composition. To the classical catalogue of the virtues now 
were added new virtues like such as faith, hope, and charity (with Aquinas), and some 
classical virtues were either sidelined, radically transformed or totally abandoned, like such 
as the ancient virtue of megalopsuchia,12 translated as pride, magnanimity or, in more 
recent renditions, greatness of soul, which is not considered to be in line with the Christian 
virtue of humility. To the thematic composition were now added questions like sin or, more 
generally, an emphatic conception of evil.   
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 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1123a35-1125a35. MacIntyre, as most others, regards as less than 
satisfactory the usual translations of certain key Greek moral terms such as eudaimonia and megalopsuchia.  
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4.4. A Core Conception of the Virtues 
 
This rich and layered account of the tradition of the virtues seems to offer us not 
exactly one tradition, but rather many contending, or at least divergent, traditions of the 
virtues. A chief achievement of MacIntyre‘s work is to draw out of this rich tapestry of pre-
modern virtue-ethical perspectives what he calls a ―core conception of the virtues.‖ What is 
intended by a core conception here is not a monolithic body of ideas. Rather, it is in itself 
multilayered and multidimensional. As we have seen, from the outset, MacIntyre pointed to 
the manifold meaning and usage of the notion of virtue as it was used by a plethora of past 
thinkers. In Homer a virtue is what enables one to discharge one‘s social role; in Aristotle it 
enables one to achieve the characteristic telos of human life; in Benjamin Franklin it 
amounts to being an instrumental quality for achieving earthly or heavenly success.13 Thus, 
not only in their catalogue of the virtues but also in their rank-ordering and in their 
conceptions of them, they differ considerably. Yet, MacIntyre endeavors to take us beyond 
this manifold meaning of virtue and highlight some commonalities, or unifying elements, 
running through all these divergent accounts of the virtues. As he specifies, there are three 
common elements in any understanding of the virtues. The first is the notion of practice; 
the second is the narrative order of a human life; and the third is the notion of a (moral) 
tradition. 
The notion of ‗practice‘ as the first element of the core conception gives us a profile 
of the immediate background of our moral life and locates the virtues therein. In 
MacIntyre‘s renowned portrayal, a practice refers to 
any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human 
activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the 
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 In order to highlight the extent of dissonance between varying conceptions of the virtues MacIntyre in a 
somewhat ironic vein speculates that ―Aristotle would certainly not have admired Jesus Christ and he would 
have been horrified by St Paul‖; p. 184. 
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course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate 
to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human 
powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of ends and goods 
involved, are systematically extended.14 
So construed, the concept of practice covers an extensive range of relatively complex 
human activities: games like football and chess; artistic or semi-artistic activities such as 
painting, music, and architecture; productive and professional activities like farming; 
intellectual activities like the natural and social sciences; and activities like sustaining a 
household or family and engaging in politics in the Aristotelian sense.  
The notion of ‗internal goods,‘ or ‗goods internal to practice,‘ as opposed to those 
that are external to it, is very important in this context. Certain types of goods can only be 
acquired through and in the context of a practice to which the goods in question are in a 
constitutive relation. Such goods are not external additions to, or supervenient on, practices; 
they are rather inscribed into the very possibility and meaning of practice. Otherwise stated, 
certain goods disclose themselves and become available to us only through certain practices 
harboring them.  
MacIntyre proposes the example of portrait painting in order to expand upon the 
relation of the virtues to human practices and internal goods. Money and reputation can be 
obtained through painting, but they can also be secured in a variety of ways other than 
painting. However, excellence in painting in general, or the characteristic attributes of a 
virtuoso painter, like a good sense of perspective, for instance, not to mention the qualities 
acquired due to a whole life lived as a painter, one may cultivate only through painting; that 
is, in and through the practice itself. It is in this sense that certain goods are internal to the 
practices disclosive of them, but others, such as money and reputation, are merely or 
primarily external. Similarly, a special ―analytical skill, strategic thinking, and competitive 
intensity,‖ constitute a particular range of goods internal to the practice we call chess, quite 
apart from potential external goods we may obtain through it, such as fame or prestige. 
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Crucially, this feature of internal goods is also what renders their achievement a shared 
good for the whole community in which they are achieved, because internal goods are 
objects of or relevant practices harboring them provide an arena for striving for excellence. 
On the other hand, external goods are, for the most part or even always, someone‘s 
property and they are objects of possessive competition. For this reason in later works 
MacIntyre refers to the same distinction with better terminology: ―goods of excellence‖ 
versus ―goods of effectiveness.‖15  
Internal goods are thus related to practices, but where and how do the virtues stand in 
relation to practices and the internal goods correlated with them? In MacIntyre‘s practice-
based conception of the virtues, ―a virtue is an acquired human quality the possession and 
exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices 
and the lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving any such goods.‖ MacIntyre 
identifies three main virtues that are particularly important for achieving internal goods and 
sustaining practice: justice, courage, and truthfulness or honesty. But how are these virtues 
exactly related to practices? Every practice in its complexity is a locus of relationships, first 
of all among practitioners and secondly among any other relevant persons. Additionally, 
every practice, from sports games to arts and sciences, has a relatively long history during 
which a host of standards of excellence is already constituted by past or present 
practitioners of the practice in question. Arguably, it is in fact part of many human practices 
to amplify and advance already established standards of excellence to new, higher  levels. 
But this all indicates that participation in a practice means some exposure both to a possibly 
large number of practitioners and their evaluations, on the one hand, and a certain cluster of 
standards of excellence definitive of the achievement of that practice, on the other.  
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What does this, in turn, mean aretaically? It means that such an exposure to what any 
practice involves in terms of practitioners and standards of excellence will only be fruitful 
if the individual who is so exposed earns and executes the capacity ―to recognize what is 
due to whom‖ (justice), bears or fosters in himself the dispositional qualities to withstand 
and persist in face of challenges and risks (courage), and implants in himself the readiness 
―to listen carefully to what we are told about our own inadequacies and to reply with the 
same carefulness for the facts‖ (honesty). If I am a novice at playing chess I have to be 
open to suggestions and even guidance from other more experienced practitioners, 
recognizing their rightful authority in this domain, but I have also to meet challenges of the 
game in the face of competition. Given the broad range of activities included under the 
concept, these relatively common features of various practices would most likely take on 
differential weights with respect to different practices, and possibly more weight in so far 
as the practice in question is much more complicated in terms of inter-human relations and 
the range of concerns it embodies than a game like chess. Dispositional qualities required 
for mastery in chess would certainly figure in a different light and probably gain some more 
force to be effective in the field of political practice, for instance. To use the metaphor we 
mentioned in a previous chapter, these qualities (justice, courage, honesty) would figure in 
the ‗magnetism‘ of a different field, namely politics, and would thus generate a different 
magnetism among themselves (the virtues). But in the main they would be cardinal features 
of most human practices.           
What is also worth noting here is that the virtues figuring in a practice constitute also 
the key to the quality of human relationships formed or organized around that practice. This 
is to say that the virtues which are sustained by and in turn sustain practices are not only 
our ways to internal and external goods or only to the success and vitality of practices, but 
they are also crucial in keeping human relations revolving around practices in good ethical 
shape. Justice, courage, and honesty define our relations with other people as well as our 
qualifications regarding various practices.                       
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Now, it is easy to see from this account of practices that we live most of our waking 
lives participating in a number of such activities and, to the extent that we cultivate the 
requisite virtues and are successful in achieving the relevant internal goods accruing to the 
practices in which we participate, we contribute both to our own well-being and to the 
larger social or human whole in which those practices find a home. All the practices in 
which we participate constitute the immediate background for our ethical experiences, 
endeavors, and achievements and, therefore, for the cultivation and formation of the virtues. 
But in its multiplicity this immediate sphere of practices does not meet the full range of our 
ethical aspirations. In other words, in its heterogeneity any array of practices would fall 
short of matching the relatively unitary perspective we usually, yet perhaps sometimes 
implicitly, try to project on our lives.  
This perspective or horizon of unity is opened up for us, according to MacIntyre, in 
terms of the narrative profiles in which we see our lives. It is in terms of our individual life-
story that we can gain access to a more unitary perspective of our lives. Our embroilment in 
the particular history which is our life story makes us move within a temporal horizon that 
includes all our struggles, achievements, failures, and losses. The sphere of practices then 
becomes intelligible and virtue-evaluable only in this sphere of narrative horizons. Whether 
what is deemed to be virtuous in the context of a practice – and therefore is our locus of 
moral concern – amounts to a genuine character trait in us, whether various internal goods 
or goods of excellence to which we aspire come to constitute a solid feature of our lives, in 
short whether our lives are leading us anywhere worth our commitment and allegiance, all 
can only be rendered intelligible from within such a narrative grasp. In MacIntyre‘s words, 
―The unity of a virtue in someone‘s life is intelligible only as a characteristic of a unitary 
life, a life that can be conceived and evaluated as a whole.‖ The first and immediate 
background of our ethical bearing is in this way comprehended by a wider personal life 
horizon or context.                          
Both the practices in which we participate and the narratives in which we conceive 
our courses of life define our relationship to virtues and goods. If practices provide us with 
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arenas where we can come to acquire and develop virtues, narrative identity puts us in 
relation to virtues and goods with a higher level of unity. Just like practices, however, 
narratives are not unitary, and this is not because of the banal fact that we can come to 
regard our lives in varying narrative portrayals, but because our self-narrative is already 
enmeshed in an interlocking set of other narratives that altogether body forth a moral 
tradition, which is the third element of the core conception of the virtues. Moreover, not 
only do human beings as practitioners have narratives or stories, but even practices have 
stories of their own which involve many times and many people. In other words, not only 
persons but also practices have a storied existence finding their widest possible meaning 
and coherence in traditions. As MacIntyre says, ―The individual‘s search for his or her 
good is generally and characteristically conducted within a context defined by those 
traditions of which the individual‘s life is a part, and this is true both of those goods which 
are internal to practices and of the goods of a single life.‖                            
 
4.5. Contexts of Aretaic Coherence: Practices, Narratives, Traditions 
 
Now, clearly the core conception of virtue MacIntyre distills from the tradition of the 
virtues is primarily harnessed to restore and reinstitute a context of coherence for the 
practice of the virtues and for moral life in general.   Practices are indispensable for the 
existence of the virtues because, with their shared, relatively stable, well-established 
standards of excellence and attitudinal requisites (together with their exemplary virtuoso), 
they provide a context of normative coherence for the practitioners and the virtues. 
Narratives and narrative self-understanding lend some evaluative coherence with respect to 
the goods and aretaic achievements of a single human life. And, finally, traditions lend 
some historical coherence and intelligibility to our practices and narrative quests by 
projecting practices and narratives as situated in an unfolding historical story of 
developments, advances and declines or setbacks. Therefore, the whole framework is 
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steered to lead us towards some rehabilitation of moral coherence by counteracting the 
moral cacophony consequent upon that came with the Enlightenment initiatives 
adumbrated described above. Since these concepts are so central into MacIntyre‘s invitation 
to recuperate the virtues, I would like to take up each in turn to assess their promises and 
shortcomings in a way pertinent to my purposes here. 
MacIntyre‘s moral sociology of practices is highly suggestive and illuminating, 
particularly in showing the place and sources of the virtues in the concrete fabric of our 
moral life. By maintaining concrete contexts for the cultivation of the virtues, practices 
constitute what are sometimes called the seedbeds of the virtues. In subscribing or exposing 
themselves to the standards of excellence embodied in practices, individuals undergo a self-
transformative process, and they partake in a life of larger meaning than their emotive or 
preferential allegiances.16 Borrowing from Oakeshott, practices are the primary arenas of 
―self-enactment‖ and ―self-disclosure‘ enmeshed in ―durable human relations.‖17 But any 
strong affirmation of such a concept of practice as an ongoing complex of activities 
embodying rules and standards of excellence awaiting practitioners‘ espousal and mastery 
would raise questions of conventionalism in ethics. Given that the pivots of any practice are 
the internal goods and excellences it sustains, one could ask if there is any measure to 
evaluate the relevant practice other that the inner criteria it embodies. This question 
becomes even more complicated if we consider the possibility that there might be bad, 
deformed, or evil practices, or evils engendered by practices. Taking their bearings from 
Foucault and a number of other critical theorists, E. Frazer and N. Lacey reveal how 
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practices and their internal goods could be tailored to power differentials, thereby 
unnecessarily restraining those who are subject to them.18          
Now MacIntyre‘s conception of the matter is surely less vocal about this underside of 
practices and this diminishes its capacity to account for the shifts and conversions away 
from certain practices in the past. This is because internal goods and the ―social teleology‖ 
of a practice would not count as sufficient warrant for much of a change in cases such as 
the civil rights movement and the abolition of slavery. Although at one point MacIntyre 
considers the possibility of evil practices and holds open such a possibility, he is in general 
unwilling to lend much credence to this idea. 
Some theorists who are emphatic on the role of practices in ethical conduct grapple 
with this range of problems having recourse to certain normative distinctions. In his recent 
works J. Raz distinguishes between the contingent coming into existence of values 
depending on social practices, on the one hand, and their value status, on the other. Once 
they are in existence values are capable of acquiring autonomy from their originally 
―sustaining practices‖ and, therefore, even in the absence of practices, that is, even in cases 
where the relevant practices die out, values can remain alive or they can later be revived. 
As a corollary to this idea Raz also separates a set of values which he thinks are 
independent of what he calls the ―social dependence‖ of values on practices. The paradigm 
example of this kind of value is freedom, which, Raz argues, is an ―enabling condition‖ and 
―no sustaining practice is necessary to make it possible.‖19 With these moves Raz tries to 
attenuate the practice-based status of excellences and goods and to keep certain goods from 
the contingencies of social practices. Oakeshott provides a similar outcome by restricting 
the scope of practices to embodying adverbial rules rather than substantive purposes.                                        
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MacIntyre, too, acknowledges the contingent beginning of practices (and traditions). 
He is, it seems to me, much more concerned about deformations in practices than the above 
authors and he recognizes the possibility of change and transformation in practices. 
Especially as to the last point MacIntyre stresses the role of practitioners in negotiating the 
nature of internal goods and their ability to sharpen practices toward a better grasp of the 
relevant goods of excellence. In most games or arts, for instance, it is players‘ or artists‘ 
mastery and achievement that takes the art or the game in question toward a higher level of 
accomplishment, broadening and enriching the horizons of the practice. MacIntyre provides 
interesting examples from the history of the arts (especially painting) and certain games in 
this respect.20 But, as can be seen, this is about the progress of practices, not about their 
deformation, let alone their evils, and the vector of transformation is still determined or 
guided by goods internal to practices. In comparison with other thinkers who offer a 
practice-based account of goods and excellences (like Raz and Oakeshott), then, MacIntyre 
stands more emphatic on the indispensability of practices (Raz, for instance, strives to open 
some normative crack in the nexus of practices and goods).  
In dealing with the deformation problem, however, MacIntyre has recourse to the 
distinction between practices and institutions mentioned above. Although the primary 
components of a practice are its internal goods and standards of excellence, most practices 
deliver or are capable of delivering goods external to them, such as status, prestige, and 
power, which exposes them to potential corruption and deformation under the sway of 
institutions primarily bent on procuring external goods. As Knight notes, at the root of this 
distinction lies, among other things, MacIntyre‘s first-person experience of academic life in 
university settings, where, the latter thinks, the internal goods of scholarly work and 
activities are under constant jeopardy due to the institutional interests of the universities in 
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meeting the demands and expectations of the market and a knowledge-based economy.21 
But the problem extends towards many other practices working within the managerial 
networks of institutions where goods of excellence are in tension with technical-
bureaucratic imperatives, as can be observed in the over-commercialization of sports. And 
in MacIntyre‘s portrayal capitalism at large enervates the practice character of some key 
human activities, like production, because it creates conditions in which people engage in 
activities without internal goods. MacIntyre‘s distinction between practices and institutions 
is again a useful one and it joins varied criticisms of the hold of instrumental reason and 
alienation in modern settings, but it is still difficult to see how this could cover those 
practices the evils of which cannot neatly be imputed to institutional invasion.       
MacIntyre in general counts on the internal resources of practices for providing the 
requisite grounds for criticism of wrong-headed practices unless they are not totally 
exhausted by institutions and, for this reason, resists standards external to or independent of 
practices, or notions like ‗transcending goods,‘ which C. Taylor incorporates in his own 
ethics of the good.22 But MacIntyre‘s Thomistic turn in the aftermath of After Virtue seems 
to afford him the final philosophical leverage to shore up the internal resources of practices: 
precepts of natural law. This turn to natural law opens up a new dimension in MacIntyre‘s 
practice-based moral framework because it adds to it a new normative input beyond 
internal goods. In this way the centrality of internal goods is somewhat moderated. By the 
precepts of natural law MacIntyre understands some basic rules and principles to which 
anyone should attend for the sound functioning and healthy maintenance of practices and 
human relations, and in this he comes interestingly close to Raz‘s description of them as 
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‗enabling conditions,‘ by characterizing the precepts of natural law as ―enabling rules.‖23 
These rules enjoins us not to commit a certain range of harms to others and thus enables all 
of us to participate in activities and practices within a safety net, thereby shielding not only 
human beings and their relations, but also the pursuit of goods through common projects 
against deformation and breakdown. ―The precepts of the natural law,‖ says MacIntyre, 
―prohibit those attitudes and activities that violate the relationships of rational agents in 
pursuit of such common goods.‖24   With this move he also seems to soften his earlier, and 
again, notorious lack of sympathy for ‗rights,‘ belief in which was comparable in his view 
to ―belief in witches and in unicorns,‖25 which was another way of iterating Bentham‘s 
equally notorious ―nonsense on stilts.‖ But this does not mean that MacIntyre has made a 
pact with ‗natural‘ rights. Instead, he regards rights as embedded in practices and pursuits 
of common goods, a view which, he argues, opposes the prevailing modes of rights talk, 
which continues to configure rights  as ―continually renewed challenges to what is taken by 
those who present them to be the institutional status quo, challenges designed to dissolve 
the bonds, and undermine the authority, of all institutions intermediate between the 
individual on the one hand and the government and the justice system on the other: such 
institutions as, families, schools and churches.‖26 For MacIntyre rights are not an imprint in 
an invariant human nature and in this respect his thinking of rights as situated and 
intelligible in view of the common goods for the pursuit of which they are necessary 
(enabling) rules is consistent. 
                                                          
23
 Mark C. Murphy, ―MacIntyre‘s Political Philosophy,‖ in Mark C. Murphy (ed.) Alasdair MacIntyre 
(Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 167.  
24
 MacIntyre, ―The Illusion of Self-Sufficiency,‖ in Alex Voorhoeve (ed.) Conversations on Ethics (Oxford 
University Press, 2009), p. 129. 
25
 MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 69. 
26
 MacIntyre, ―Community, Law and the Idiom and Rhetoric of Rights‖,    Listening:Journal of Religion and 
Culture 5, (1991), p 105. For a recent evaluation and comparison of MacIntyre‘s understanding of ‗rights‘ 
with certain other approaches see Bill Bowring, ―Misunderstanding MacIntyre on Human Rights,‖ Analyse 
and Kritik 30 (2008), pp. 205-14.  
102 
 
But MacIntyre expects natural law to do more than provide only ‗enabling rules‘ in 
the way of holding in check practices and institutions. Accordingly, he strives to 
foreground some ‗subversive‘ possibilities of natural law against the centralizing bent of 
power structures by way of a contextualizing, and quite interesting, reading of Aquinas, 
who, according to this reading, opposed the ―centralizing tendencies in both ecclesiastic 
and secular affairs‖ during the theologico-politically volatile decades of the 13th century.27 
Although Aquinas shared some general features of the ―weltanschauung‖ of his age, on key 
questions he represented a dissenting voice in his theologico-political milieu. Contrary to 
dominant theological trends of his time, Aquinas did not approve repression of vice by 
legal means (what is today called ‗legislation of morality‘), notwithstanding his espousal of 
the role of law in moral education, putting him at odds with puritans as well as liberals. 
MacIntyre reads into Aquinas‘s disapproval of legal repression of vice also an attitude 
against entrusting practical-moral reasoning completely to a professionalized (ecclesiastical 
as well as secular) elite at the expense of ―plain persons,‖ an attitude consonant also with 
his favorable opinion about the use of canon law, which represented the authority of local 
customs, together with Roman law, which was obviously a centralizing force. Thirdly, and 
more to the point about the subversive impact of natural law, Aquinas deployed the 
resources of natural law to curtail ―a systematic set of exclusions‖ of the time, exclusions 
visited upon Jews, heretics, and pagans.                      
How appropriate the word subversive is here is surely open to debate (and I am in 
principle sympathetic to these kinds of uplifting readings of classical or traditional sources) 
and the cogency of MacIntyre‘s interpretation is a matter of Aquinas scholarship, which is 
already a world unto itself. To mention just one major issue in that scholarship, as we learn 
from Wolterstorff, interpretations of natural law drawing on Aquinas are divided in terms 
of whether or not the latter‘s view of natural law amounts to construing the laws of nature 
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as an imprint in (human) nature.28 This issue seems to be pertinent here, because, given 
MacIntyre‘s programmatic avoidance of Aristotle‘s metaphysical biology in favor of a 
refiguring of Aristotle‘s thought in terms of social teleology, one wonders how this turn to 
natural law could be sustained. In other words, how is the natural law approach consistent 
with his initial statement to the effect of discarding Aristotle‘s metaphysical biology in 
favor of social teleology? How can nature and natural law be invoked here ―in the absence 
of a full restoration of Aristotelian or Thomistic metaphysics?‖29 At this point it seems that 
we are offered a ―natural law without nature,‖30 which still does not quite fit with 
MacIntyre‘s social teleology.  
Before turning to MacIntyre‘s conception of tradition I would like to stress one point 
about his treatment of ‗rights.‘ Above I pointed to some moderation in his understanding of 
rights. This could also be seen in his contention that past practices could involve and 
sustain rights even if they do not articulate this explicitly, that is, even if they do not have 
an idiom of rights. As MacIntyre writes, ―It does not follow that, where there is no 
vocabulary to express claims in terms of rights, there can be nothing truly describable as 
ascribing and claiming rights.‖31 But this allowance does not change his principal construal 
of rights as socially embedded and intelligible insofar as they are nested in practices and 
common projects geared to common goods. Macintyre anchors rights on practices and this 
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places his account of rights beyond foundationalist conceptions which attribute rights to 
human nature, human reason, or spirit.32  What is problematic, in my view, is that 
MacIntyre‘s way of anchoring rights on practices driven to common projects and goods 
tends to leave rights at the level of a parochial interest. What will happen, one wonders, to 
rights in relation to those with whom we do not pursue a common project? MacIntyre‘s 
discussion of practices and rights is, I think, in the end closed with a negative balance with 
respect to rights.    
 
4.6. Tradition against tradition 
 
Gadamer deems proper attention to tradition as a kind of Socratic ignorance, that is, 
an initial acknowledgment of the need for openness and receptivity to tradition.33 Thus, 
acknowledging the role of clusters of foreknowledge and forethought tradition bestows on 
us is an epistemic and even ontological humility, even though tradition here is not 
understood as a fixed, steadily unfolding cultural essence. MacIntyre‘s turn to the concept 
of tradition seems to acknowledge the same Socratic ignorance, but again in MacIntyre‘s 
conception tradition is not something smoothly passed on from one generation to another, a 
view of tradition he considers and disowns as Burkean. And although his portrayal of 
tradition at some points in After Virtue sounds close to this smooth unfolding of a 
substantive vision, later on he began to articulate the more agonal aspects of what he calls 
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‗tradition-guided inquiry.‘ A key study exemplifying the way he executes such tradition-
guided inquiry in the face of ‗rival traditions‘ is his Three Rival Versions of Moral 
Inquiry.34 
In this book MacIntyre tries to refine his account of virtue ethics as a tradition of 
inquiry that is in certain crucial respects at odds with two other traditions, what he calls 
―encyclopedia and genealogy,‖ and ultimately superior to them. Along with this attempt at 
clarifying the major themes and concerns of his earlier books, he also presents a somewhat 
detailed discussion of the current situation in academia, especially the interminable 
disagreements in academic communities. This is why he opens a discussion on ‗lecture‘ as 
an academic genre and on the modern university as the institutional embodiment of the 
current academic situation. The central question identified at this point is the problem of 
incommensurability and untranslatability. This problem is especially striking in the 
humanities and social sciences, but it is especially thought-provoking for MacIntyre 
because incommensurability is a challenge also for his own account of the moral situation 
today and his own orientation in moral and, more generally, philosophical thinking. 
Endorsing a moral standpoint requires one to respond to the presence of rival and 
incommensurable standpoints available in the academy and in the larger public discourse.  
MacIntyre holds that admission of incommensurability does not by itself render 
rational debate between rival systems of thought (let‘s say paradigms) impossible; on the 
contrary, it may constitute a prologue to rational debate and even to ―that kind of debate 
from which one party can emerge as undoubtedly rationally superior, if only because 
exposure to such debate may reveal that one of the contending standpoints fails in its own 
terms and by its own standards,‖ which is in fact the expression of MacIntyre‘s account of 
rational vindication. Thus, the only way to transcend incommensurability and to make 
some progress in rational debate is by evaluating a particular standpoint in its own terms 
and showing whether or not it is adequate in terms of its own standards. Later on in the 
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same book he further clarifies this point by adding that the superiority of any one moral 
standpoint (A) over another (B) might be vindicated if it is shown that the internal problems 
and predicaments within B are better explained, articulated, and even resolved by A than 
can be done by B itself. 
MacIntyre identifies three rival paradigms of moral inquiry, which are also rival 
modes or models of rationality, each finding its canonical expression in a 19
th
 century text -
- the encyclopedia as embodied in the Ninth Edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica, 
genealogy as embodied in Nietzsche‘s Genealogy of Morals, and the encyclical letter of 
Pope Leo XIII, Aeterni Patris. 
Among these rival traditions, the encyclopedic attitude stands out with its unitary 
conception of substantive rationality and ahistorical rationalism. The unity of truth and 
reason; synthesis, unilinear progress toward, and convergence on a universal truth; and 
reliance on the ‗scientific treatise‘ as the proper literary medium of scholarly expression are 
the fundamental features of this attitude. As a corollary to these, it depends on a strongly 
drawn distinction between truth-from-a-point-of-view and truth-as-such. When it comes to 
ethics, all these features of the encyclopedic approach lead to a conception in which moral 
life is seen in relation to a set of notions like duty, obligation, and rights; a conception 
providing an ethical standpoint deemed superior to pre-Enlightenment conceptions by 
rational justification. Although it was a particular standpoint, the encyclopedic vision 
regarded it as universally valid and applicable to all societies and traditions. 
On the other hand, the genealogist subverts all the principal claims of the 
encyclopedia. According to the former, which is represented by the line of authors from 
Nietzsche through Foucault to Deleuze and Guattari, all claims to truth are expressions of 
the will to power disguised under the banner of truth. Truth is in fact not a possibility, and 
all one can aspire to is a multiplicity of perspectives which discloses the covert dimension 
of truth talk. Accordingly, genealogy aims at deciphering the relative character of truth and 
thus adopts ‗aphorism‘ as the principal literary style. In ethics, the genealogical approach 
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targets the same notions (duty, virtue, obligation, truth) endorsed by the encyclopedist in 
order to subvert them and uncover the concealed formations of willfulness in them. The 
genealogist deliberately plays with perspectives, avoids commitment to any one of them, 
and multiplies perspectives and subject positions in order to lay bare the perspectival 
character of truth, expose the ―false pretensions of reason‖ and highlight the fictive nature 
of the self. 
Among these two rival and incommensurable perspectives, MacIntyre treats the latter 
more thoroughly, because he considers the encyclopedist‘s vision as discredited today even 
in terms of its own standards (continual progress in rationality, human and social 
perfection, and resolution of moral issues and disagreements among rational persons). 
Although higher education and contemporary scholarly practices are still maintained along 
encyclopedic lines, the encyclopedic approach proved untenable as an account of our moral 
and, more generally, philosophical condition. However, the genealogist still constitutes a 
challenge and a genuinely rival standpoint that needs to be engaged. MacIntyre develops an 
interesting critique of the genealogical view by asking, for instance, who the genealogist is 
addressing in his or her book. In the encounter between the reader and the writer, there 
emerges a timeless and atemporal now in which the activity of reading/encountering the 
text occurs and the ideas of the genealogist are addressed and communicated to an 
audience. But this must be an atemporal now in which the ideas or arguments of the 
genealogist must take effect and be intelligible on the basis of standards of reason-giving 
and reference available to the audience. What MacIntyre tries to indicate with this 
observation is that a tacit, unacknowledged metaphysics is at work here. MacIntyre admits 
that the genealogist could respond by saying that even such a tacit metaphysics could be 
affirmed as a transient position to be later discarded. But, then, in all these transient 
positions or perspectives the genealogist must still presuppose a continuing self hidden 
behind and continuing through time beneath all these streams of perspective. As a corollary 
to this, the genealogist cannot help but depend on a narrative of success and failure to make 
sense of his or her unmasking odyssey. Also, if the genealogist is addressing anyone, he or 
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she must presuppose at least the selves of the reader and the writer for such an encounter to 
be possible in the first place. Thus, the genealogist as author must appeal to certain 
continuities that hinder his or her principal claims. In the end, the genealogist cannot 
remain loyal to the requirements of his or her own standpoint and this is one way to show 
how a moral-philosophical standpoint might fail in terms of its own standards. 
According to MacIntyre, despite their differences and incompatibilities, the 
genealogical and encyclopedic approaches share one point: both consider the history (of 
philosophy) as continuous. In one case it is a continuous movement from ignorance and 
superstition toward progress and in the other it is a continuing body of pretensions to 
universality and objectivity. For MacIntyre, however, there is another possibility, which is 
to attend to the rupture separating post-Cartesian philosophy from the line of thinkers 
between Socrates and Aquinas. Such an understanding of the history of philosophy brings 
us to the third vision of inquiry, which is superior to the others: the tradition-guided rational 
inquiry exemplified by Thomism.  
As indicated above, all three inquiries explored in MacIntyre's book are alternative 
forms of rationality supplying rival moral standpoints. Whereas the encyclopedist 
conceives of rationality as impersonal, universal, and disinterested, the genealogist deems it 
an unwitting representative of particular interests despite false pretensions to neutrality and 
disinterestedness. Tradition, or the Thomist tradition, on the other hand, holds that reason 
can achieve true universality and impersonality insofar as it is neither neutral nor 
disinterested. Here ―membership in a particular type of moral community, one from which 
fundamental dissent has to be excluded, is a condition for genuinely rational enquiry.‖ This 
means that, although it may sound paradoxical, ―a prior commitment is required.‖ Moral 
and intellectual virtues are needed for initiation into the philosophical community. Hence 
the requirement of self-knowledge and self-transformation. 
‗Tradition‘ considers philosophy as a ‗craft‘ and recognizes a master-apprentice sort 
of relationship as valid for philosophy, as it is for other crafts. The authority of tradition is 
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represented by its proficient members. This is a crucial point because, by recourse to such a 
notion, which MacIntyre worked out in his previous books around the notion of practice, he 
articulates a number of central dimensions in his (traditional, Thomistic) account: 
temporality or historical situatedness, authority, tradition-guided or embedded rationality, 
and membership in a particular moral community. 
In his affirmation of the concept of tradition MacIntyre joins other scholars, like 
Gadamer, who challenge philosophical perspectives that place reason in contrast to 
tradition. Traditions are the custodians of rationality and rationality figures only within 
traditions. But, as I noted above, tradition here does not signify the steady unfolding of a 
substance. On the contrary, MacIntyre identifies at least three moments or situations a 
tradition might face in its development and in its encounter with other traditions. There are 
debates and conflicts of interpretation ‗within‘ a single tradition; there are rivalries and 
disputes ‗between‘ different or rival traditions; and there are sometimes ‗epistemological 
crises‘ a tradition might undergo as a result of the first two sorts of situation.35 And when a 
tradition falls in an epistemological crisis there are two ways to cope with it: conceptual 
innovation or acknowledging the superiority of another tradition. If, instead of these, a 
tradition attempts to hide behind epistemic barriers or contrive ways of domesticating 
challenges, it self-destructs or at least remains stagnant.                 
Any tradition then needs to meet the challenges of emergent conditions and rival 
traditions. Depending on its capacity to deal with these conditions, a tradition might 
progress, fragment, or breakdown. This also means that some of the problems we detected 
in relation to MacIntyre‘s conception of practices seem to be addressed at the level of 
tradition, because rival traditions provide for each other an external standpoint and 
challenge against which they have to check or even rework themselves. The internal goods 
of a practice might be challenged by the external viewpoint provided by the moral and 
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intellectual resources of another tradition. The renewal of a practice might issue from its 
engagement with other traditions.  
In MacIntyre‘s conception of tradition there has been a subtle yet important shift 
which needs to be noted. Although in After Virtue tradition was more of a moral 
characteristic, in later works MacIntyre started to foreground its intellectualist aspects, as 
can be seen in his focus on ‗inquiry,‘ or traditions of inquiry, and their rational vindication 
and superiority against one another. Parallel to this subtle shift MacIntyre started to expend 
a great deal of energy in this vindication endeavor. In elaborating his conception of 
tradition (or traditions of inquiry) MacIntyre gets his bearings from the history and 
philosophy of science, especially from figures like Kuhn and Lakatos. His notion of 
‗traditions of inquiry‘ sounds rather like Lakatos‘s ‗research programs.‘ Therefore, as 
Porter explains, MacIntyre‘s portrayal of traditions and their relations seems more plausible 
in the case of scientific traditions than in the moral domain.36 More crucially, I think, this 
creates a certain dissonance with our moral situation today, with our multiply situated 
character. In this regard I find Gadamer‘s more dialogical conception of tradition and 
Taylor‘s attempts, informed by the former‘s hermeneutics, to retrieve and conceptualize 
what he calls the Herder-Humboldt line much more promising.37 The main concern for the 
latter is not the rational superiority of one tradition over another, but mutually 
transformative learning processes, which are somewhat subdued in MacIntyre‘s sweeping 
concerns with rational validation and the comparative superiority of traditions. 
We are multiply situated and we draw implicitly or explicitly upon the intellectual 
and moral horizons these sites provide for us. Among these horizons we might at times or 
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in general find some of them more central to our self-understanding or more illuminating 
for our aspirations. We might even aspire to reach the fullest possible purchase on them to 
get our bearings and commit ourselves to one. Or, perhaps more modestly, we might strive 
to achieve what Taylor would call a more clairvoyant state of self-understanding in the face 
of the various ethical-existential conflicts of modernity. Still, in most cases our situation as 
embroiled in them does not neatly fit the picture of streamlined traditions vying for our 
espousal. The merit of MacIntyre‘s view is that he regards the inability to belong to a 
tradition on the part of individuals both as a pervasive feature of our contemporary social 
existence and as bent on conformism to dominant practices and conceptions, and this could 
be taken as an invitation to a more reflexive attitude to one‘s attachments.38 Against the 
rising tides of conformism and uniformity, attempts at recapturing alternative traditions and 
world views by engaging in serious inquiry into their intellectual and moral resources are 
invaluable. But it seems to me that, although MacInytre restores an awareness of finitude in 
relation to practices, narratives, and traditions, he misses it in its life-worldly density. His 
interpretations at some points reveal not the picture of a moral self, but the image of an 
intellectual historian at work.39                       
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4.7. Virtue and Freedom of a Dependent Rational Animal 
 
MacIntyre‘s opus from the beginning emphasized rationality as it is embodied in 
practices and traditions which are also, as we have already seen, contexts of coherence for 
the fruition of the virtues. And although we detected a number of puzzles in his turn to 
Thomistic natural law despite his initial avoidance of Aristotle‘s metaphysical biology, the 
general thrust of his thinking did not show any retreat from taking up the question of the 
virtues in terms of social teleology and the three novel elements he partly implants in, and 
partly draws out of, Aristotelian ethics and politics: practices, narratives, and tradition. 
And, also as we noted before, this overall thrust takes on a more intellectualist meta-
concern with rational rivalry between and validation of traditions. However, in a 
comparatively slender recent treatise one may observe a major reorientation in his thinking. 
Now alongside practices and rationality MacIntyre incorporates two more themes or 
concerns into his virtue-ethical perspective: human dependency and human animality, 
which together constitute two definitive aspects of human existence and the solid 
background to the coming into existence of ―independent practical reasoners.‖ Becoming 
an independent practical reasoner is, in turn, a chief human good; in fact, it is the key 
course of human flourishing.  
Most philosophers, both today and in the past, have taken as the focus of their moral 
thinking fully adult members of the human species. In a sense, they offer us various forms 
of an ethics of self-sufficiency, of which rationality has been the master feature. Various 
forms of human dependency, from infancy to old age, and our primordial (human) 
animality, and thus certain basic commonalities between human beings and other intelligent 
animals (dolphins are MacIntyre‘s principal protagonist here), on the other hand, have not 
received sufficient attention in this literature. But MacIntyre now argues that any moral 
theory will be lacking in important respects if it does not take these aspects of human 
existence into account. But what purpose does it serve to bring human animality and 
113 
 
dependency into relief? Where does it lead us to orientate ethical awareness in the direction 
of dependency and animality? How are the virtues and freedom served by such an 
orientation? 
MacIntyre ranges over a number of commonalities between humans and higher, or 
intelligent, animals. One feature common to all biological species is that their telos is 
flourishing, albeit a flourishing in ways characteristic of the life-form of each species. A 
second property intelligent animals share with humans is their capacity to have ‗reasons for 
actions‘ and, even more, to discriminate between varying reasons for action. And a third is 
the capacity observed in higher animals to participate in cooperative activities and achieve 
common goods. MacIntyre argues that much contemporary philosophy has lost any view of 
such commonality or has at least fallen short of making it a special concern due to an 
excessive separation between humans and non-human animals on the basis of human 
linguistic abilities. In a sense, MacIntyre is criticizing the linguistic turn of contemporary 
philosophy on this score. The linguistic orientation in philosophy suppressed non-linguistic 
forms or aspects of intelligent activity that are quite common among higher animals. It 
should be noted that here MacIntyre does not deny the importance of differences between 
―language-possessing and non-language-possessing animals,‖ but evaluates the pervasive 
―cultural influence of a picture of human nature according to which we are animals and in 
addition something else‖ and ―we have … first an animal nature, and in addition a second 
distinctively human nature,‖40 as obscuring significant continuities between humans and 
intelligent non-human animals. Now in this part of the debate MacIntyre engages a fairly 
intricate range of issues bearing on questions in ethology, biology, and developmental 
psychology, and one might still wonder what is served by pinpointing the continuity 
between humans and other higher animals the way MacIntyre does. As far as I can tell, the 
aim here is to get a purchase on the developmental and biological roots and character of 
human flourishing, which is partly due of a bodily-biological and developmental character 
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that is forever open to various sorts of affliction, fragility, and, in general, vulnerability. But 
this is not the terminus of MacIntyre‘s account, which comes only after the implications of 
this generalized vulnerability for human dependency are drawn. In MacIntyre‘s full account 
vulnerability and dependency figure as two anthropological constants with which a viable 
ethico-political perspective must come to grips.  
Now, since Macintyre identifies becoming an ‗independent practical reasoner‘ as the 
chief human good, this good needs to be construed against this background of vulnerability 
and dependency. This state of human maturity and agency develops against and in the face 
of many actual or possible afflictions against which, in turn, we need some fundamental, 
and even continuous, care and responsiveness from others -- first from our families and 
loved ones but later, as we grow up and become full members of various relational 
networks of human association, from more collective formations, such as whole 
communities. The kind of care and responsiveness we need and receive during infancy and 
in the family (or in parent-child relations) signify the unconditional character of some 
ethical relations and demands. The nature of parental relations does not rest on reciprocity 
in giving and receiving and constitutes a prime example of generosity. But this relationship 
of generosity is directed at some more specific ethical achievements. What we gradually 
acquire in any such relation of care is the capacity to represent and evaluate the goods at 
which we aim, to conceive the contours, not of a mere life, but of a good life. At first, we 
are susceptible to our felt or immediate needs and desires. But we gradually leave this 
infantile state through the acquisition of a more discriminating evaluative capacity in the 
face of our needs and desires. We become capable of conceiving and evaluating our 
‗reasons for action‘ as good or bad. And, in the end, if the process goes unimpeded by some 
grave affliction, we become competent or full practical reasoners capable of representing to 
ourselves not only reasons for action, but wider ranges of goods and concerns. We acquire, 
following Taylor, ―rich human languages of qualitative distinction.‖  
Now, this course of self-development from infant susceptibility to immediacy to 
competency in practical reasoning is heavily dependent upon the care and generosity we 
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receive from others. But, crucially, even becoming an independent practical reasoner does 
not eclipse our fundamental human dependency, but carries it into a more complicated 
plane. Becoming an independent practical reasoner is not an all-or-nothing matter. It is 
rather a matter of degrees, because even as competent adult agents we are liable to various 
inadequacies, frailties, confusions, predicaments, and deficiencies. Against these troubles 
we need help, criticism, or warning from our friends and others who can shed some light 
even on what our own good requires, attesting to the fact that no one can be the sole or 
ultimate authority on one‘s own good. But even this talk of deficiencies and vulnerabilities 
does not capture the full import of MacIntyre‘s notion of dependency here, because there 
are forms of dependency which are the result of old age, disabilities, or grave suffering, 
physical or mental, to which any competent human agent is always or perhaps ultimately 
prone. This means that there are certain sorts of relationships ―without which we cannot 
become independent practical reasoners‖ or ―be sustained as independent practical 
reasoners.‖ These social relationships provide for us arenas of ethical learning, a form of 
learning which includes acquisition of a range of virtues, moral and intellectual. Our 
transition from infantile immediacy (of needs and desires) to a more reflective-evaluative 
state or, in MacIntyre‘s words, our ―move from dependence on the reasoning powers of 
others … to independence in our practical reasoning,‖ happens through the transformation 
and redirection of our desires toward a richer grasp of our own good. MacIntyre‘s example 
here is the virtue of temperance, the virtue related to bodily pleasures and needs by which 
we refrain from our immediate needs and desires, or follow them in a proper degree, in 
view of a fuller or higher good we seek. So this stage of our self-development as 
independent practical reasoners involves a cardinal virtue, which is a member of the family 
of the ―virtues of independence.‖ Also, these transformations occur in ordinary human 
social settings and in ordinary activities, some of which have the characteristics of a 
practice as discussed above. But this leads us again to the conclusion that there are virtues 
without which, in turn, these practices and social relationships cannot be maintained in a 
sound way. The example this time is truthfulness, the possessor of which is accountable, 
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reliable, and confidential, qualities which are indispensable for the maintenance of an array 
of practices and shared deliberation and, therefore, common goods.                  
However, these cardinal virtues required and more or less achieved during our 
journey to independent agency should not divert our attention away from an even more 
cardinal virtue in relation to which the whole question of dependency-vulnerability 
becomes truly intelligible. This is the virtue of generosity. In MacIntyre‘s account, the 
world of independent practical reasoners rises on the shoulders of a network of human 
relations of receiving and giving structured by generosity. In fact, generosity, or, in his new 
formulation, just generosity, mentioned in a previous chapter, figures as the hinge virtue 
enlivening human relations and associations. It is just generosity because it is conscious of 
a prior and even continuing dependence on care and regard by others, or of ―uncalculated 
giving‖ by others; and hence it is a ―virtue of acknowledged dependence.‖ It is nourished 
by a sensitivity to human misfortunes, deformities, and infirmities which may come upon 
us at any time. Just generosity entails that the kind of receiving and giving going on in 
these relationships cannot be captured by the usual understanding of justice or generosity 
alone. As MacIntyre says, 
In order to become independent practical reasoners, we needed from our 
parents, teachers, and others a kind of care that was not conditional on the 
expectation that we would render them some service in return. Moreover the 
people to whom we owe assistance when we have become independent adults 
may be people who never have done and never will do anything for us. So a 
certain generosity beyond justice is required if justice is to be done.41 
What I find especially pertinent for my concerns is MacIntyre‘s portrayal of the 
situated and gradual formation of what he calls independence in practical reasoning out of 
an ensemble of relations of giving and receiving and against a background of actual and 
potential weaknesses, needs, and vulnerabilities. In this slow process of self-formation, 
acquisition of the virtues plays a key role in the shaping of such independence in practical 
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reasoning; an independence which is always partial and correlated with other dependencies 
and vulnerabilities. MacIntyre calls such virtues the virtues of independence. What this 
suggests is that achieving some measure of independence is always a matter of character 
formation in accordance with the virtues. In other words, independence is achieved against 
and in relation to an aretaic background. They are the virtues that guide us to independence. 
To translate this into my terms, freedom starts to inhabit us and is nourished through our 
acquisition of the virtues. Freedom is an achievement that rests on ethical self-
transformation in an engaged openness to the demands of the world.  
Here ‗independence‘ or freedom seems also to be placed beyond the usual alluring 
dichotomies, like egoism-altruism and autonomy-heteronomy. In regard to the first, 
MacIntyre is quite explicit. One crucial implication he draws out of his picture of networks 
of giving and receiving is the irrelevance of a distinction like egoism-altruism. Relations of 
just generosity explode any such dichotomy because they rest on an understanding 
according to which the good of each is achievable only in relation to and through the 
contribution of others. The notion of just generosity as beyond altruism and egoism seems 
to be informed by Aristotle‘s conception of friendship, in which, Aristotle says, self-love 
and other-love are in balance. Though inattentive to human dependency in general, 
Aristotle‘s conception of friendship is still rich and relevant in this context, and MacIntyre 
at one point even stresses the need to extend the hand of generosity to the stranger, which is 
a novel emphasis in MacIntyre.  
Before turning to what sort of politics this perspective leads us to I must note a 
number of other important changes, some methodological and others more substantive, in 
MacIntyre‘s thinking here. The most important change is MacIntyre‘s turn to human nature 
as biologically construed, given his earlier indictment of inquiries into ethics focusing on 
―man qua animal.‖42 But this should not be taken as a simple reversal of emphasis from 
social teleology to metaphysical biology, because both here are in some degree fused. 
                                                          
42
 MacIntyre, After Virtue, pp. 150-51. 
118 
 
Human flourishing is construed in terms both of our biological and psychological 
development and of our participation in social relations, practices and activities.  In terms 
of broader philosophical currents, MacIntyre‘s attempt to renaturalize ethics by offering an 
―in some sense … naturalistic account of good‖ seems to me in line with the search for a 
non-reductive naturalism in ethics that can be observed among a variety of theorists today.43 
MacIntyre is now in a terrain beyond ―natural law without nature.‖ But this time, and 
despite his statements to the contrary, the role of Thomistic natural law in his account, 
which is now heavily dependent on current work in disciplines like ethology and biology, 
seems to be installed as an appendix. Also, MacIntyre‘s concern with human vulnerability 
and dependency finds counterparts in approaches ranging from the ethics of care to 
philosophical perspectives thematizing questions like ‗luck‘ and ‗capabilities‘ in ethics and 
to philosophies highlighting human finitude and mortality as central guideposts for ethics 
today – all draw on the ethical implications of human vulnerability and dependency in 
some form. MacIntyre‘s interest in these questions brought about some negative 
revaluations regarding Aristotle‘s thought. When it comes to vulnerability and dependency, 
MacIntyre now finds Aristotle‘s thought terribly defective, as can particularly be seen in 
the latter‘s view regarding magnanimity (or greatness of soul), a virtue that, as construed by 
Aristotle, counteracts any acknowledgment of dependency, vulnerability, or receiving from 
others.       
            
4.8. Post-statist Politics of Local Community 
 
 MacIntyre sees modernity through images of fragmentation and decline. In fact, he 
could be considered more of a decline theorist than a transformation theorist, if we may 
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make such a distinction. And his dramatic portrayals of moral fragmentation recall 
Adorno‘s image of the ―wrong life‖ in which ethics figures only as a ―melancholy science.‖ 
MacIntyre‘s images of the modern ―moral wilderness‖ and moral Babel, together with his 
depiction of modern ethics as simulacra of morality, are no less dramatic in tone. But, 
unlike Adorno, who considers staying at the level of minima moralia to be the only viable 
attitude in the midst of a wrong life, MacIntyre initiates the recovery of a Thomistic 
Aristotelianism, a kind of magna moralia, in tension with other moral perspectives. One 
may still wonder how, after such a colossal fragmentation of ethical life, we could ever find 
any ground or resource to start again. Likewise, which site could be exempt from such a 
cataclysm so as to render its inhabitants able to detect its effects, and does this not entail an 
epistemic privilege there?44 Today, images akin to that of the ‗wrong life‘ lead some 
theorists to the denial of any possibility of normative political theory, of any site exempt 
from such a life.45 Where does MacIntyre lead us to politically in this Babel, then?                 
MacIntyre‘s assessment of modern forms of politics extends his ethical strictures to the 
realm of politics. Modern politics is civil war by other means. It is dominated by elite 
competition over and through the goods of effectiveness, and therefore it needs to be 
resisted from the standpoint of the tradition of the virtues. What should immediately be 
obvious from such a characterization is that MacIntyre construes sound politics in terms of 
‗practice,‘ a practice that is, like most others today, under the sway of institutions. More 
specifically, the very institutions (or the way of institutionalization) of modern politics, 
particularly the nation-state and its bureaucracy, repress the practice-character of politics 
and enervates the internal goods of political practice under the sway of money, status, 
efficiency, and power. So, given the concrete communal character of practices, does 
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MacIntyre‘s position reveal a communitarian standpoint? This is the usual label attributed 
to him, along with a host of other political thinkers today, and, given that After Virtue‘s 
conclusion was a plea for the coming of a new St. Benedict, the father of monastic life, to 
guide us in our dark age, his views may rightly be considered a form of communitarian 
politics. But, on the other hand, he has at every opportunity opposed such a characterization 
of his standpoint and offered reasons for this denial. First of all, he admits that communities 
are always open to corruption; and, therefore, secondly, community per se is not the 
normative ideal he espouses; thirdly, for MacIntyre communitarianism represents the 
mistake of infusing ―the politics of the state with the values and modes of participation in 
local community.‖ But this means that he affirms modes of local community to the extent 
that they shed or are free of statist qualities. This is why I think MacIntyre‘s political theory 
may be described as a ‗sophisticated communitarianism‘46   or a post-statist politics of local 
community. According to MacIntyre, the level at which politics can be maintained as a 
practice is the level of the local community. Despite the fact that it provides the most solid 
and initial bond of generosity, the family is naturally limited in providing an arena and 
instilling certain capacities required for the formation of a broader perspective for the 
evaluation of our good as social beings. But the state, on the other hand, is a leviathan 
cursed by its own massive body to exhaust genuine political practice. Despairing deeply of 
the state‘s political agency, MacIntyre emphasizes that the small is beautiful even in 
politics. Certainly no one today can see state as the bearer of rationality. The state at present 
is disenchanted. But celebrating local communities against the state amounts to something 
like dissolving Hegelian holism and mediation into one of its constitutive moments, which 
would not be to the benefit of any one of them. Some socio-economic and political 
concerns can only be dealt with at a supra-communal level; and, just like MacIntyre‘s 
traditions, communities would arguably flourish more in an environment of openness to 
challenges and questioning which would render the cultivation of potentialities and 
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reciprocal disclosure possible. Also, in our global moment, any retreat back to communities 
would probably be a futile undertaking. What we need is perhaps to preserve mediations 
between levels below and above the state. In this respect, MacIntyre‘s recent overtures to 
the stranger seem promising indeed. 
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CHAPTER 5 
RETRIEVING THE GOOD WITH TAYLOR 
 
 
Retrieving goodness for our late modern times constitutes a prime challenge 
confronting political thinking today. The reference to late modernity here is not a haphazard 
one. Characterized by profound ruptures and transformations, ours is a time of endings and 
beginnings, arrivals and departures, usually represented in the self-images of the age by the 
notorious prefix -post: postmodernism, post-humanism, postindustrial, etc. Not only in 
terms of political upheavals and turbulence, but also in terms of intellectual currents and 
tendencies, our times invite, and maybe necessitate, works of retrieval in various domains 
of life: retrieving solidarity after fragmentation, equity and justice after exploitation, 
recognition after denial, authenticity after alienation, fullness after disenchantment, and 
―retrieval of the good after normativity.‖1  
The idea of the good has always been one of the seminal ideas in the history of ethics 
and politics. In Plato the idea of the good, or agathon, constitutes the hinge point of a great 
metaphysical edifice. The idea of the good is at the summit of the hierarchy of ideas, it is 
the highest idea, and it is ―the source not only of the intelligibility of what can be 
understood, but also of its being and essence‖ (Republic, 509B 6-8). Aristotle pushes this 
idea toward a more teleological rendition. He famously opens his Nicomachean Ethics with 
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the postulation that ―every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is 
thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be 
that at which all things aim.‖ 
Putting the question this way, however -- that is, approaching the issue from the 
notorious distinction between the Platonic and the Aristotelian conceptions of the good -- 
might readily lead us into deeper metaphysical quandaries concerning the idea of the good. 
Although it has for some time now been commonplace to pit Aristotle against Plato in this 
domain, the very idea itself has usually seemed somewhat elusive in terms of its 
epistemological and ethico-political implications.  Pointing out how futile and far it would 
be from ―the path of authentic questioning‖ to try to get a ―propositional explanation‖ of 
this idea, Heidegger contends, 
 One straightaway wants to know what the good is, just like one wants to know 
the shortest route to the market place. … This does not mean, however, that the 
idea of the good is a ‗mystery,‘ i.e. something one arrives at only through 
hidden techniques and practices, perhaps through some kind of enigmatic 
faculty of intuition, a sixth sense or something of the kind.2   
The precise character of the idea of the good has been highly contentious among 
philosophers, making its implications for ethics and politics likewise controversial. For 
some, again like Heidegger, the idea had no bearing at all for ethics3; whereas, somewhat 
parting from his mentor, Gadamer devoted some of his most interesting studies to the 
clarification, or even the rescue, of the ethico-political, or more generally the practical, 
import of the same idea.  
Now all of this talk of the good might sound excessively metaphysical for our late 
modern ears. We are, in fact, very distant from a Platonic understanding of the good. Yet, 
even in our times there have started to emerge qualified witnesses, from Iris Murdoch to 
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Levinas, to the powerful pull of the good in our ethical life, despite its metaphysical echoes. 
Still, they all know how difficult it is to give the idea of the good some of its past grandeur 
given the philosophical Zeitgeist, and how arduous a task it is to initiate some work of 
retrieval in this domain. In characterizing post-Kantian moral philosophy, Murdoch states, 
―The idea of the good remains indefinable and empty so that human choice may fill it. The 
sovereign moral concept is freedom.‖4     
Among contemporary attempts at retrieving the idea of the good or the good life, 
Charles Taylor‘s oeuvre stands out as a prolific initiative. In a number of places, Taylor 
offers his own interpretation of the fall of the Platonic way of thinking about the good. 
Although the overall structure of the model maintained its dominance throughout the 
ancient period, it underwent some major transformations under recurring reappraisals from 
Aristotle through the Hellenistic thinkers to Descartes, where the model ultimately 
undergoes what Taylor calls an ―internalization‖ process. The model of Platonic self-
mastery is maintained, but its cosmic moorings are broken; and the whole idea of mastering 
the self and achieving the right ordering of the soul is interiorized.5 Here it should be noted 
that Taylor in general wants to preserve some of the insights of this Platonic model, 
especially its transcendentalist bent, to which we shall later return. More important for our 
purposes, however, is his explication of the good in relation to the self.  
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5.1. Phenomenological Ways to the Good 
              
Most of Taylor‘s work devoted to the place of the good in our moral and political life 
and its relation to our sense of selfhood is of a phenomenological, or, more properly, a 
hermeneutic phenomenological character. What he offers is, as he says, a 
―phenomenological account of identity.‖6 The promise of moral phenomenology is to grasp 
the human being as a moral agent in its concrete wholeness. This is why most thinkers who 
aimed at transcending the characteristically Kantian focus on the determination of the pure 
rationality of moral maxims or the utilitarian appeal to uncovering the utility function of 
moral acts make recourse to phenomenology in order to capture human moral being in its 
entirety and as it is given to experience. Despite his ultimate concern with and stress on 
discursive validation and communicative instantiation of moral insights, even Habermas 
concedes that our primary access to the moral domain can only be thematized via a 
phenomenology of morals, that is, with a focus on our ordinary life praxis and our 
experiential life-worldly encounters. He writes, ―As long as moral philosophy concerns 
itself with clarifying the everyday intuitions into which we are socialized, it must be able to 
adopt, at least virtually, the attitude of someone who participates in the communicative 
practice of everyday life.‖7 To this extent, ―the moral philosopher must take up a vantage 
point from which he can perceive moral phenomena as moral phenomena‖ and ―in a 
performative attitude.‖8 But Habermas‘s interest in the phenomenology of morals is of a 
transitory bent, something like an intermediary moment in order to move toward more 
justificatory levels of moral thinking. In congruence with this deeper motive he takes his 
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7
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Consciousness and Communicative Action, trans. C. Lenhardt and S. W. Nicholson (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
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8
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bearings from what he calls a ―linguistic phenomenology of ethical consciousness‖9 as it is 
elaborated by Strawson, primarily in his article ―Freedom and Resentment.‖ His initial 
acknowledgment of the role of moral phenomenology as our primary means of access to 
the moral realm then lends itself to a stronger and broader concern for distilling the ―moral 
core‖10 of ordinary moral experiences along formal pragmatic lines. Habermas‘s 
reconstructive energy is, therefore, poured more into the discursive validity of norms of 
action rather than disclosure of morals in the first place.  
However, notwithstanding the above characterization of his project as sort of a 
linguistic variant of phenomenology, Strawson‘s work is emphatic on the role of moral 
feelings, emotions, and intuitions as they arise in our daily encounters, especially the 
feelings of resentment, gratitude, and forgiveness. In trying to make clear ―what it is 
actually like to be involved in ordinary interpersonal relationships,‖ Strawson stresses the 
importance of ―the mere manifestation of attitude and intention‖ as the source of ―gratitude, 
resentment, forgiveness, love, and hurt feelings.‖ As he states, 
How much we actually mind, how much it matters to us, whether the actions of 
other people—and particularly of some other people—reflect attitudes towards 
us of goodwill, affection, or esteem on the one hand or contempt, indifference, 
or malevolence on the other. If someone treads on my hand accidentally, while 
trying to help me, the pain may be no less acute than if he treads on it in 
contemptuous disregard of my existence or with a malevolent wish to injure 
me. But I shall generally feel in the second case a kind and degree of 
resentment that I shall not feel in the first. If someone‘s actions help me to 
some benefit I desire, then I am benefited in any case; but if he intended them 
so to benefit me because of his general goodwill towards me, I shall reasonably 
feel a gratitude which I should not feel at all if the benefit was an incidental 
consequence, unintended or even regretted by him, of some plan of action with 
a different aim.11  
                                                          
9
 Habermas, ―Discourse Ethics‖, p. 45. Emphasis is mine. 
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 Habermas, ―Discourse Ethics‖, p. 48. 
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5.2. The Way through Emotions in Moral Phenomenology 
 
What is emphasized in general here is the way in which these emotions color our 
engaged experiences of morals, and how they inflect interpersonal relations and the moral 
flow of life. In one of the earliest works devoted specifically to moral phenomenology, 
Mandelbaum raises similar concerns regarding the emotional import of interpersonal 
situations. Although Mandelbaum is ultimately concerned with moral consciousness as it is 
expressed ―chiefly in moral judgments‖, his starting point also seems to be the emotionally 
saturated character of moral encounter and experience. He says, ―I sense the embarrassment 
of a person, and then turn the conversation; I see a child in danger and catch hold of its 
hand; I hear a crash and become alert to help.‖12  
All these observations attest to the significance of intuitions and feelings in morals. 
This is astonishing in itself given the inferior or at best secondary status ascribed to 
emotions and feelings in most traditional moralities. Feelings, emotions, and above all 
passions were usually held to be the dark realm of man that morality, powered by the light 
of reason, was to dispel. According to Solomon, ―This is the mistake of so many traditional 
theories: they take emotions at their worst and most irrational and reason at its best, usually 
as corrective to emotions.‖13 But beyond moral theories, even our ordinary way of talking 
about emotions usually seems subject to the imagery of a ―hydraulic metaphor‖ that 
portrays emotions as ―fluid forces, pushing their way up through the psyche, accumulating, 
and eventually bursting through.‖14 These observations help Solomon to identify more 
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specifically why feelings and emotions are treated with such disdain in many traditional 
moral theories, despite some more sympathetic reception in modern times, as in the so-
called ‗moral sense school,‘ represented initially by Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, and further 
elaborated by Hume and Adam Smith into a general theory of ‗moral sentiments.' With 
reference to Kant, who is held accountable for the greatest harm perpetrated against the role 
of emotions in ethics, Solomon detects eight allegations against emotions. Emotions are 
ineffable, too personal, not amenable to judgment, subjective, irrational, and capricious, 
concern only the particular as opposed to the universal, and, lastly, are not amenable to 
command.15 When it comes to ethics, then, emotions are not regarded as relevant. But is 
this a sound conclusion?16 The whole enterprise of phenomenology, especially its offshoots 
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and the particular constitute some sort of priority in a given situation, yielding to universal principles is the 
greatest injustice. And, lastly, against the ‗no command thesis‘, Solomon argues that maybe we cannot, 
strictly speaking, ‗command‘ emotions, but we hold people responsible for their emotions, we criticize, reflect 
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toward ethics, comprises various sophisticated attempts at vindicating not only the 
relevance but also the centrality of emotions. But how can emotions be rescued from such 
colossal attacks and why would such a rescue operation be significant?  
In moral phenomenology emotions are seen as more or less reliable guides to the 
moral domain. Much depends, however, on the way one treats emotions in relation to our 
being-ethical, whether it be with an existential phenomenological or ontological approach 
or more of a merely descriptive (phenomenological) elucidation of moral feelings. Plainly 
put, in keeping with its founding motto, ―to the things themselves,‖ phenomenology deems 
appearances important. This is because, although one might err in one‘s perception or 
conception of something, one is most sure about its appearance to oneself, to one‘s 
consciousness. But the stress on consciousness here still keeps us in the grip of only a 
particular manner in which the phenomenology of morals is pursued. It remains within the 
realm of cognition, of a cognitivist account of moral experience. Now, the way values, or, 
in Kriegel‘s words, ―axiological objects,‖ appear to oneself is primarily through emotions 
and affects.17 This was the way, for instance, Max Scheler established his point of departure 
for moral phenomenology and his peculiar ‗ethics of value.‘ Emotional experiences convey 
value-feelings to us. They are felt valuations and ―values and valuables appear to us most 
faithfully and lucidly in emotional experience.‖18 This insight was partly due to Scheler‘s 
relatively free style of phenomenology, which prioritizes core intuitions over 
methodological scruples.19 Emotions, in this regard, are not, in Scheler‘s words, ―blind 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
on, and cultivate emotions. Solomon‘s overall argument is ultimately that emotions are the basis of our more 
elaborate moral notions, including, and especially our sense of justice.  
17
 Uriah Kriegel, ―Moral Phenomenology: Foundational Issues,‖ Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 
Volume 7, Number 1 / March, 2008, p. 3. 
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 Manfred S. Frings, ―Scheler‖, in Simon Critchley and William R. Schroeder (eds.), A Companion to 
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feelings,‖20 but are the very texture of our world-awareness. Scheler‘s philosophical 
approach points to a different manner in which moral phenomenology can be pursued. This 
whole style of thinking opens a path in which it becomes quite conceivable to see affects 
and affectivity as a sort of proto-ethics.21   
 
5.3. Taylor’s Moral Phenomenology 
 
Taylor‘s moral phenomenology gets its bearings from similar considerations. 
Feelings are not just ―brute sensations,‖ but are rather ―affectively charged perceptions of 
the natural world that surrounds us.‖22 More specifically, though, what is the nature of our 
emotional experiences? Can emotional experiences be made subject to an objective 
analysis? If not, can they be categorized with what are called secondary qualities, for 
instance? Can we understand them as only an aspect of our human sensibility and, 
therefore, not part of the makeup of the universe?  
Now, for some of our immediate feelings a quasi-objectivist account might seem 
quite plausible -- physical pain or physical fear, for instance. A physiological or objective 
analysis of pain or fear might capture a great deal of what is involved in these immediate 
feelings, although even in such cases ―the kind and mode of feeling them is by no means 
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 Max Scheler, Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values: A New Attempt Toward the 
Foundation of an Ethical Personalism (Northwestern University Press, 1973), p. 255. The context where 
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yet determined.‖ There are changing facts involved when I 'suffer,' 'endure,' 'tolerate,' or 
even 'enjoy' 'pain.'23 An objective account of physical pain or fear could be attempted, 
though at the risk of a reductive analysis. Taylor gives as an example the relative adequacy 
of medical language to describe our situation ―when we are physically afraid‖ in cases in 
which we feel ―menace to life and limb‖ -- when, for instance, ―a tiger is prowling in the 
garden, or a hostile mob seems about to attack.‖ Such cases seem amenable to description 
in objective terms. What is feared could be described as ―injury which will cause severe 
pain, or malfunction of our limbs or organs, or death.‖24 We can even imagine a machine 
with receptors identifying relevant causal factors as dangerous and registering them as 
inputs so as to recognize the fearsome situation, because the reconstruction of the fearsome 
state in (medically) objective terms, as in the above example, presumes a causal and 
probabilistic process in menacing situations, and thus allows a mechanistic analogy, 
comprising ―a complete structural analogue of fear‖.25               
But most of our characteristically human emotions would make such accounts seem 
terribly facile and simplistic. Anxiety, especially ―unfocussed anxiety,‖ when there is, 
strictly speaking, no explicit or objective causal determination, or shame, when the 
shameful cannot be indexed, again, to strictly causal properties, would defy objective 
accounts of the kind mentioned above. Taylor pays particular attention to the feeling of 
shame, when, in Nietzsche‘s words, ―the feeling ‗I am the mid-point of the world!‘ arises 
very strongly … dazzled as though by a great eye which gazes upon us and through us from 
all sides.‖26 That in certain cases what arouses this feeling might be identified as an ‗object 
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of shame,‘ such as a ―shrill voice‖ or ―effeminate hands,‖ may mislead us into falling back 
on naïve objectivism again. But on closer inspection it becomes clear that these properties 
can only be objects of shame in a context in which they are expressive of certain meanings 
and where their relevant implications embody particular significances. A shrill voice and 
effeminate hands, for instance, might be thought to indicate a lack of manliness, strength, 
and self-possession, and thus be taken as contrary to all that could be considered as part of 
human dignity in a given cultural horizon.27 This is why shame is also associated with what 
is called ‗double intentionality,‘28 meaning that our feeling of shame is not just an 
(intentional) act on our part, but it is also a feeling in the face of others, as the intentional 
locus of others. Shame is usually shame in our being with others or, in Taylor‘s words, in 
our being ―a presence among others.‖29 Consequently, the character of our emotional 
experiences involves more than what an objectivist account can offer. There is a surplus 
that cannot be neatly captured by objective terms. The being of the shameful requires more 
than a causal nexus; it requires an agent capable of experiencing a certain range of feelings, 
such as shame, and experiencing them as correlates of some further or deeper meanings, 
such as dignity, honor, or autonomy. The contrast with the fearsome or the menacing 
situation is clear. In the menacing situation, the whole condition might be described in 
terms of the probability of an attack and of grievous physical harm arising from that attack. 
The physical harm can, in turn, be described in medical or physiological terms. But in the 
shameful situation a deeper level is opened up, a level which can only be comprehended in 
terms of characteristically human meanings. Without these meanings, without a whole 
network of human significances, the shameful in most cases cannot make sense. Thus, 
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emotional experiences require a form of life embodying these meanings in human 
interaction, practices, and even human institutions. 
But maybe we are being too hasty. Before approaching the threshold of an account 
with reference to a form of life, we need to further clarify emotional experiences to see 
their peculiarly human significance more clearly. In order to unpack these unique aspects 
Taylor refers to what he calls the ‗imports‘ that situations bear and emotions bestow on us. 
So far we have established that what emotions register are not, strictly speaking, causes. 
Emotional experiences are not reducible to stimulus-response processes. They are not 
merely responsive to causality. But they are nevertheless entwined around situations. They 
betray what is involved in situations and they originate as correlates of situations. In a sense 
they register the sense of the situation. For Taylor, an import is what an emotional 
experience discloses to us in relation to a situation. In the case of anxiety, for instance, 
where there is no object or focus openly corresponding to the feeling, this very ―inability to 
find a focus is itself an aspect of my sense of my situation.‖ Even though the locus of my 
feeling is not open to a straightforward characterization, it is still not ―objectless 
simpliciter‖; it rather incorporates my sense of my situation, such as the sense of an 
impending threat. So, if we follow the example, when I am in the grip of anxiety, the 
import of my situation is the sense of an impending threat. But this emotion-import-
situation pattern can be observed in most of our characteristically human emotions, which 
are experienced as involving a certain property, such as being humiliating, shameful, 
ominous, exhilarating, prideful, or blissful.30 
In all these delicate descriptions regarding a variety of human emotions and feelings, 
the chief task is to elucidate the experiential character of human emotions. All these 
feelings and their imports, according to Taylor, are subject-referring. That is, they entail a 
subject of emotions, as we emphasized above. This is why in a further clarification of the 
term import Taylor speaks of it as ―a way in which something can be relevant or of 
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importance to the desires or purposes or aspirations or feelings of a subject.‖31 However, 
they are at the same time experience-dependent. They cannot be isolated into, or reduced 
to, categorical units such as subject and object, or cause and effect, but they are correlates 
of a complex relational pattern, a network of meanings. The relation is one of relevance or 
significance, not causality. Imports are thus inside and outside; they are both in our 
experience, but at the same time out in the event of the experience. Of course, experiences 
are concrete; concrete human beings experience concrete situations as imbued with 
emotionally-charged meanings, or, imports. But the concrete here should be taken in the 
existential sense of the term. 
What ultimately emerges here is, in Solomon‘s words, ―a unitary phenomenon‖ that 
is not reducible to an emotion-object bifurcation. This emphasis is important because it also 
challenges attempts to understand emotions in intentional terms. Emotions are not just 
experiences of emotionally intending objects. There is no one-way street here. ―An emotion 
defines its object, just as the object defines the emotion.‖32 Hence, again, neither mere 
intentionality nor mere causality will quite capture the depth of emotional experiences.                                             
 
5.4. Heideggerian Background 
 
By this point it should have become apparent that Taylor is not just dealing with 
phenomenological elucidation, but also striving to uncover some of the deeper, ontological 
vectors of human being as they emerge in characteristically human situations of affect. 
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Here the Heideggerian background to this strategy of approaching depth 
phenomenologically is fairly clear. Indeed, Heideggerian mood analysis constitutes the 
paradigm here. The phenomenological investigation of moods occupies a decisive place in 
Heidegger‘s existential analytic of Dasein, in revealing the ―existential constitution of the 
there,‖ and in uncovering the ‗facticity‘ of everyday Dasein. The word Heidegger originally 
uses in his analysis of moods is Befindlichkeit. Sometimes this is translated as ‗state-of-
mind‘ or disposition, but most commentators, and the translators themselves, point to the 
inadequacy, or even the possibly distorting effects, of this phrase, suggesting instead that 
the German term means ―more literally, the state in which one may be found.‖33 Neither a 
mental, nor a psychological connotation is, however, primarily intended here. The 
phenomenon of moods is scrutinized, in Heidegger‘s words, ―as a fundamental 
existentiale,‖ and what are thematized are, thus, fundamental ontological structures as they 
are disclosed in our moods. Our ordinary states of affect are important for the implicit 
ontology they reveal. More terminologically, our ontic affective experiences are important 
for their ontological overtones. So much so that, according to Heidegger, ―the possibilities 
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of disclosure which belong to cognition reach far too short a way compared with the 
primordial disclosure belonging to moods.‖34  
But what is disclosed in moods? The first is the very fact that we are always in some 
mood. Even in our seemingly most indifferent or apathetic states, we are likely in the grip 
of one mood or another, possibly boredom or anxiety. Even in our most detached stances 
toward the world, such as in the scientific investigation of nature or some phenomena, we 
are in a scientific, that is, exploratory, inquisitive, or curious mood.35 And oftentimes our 
constantly ―moodwise‖ condition is best betrayed while we are struggling to flee a certain 
mood. A good mood can deteriorate into a bad one, and while a certain mood discloses the 
burdensome character of Being, another mood, ―a mood of elation,‖ might dissipate this 
burdensome character. But by this very act of dissipation, it once again indicates the 
burdensome character of Being as an (affective) possibility; it reinstates its other. But then 
again, what is disclosed thereby? The fact that we are always ―mooded‖ 36 and ―never free 
of moods‖37 discloses the ‗thrown‘ character of our existence or, simply, our ―thrownness.‖ 
This is because in a mood ―Dasein is always brought before itself, and has always found 
itself … in the sense of finding itself in the mood that it has,‖ and ―as an entity which has 
been delivered over to its Being.‖38 That we find ourselves in moods, or that, somewhat 
paradoxically, we are given to ourselves in moods, signifies our always already thrown 
existence. 
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Affectivity or moods are disclosive also in that they reveal the world in such a way 
that entities in or aspects of it matter to us in certain ways. What matters to us, does so due 
to our moods. In other words, affectivity is the way in which things, situations, and people 
matter to us. As Heidegger says, ―A mood assails us.‖39 And in varying situations and 
contexts varying moods assail us. In the wilderness in the dark, for instance, any strange 
voice or occurrence, anything blocking our way or vision, might seem – and might make 
our environment seem – uncanny, worrisome, or disturbing. But when we are in the 
laboratory, things will not matter to us this way. Voices, sights, or obstacles will not strike 
us as threatening, at least not in the above sense. Presumably we will not be absorbed by 
feelings of the uncanny. But then we will be immersed in a different mood, in the mood of 
scientific curiosity, perhaps, seeking objective explanations of obstacles in our way. Moods 
assail and predispose us toward the world even in the absence of any specifiable object. 
Things can affect us this way or that only because we are already immersed in a certain 
mood. This is to say that moods disclose various ways in which things can matter to us. 
Mattering is ―grounded in one‘s state-of-mind; and as a state-of-mind it has already 
disclosed the world – as something by which it can be threatened, for instance. Only 
something which is in the state-of-mind of fearing (or fearlessness) can discover that what 
is environmentally ready-to-hand is threatening.‖40 Moods are states in which we find 
ourselves in a range of concerns, where things matter to us in varying ways. They unveil a 
whole context of significance within which we find ourselves already concerned with a 
variety of matters, practical or personal. And some moods are especially ontologically 
revealing, such as anxiety, melancholy, despair. This is why these moods in particular have 
attracted so much attention in the existentialist and phenomenological literature. 
Now this whole analysis of moods by Heidegger guides us toward an understanding 
of the always already exposed character of our being, or Dasein‘s primordial openness to 
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the world. Moods signify our affective openness and exposure to the world. This is why 
Heidegger describes moods as our ―disclosive submission to the world.‖41 This insight, 
having its roots in the phenomenological notion of intentionality, now denotes a more 
radical, ontological characteristic of human being. Heidegger, in contrast to Husserl, seeks 
to distill the pre-reflective or pre-cognitive overtones of moods, rather than seeing them as 
intentional. Husserlian intentionality was certainly fruitful in the way of revealing the 
engaged character of Dasein, or the primordial connection of man and world; yet Husserl‘s 
construal of emotions as intentional acts toward values was still some distance from 
covering the pre-reflective, non-intentional depth of moods, which Heidegger embraced as 
central in his explorations.42 But the same difference can also be seen as a broadening or 
deepening of intentionality. If, following Schrag, we take the major thrust of Heidegger‘s 
analysis as an attempt at uncovering our ―pre-cognitive relatedness to a world of existential 
concerns,‖ then what we have is an ―existentialized and historicized‖ intentionality.43 On 
the other hand, one should not fail to notice that Heidegger‘s emphasis on Dasein‘s world-
openness is not a pretext to dissolve man in moods. On the contrary, he affirms that volition 
and cognition might, and maybe should, have the upper hand ―in certain possible ways of 
existing,‖ and that ―Dasein can, should, and must, through knowledge and will, become 
master of its moods.‖ But this is no denial of the ontological primordiality of moods, ―in 
which Dasein is disclosed to itself prior to all cognition or volition, and beyond their range 
of disclosure.‖44              
This Heideggerian background provides the main impetus behind the accent on the 
inadequacy of understanding emotional experiences in terms of the subject-object 
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dichotomy. In fact, Heidegger emphasizes this point a number of times in his analysis of 
moods. Falling into the grip of a certain mood is not like ―coming across a physical 
condition.‖ But neither is it ―related to the psychical in the first instance.‖ It is ―not itself an 
inner condition which then reaches forth in an enigmatical way and puts its mark on things 
and persons.‖ ―It comes neither from outside, nor from inside.‖ Or, to use Heidegger‘s 
particular terminology, the facticity disclosed through moods is not to be confused with the 
factuality of things present-at-hand. In moods what is distinctive is not the perception of 
anything, not even perception of ourselves, but that we are brought before ourselves, we 
already find ourselves. We are already engrossed in a field of concerns. All these make 
subjectivist as well as objectivist points of departure deficient in the analysis of moods. In 
Hatab‘s felicitous phrases, moods are modes of ―emergent ambience,‖ or of ―ambient 
attunement,‖ rendering conscious, subjective control, or objectivist detachment impotent.45 
Hence, returning to the above question as to why we should attempt to rescue emotions 
from philosophical oblivion or condescension, we may answer that our emotions, 
affectivity, or moods are part of our world-engagement and they help reveal our primordial 
insertion into a life-world. They indeed have some potential to counteract subjectivist or 
anthropocentric leanings in ethics and politics because they reveal that the king of modern 
philosophy, the subject, is not in fact naked, but emotionally clad.  
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5.5. Engaged Agency 
 
This exposed character of Dasein, this ―original exposure into the vastness of beings 
and the depth of being,‖46 has been taken in varying directions in post-Heideggerian 
literature. We are condemned to be free, if you ask Sartre.47 If you ask Merleau-Ponty, on 
the other hand, we are condemned to meaning. Taylor takes the second route, that of 
meaning. We are exposed to a horizon of meanings, a background of significances, or a 
semantic space. As is clear, Taylor‘s way of putting the matter is somewhat free of 
Heidegger‘s more dramatic tone. The former sketches the portrait of an ‗engaged agency,‘ 
whereas the latter insists on the thrown character of Dasein. Nevertheless, the Heideggerian 
substrata are evident here. What is especially important, however, is that Taylor fields 
Heideggerian insights in the service of a nuanced moral thinking, something Heidegger 
himself never explicitly attempted. In his analysis of emotions and in the conclusions he 
reaches, Taylor's thought revolves around Heideggerian mood analysis, but he co-opts 
some of the central motifs of the existential analytic for his particular ethico-political 
purposes by integrating other philosophical (re)sources; foremost among them being 
Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty, at least among 20
th
 century thinkers. This venture to 
develop phenomenological insights toward ethics has been one of Taylor‘s most distinctive 
contributions. As Taylor recognizes and explains, engaged agency is agency in a space of 
meanings. But Taylor does not leave the matter here and goes further: this space is also a 
moral space. But how is that possible? How is the space of meanings we are in also a moral 
space?  
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In order to see the connection here some further dimensions of the ‗emotion-import-
situation‘ pattern need to be unpacked, particularly the  linguistic dimension where in 
which our ‗moral feelings‘ are articulated. But first a recapitulation;: sometimes the appeal 
of objectivism induces us to think that one needs to getdo away with feelings in order to 
attain a clear grasp of the a given situation one encounters. But in fact emotions carry the 
import of the situation to us. Emotions are situationally imbued. Rather than impeding 
intelligibility or clarity regarding situations, emotions clear reveal the way situations 
happen as events of human involvement. In other words, the primary mode of the 
manifestation of morals in situations is through emotions. This surely does not exhaust all 
our moral engagement. There is also a more rational, maybe somewhat post-emotional 
plane where we are in what is called ‗the space of reasons,‘ where argumentation, 
deliberation, and exchange of reasons predominate. But the problem arises when we 
ontologize this space backwards at the expense of the emotional level by seeing the latter as 
only obstructive, when it is in fact more originary.         
Above it has been shown that imports are what moods or emotions disclose to us 
regarding situations. Now, in some cases feelings and emotions might be relatively direct 
and straightforward; that is, they can be expressed in a relatively direct or straightforward 
way. We might describe an action or an attitude referring to our desires, our immediate 
wants and intentions or, in Taylor‘s terms, by referring to our desired consummations: I am 
hungry, I am tired, or I‘d like a taste of that. But in many other cases, such direct and 
straightforward characterization of our feelings or the sense of our motives would be too 
weak, or too inadequate, to bear the weight of the emotion we have, to meet the import of 
the context, or to describe the predicament in the situation we face. In these instances we 
need some finer description, a richer vocabulary, to catch the import of the situation. They 
require better and finer articulation because, as emphasized before, these are instances 
when we are in affective awareness of characteristically human meanings, like shame, 
indignation, or self-esteem. Some emotions, imports, and motives cannot be characterized 
merely with reference to our immediate desires and needs, but require reference to emotion 
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terms which can in turn be meaningful only in connection with other similar terms. For 
instance, the question, ―Why is this situation shameful?‖ cannot be answered without 
having recourse to terms very similar to shame in tone and tenor: base, dishonorable, 
degrading, cheat, liar, coward, fraud.48 Therefore, our emotion language, especially when it 
requires finer articulation than a bare reference to immediate desires, constitutes an 
interlocking series of terms of moral import. What is more, however, is that this vocabulary 
needs some further distinctions so as to make sense at all. For instance, without a presumed 
distinction between what is right and what is wrong, remorse would not be open to me as a 
feeling. Taylor notes, ―Some understanding of right/wrong is built into remorse, is essential 
to its attributing the import that it does.‖ Similarly, in the case of shame, we need worthy 
and unworthy as terms of distinction.49 That some moods assail us is possible only because 
we are already permeable to them, and our vocabulary of emotions and morals is already 
implicated in these moods.           
The whole point here could also be connected to Taylor‘s elaboration on H. 
Frankfurt‘s distinction between first-order and second-order desires. First-order desires are 
usually our immediate desires that we partly share with other species. We get thirsty, 
hungry, cold, etc. and as a result we desire food, drink, and warmth. These are examples of 
first-order desires, which are not necessarily peculiar to our species. Second-order desires, 
on the other hand, are desires we form on other desires; that is, they are desires on desires, 
in the sense that they evaluate other desires. For Frankfurt, and also Taylor, this is a human 
distinction,, separating our species from others. But this does not mean that only human 
beings choose between desires or between different objects of desire. This is certainly not 
the case, and there are species that choose between desires in the animal kingdom. What is 
distinctive in our species is that we evaluate desires; we evaluate, judge, and mark some 
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desires as truly desirable and others not truly desirable. This evaluative capacity belongs to 
us humans. This kind of ―reflective self-evaluation‖ is a human peculiarity.50               
Taylor embraces this distinction, yet refines it some more. Put this way, the 
distinction captures only a little of how human agency differs from that of other species. 
What we encounter in humans is not only the capacity for second-order desires, but also the 
capacity for qualitative evaluation between desires, where what is evaluated are not just 
desires, but in essence the motives underlying given desires. We do not merely choose 
between desires; we also evaluate the why of our desires, and in this way we appraise the 
quality of our motivation as noble or base, virtuous or vicious, or higher or lower. 
Sometimes I ―refrain from acting on a given motive – say, spite, or envy – because I 
consider it base or unworthy.‖51   This level of evaluation seems only partially thematized 
by the distinction between first and second-order desires. To put his refined adoption of 
Frankfurt‘s distinction into sharper profile Taylor proposes a further distinction: weak 
versus strong evaluation. It is only when we evaluate the relative worth of given desires or 
the quality of our motivation that we are evaluating strongly, according to Taylor; 
otherwise, we are weak evaluators, or ―simple weighers‖52 between alternatives. Between 
the two ways of evaluation, the ―desirability characterization‖53 constitutes a major 
difference. In weak evaluation, I am either choosing between different desires or courses of 
action, or trying to come up with the maximum consummation by combining several; and 
accordingly, the clash of desires in weak evaluation is of the nature of ―contingent 
incompatibility.‖54 In strong evaluation, on the other hand, incompatibility arises not merely 
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out of contingent reasons but on a quasi-categorical basis; I am discriminating between 
motives as to their worth, and this kind of discrimination is even connected to modes of life 
one may admire or dislike. Thus, in cases of strong evaluation sometimes even the kind of 
person one would like to be, or the kind of life one would like to live, are at stake. This is 
because what we evaluate as higher or lower, virtuous or vicious, profound or superficial, 
clairvoyant or blind, integrating or fragmenting among our motives is better grasped when 
construed in relation to corresponding evaluations of the qualitative merit of different 
modes of life, such as noble or base, alienated or free, saintly or merely human, fragmented 
or integrated. In strong evaluation we are evaluating within a very broad range of concerns, 
where sometimes even the whole point of our lives is at stake. In other words, in strong 
evaluation we are on the brink of eudaimonistic self-questioning, in which the 
distinctiveness of our being human comes to light.  
What is important at this point, however, is that this broad range of concerns, or this 
eudaimonistic level of interrogation, requires a rich evaluative vocabulary that we do not 
necessarily need in weak evaluation. This is indeed noticeable in all the characterizations 
above regarding the qualitative evaluation of motives and modes of life. Only by putting 
these evaluations within a range of qualitative distinctions, or qualitative contrasts 
(noble/base, virtuous/vicious, etc.), are we able to articulate the point of the evaluation we 
do. These articulations are ―contrast articulations,‖ inviting a language of evaluative 
distinctions. A rich background of qualitative distinctions shows up when we strive to 
articulate our basic attitudes to life.     
    
5.6. Engaged Agency and the Good 
 
Now we can bring together the different threads of the argument. As emphasized 
before, emotions and our emotion vocabulary comprise terms of distinction such as 
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right/wrong or worthy/unworthy, especially when the import of the situation or the motive 
underlying our reaction cannot adequately be characterized by a bare reference to our 
immediate feelings and desires. But this is better observed when we are engaged in a strong 
evaluation, which characteristically requires some finer distinctions, a finer vocabulary, 
and, thus, a vocabulary of qualitative distinctions of worth, which can in toto give us a 
picture of a life worth living, or the good life. Here a complex of connections surfaces all 
the way from a phenomenological elucidation of moral feelings to visions of the good or 
the good life. How the good is given to experience, how the good in a variety of ways 
shows up or is concealed in our moral experience, how it becomes manifest (to us) through 
our linguistically articulated emotion vocabulary, and in our engaged (mode of) openness to 
situations, encounters, and experiences, is clarified little by little. Emotions open us to 
situations bearing certain imports, which are intelligible only through a linguistically 
mediated and articulated vocabulary of feelings. And what these articulations provide are 
terms of distinction (or qualitative contrasts) wherein our visions of the good become more 
or less, that is, more or less articulately, manifest. We are condemned to meaning, adrift in 
a sea of meanings, but these meanings are of an axiological nature, bearing or permeated 
with distinctions of worth, which are ultimately structured by the good.  
We began with emotional experiences. This was a good starting point because, as 
Taylor writes, ―we can have no dispassionate awareness of the human good‖55 and ―part of 
being good is opening ourselves to certain feelings.‖56 Emotional experiences led us to 
certain distinctions, distinctions of worth. This is the point where we can see how, in 
White‘s words, ―our capacity for ethical discrimination in its broadest sense is entwined 
with feeling or sentiment.‖57 And in the end we recognized that a constellation of these 
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terms of ethical discrimination, in turn, can highlight a more general notion of the good, or 
the good life, pervading our judgments, practices, and transactions, implicitly or sometimes 
explicitly.         
As I interpret him, Taylor argues that if we are sufficiently pressed to articulate what 
is involved in our judgments, actions, reactions, evaluations, and practices, we cannot help 
referring ultimately to some overriding or overarching figure as the good. Various 
constellations of contrastive characterizations culminate in a more comprehensive 
figuration of the good, gathering in a single idea all our aspirations, all our sublime striving. 
Not just ancient philosophies, wisdom literature, and religion, but also most of our 
characteristically modern perspectives on ethics and the human predicament, like 
Kantianism, utilitarianism, and even atheism, are in essence large-scale or comprehensive 
philosophical articulations of such figures of the good.  
At one point Taylor states that our articulated, or interpreted, feelings ―ascribe a form 
to what matters to us.‖58 In a similar manner he seems to suggest that the good (or 
hypergoods and constitutive goods) ascribe a form to what matters to us. What matters to 
us in its broadest implications takes on a form with reference to the good for us. The good 
makes us see all our concerns and efforts under a common light. This idea could be 
connected to a partial Platonism on Taylor‘s side or, better put, to his quasi-Platonic 
retrieval of the alethic potency of the good. Just as Plato conceives the idea of the good as 
rendering all other ideas and corresponding realities visible and understandable, in a similar 
manner the good we embrace and adhere to makes all our ideals, struggles, hopes, and 
disappointments clear, understandable, and inspiring. But it is critical to note here that for 
Taylor the term ‗good,‘ and even ―the strong good,‖ refers to a fairly broad range of values, 
―meaning whatever is picked out as incomparably higher in a qualitative distinction.‖ He 
explains: ―It can be some action, or motive, or style of life, which is seen as qualitatively 
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superior. ‗Good‘ is used here in a highly general sense, designating anything considered 
valuable, worthy, admirable, of whatever kind or category.‖59  
Invoking the good in relation to the self as a constitutive dimension of selfhood is in 
effect a way of highlighting the motivational core of ethical agency and experience. As 
Habermas puts it, taking a leaf from Apel, ―Why be moral?‖ is the central question posed 
here.60 Prior to any reflective purchase on or rational-formal instantiation of moral ideals, 
how is ethical obligation experienced, formed, and felt in the first place? The sources of our 
readiness to respond to ethical demands, or our responsiveness, response ability, are the 
primary concern here. In other words, the question is what sort of agentic formation one 
needs to undergo to become motivationally equipped to respond to relevant demands, to 
feel obligated in relevant situations, and to maintain ethically upright self-conduct. In 
Taylor‘s account, the strong values guiding our strong evaluations or our practical 
reasoning in general constitute not only the alethic background, but also the motivational 
footing of our ethical life.61 But in congruence with the classical understanding of the 
matter the ethical here needs to be taken in a broader sense, including the political as well, 
particularly because the motivational requirements of political agency and commitment are 
as relevant a topic today as the motivational base of the ethical.  
Detecting a certain nihilism abounding in all sorts of contemporary political 
approaches, S. Critchley explores the possibility of ethico-political commitment, and comes 
to fairly similar conclusions regarding the structure of ethical subjectivity. The structure of 
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ethical experience, on Critchley‘s view, conforms to a circular pattern of demand and 
approval, a pattern which in turn represents the constitutive relation between the self and 
the good. What is meant by ethical experience here is the dawn of ethical commitment on 
the basis of an approval by the self in the face of a demand. The relation is circular because 
although the demand one faces and is strongly touched by is not rooted in the self, its 
dawning, or more properly, its disclosure, is dependent on approval on the part of the self. 
The very possibility of ethico-political commitment, then, hinges on such a strong approval 
in the face of a demand, whereby one binds oneself to the good disclosed in the demand 
and shapes oneself accordingly, to such an extent that it is possible to argue that ―the good 
founds the self.‖62 In a manner similar to Taylor, Critchley thinks of a very broad range of 
concerns or figures as possible, and some of them today actual, candidates for the 
designation 'the good,‘ such as the Platonic Good beyond Being, the Kantian moral law, the 
utilitarian greatest happiness of the greatest number, the Nietzschean eternal return, the 
Heideggerian call of conscience, and so on. This does not mean, however, that one might 
encounter a strong demand only in terms of such philosophical figurations. Rather, ordinary 
experiences are in many cases the root of the demand-approval dynamic and ethico-
political commitment.           
This account allows us to clarify one point in Taylor‘s notion of strong evaluation. 
The emphasis above on pre-reflective self-formation in view of the good demands some 
clarification on the idea of strong values and strong evaluation. Despite Taylor‘s engaged 
understanding of agency, this term seems to imply an evaluative stance on the part of the 
subject, as if the subject confers values on a valueless realm. But the point is just the 
contrary: the impossibility of unmediated selfhood exemplified in some egological 
perspectives is what Taylor is trying to establish in all his works. In this sense human 
agency is never radically evaluative, in the Sartrean sense of the term, for instance; that is, 
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never projecting values on an essentially valueless universe. Therefore, although the notion 
of strong evaluation seems to emphasize the role of human subjectivity in ethical 
orientation, it is crucial to see the non-anthropocentric intent here. What is disclosed, or 
what Taylor tries to uncover, in our experiences of strong evaluation is the pull and push of 
certain strong values upon us, their making a claim upon us and thus ordering or 
prefiguring our ethical orientation and responses. Rather than primarily signifying human 
subjectivity or evaluative capacity, strong evaluation puts forward the formative role of 
strong values for our very selfhood. In a sense, strong values are more central in this 
conception. 
Now, in a culture so thoroughly under the sway of subjectivist modes of 
understanding, this sort of ‗moral realism‘ counteracting value-projectivism might seem 
difficult to digest. But Taylor‘s attempt at distilling the good as pre-subjectively structuring 
our lived experiences is a variation on moral phenomenology‘s interest in the concrete 
character of moral values and the human goods we embrace, as it is first indicated, for 
instance, in Husserl‘s notion of ‗material a priori‘ of the human, grounding our notions of 
the good life.63 This makes our above reference to Scheler once again meaningful, because 
Scheler also made use of Husserlian phenomenology in his so-called ‗material ethics of 
value.‘ In particular, Scheler‘s take on the Husserlian notion of a ‗material a priori‘ sounds 
consonant with Taylor‘s idea of strong values, in the sense of referring us to a certain 
ontological realism with respect to certain characteristically human values and goods. Both 
use the insights of phenomenology for the purposes of distilling non-subjective values out 
of our 'core intuitions' experienced most intensely in certain emotions (Scheler), or out of 
our 'strong evaluations,' again best experienced in certain affective conditions (Taylor). 
Strong values are thus strong because of their motivational power and the power of 
their ontological status. They are strong values because they have a strong motivational 
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power in ordering our ordinary lives, our dealings with the world and with others. But they 
are strong values also because they are not just subjective projections onto a neutral world, 
but rather have some reality of their own. This last contention, which might seem the more 
controversial of the two, is in fact what a moral phenomenology of our practical existence 
would lead us to see. 
However, at this point we need to keep this comparison with Scheler in reasonable 
proportion; otherwise the Heideggerian background to Taylor‘s perspective stressed above 
may seem problematic. This is because, although Scheler in his analysis of our emotions or 
felt-valuations is usually seen as heralding Heidegger, one of the most forceful criticisms to 
Scheler‘s value-thinking came from Heidegger, despite the latter‘s otherwise admiring and 
receptive attitude toward the former. The main target of Heidegger‘s criticism has always 
been the subjectivizing bent of value-thinking, as he indicated when he wrote, ―Every 
valuing, even where it values positively, is a subjectivizing,‖ and, ―Precisely through the 
characterization of something as 'a value,' that something is robbed of its worth.‖64 In 
Heidegger‘s appraisal, despite his immense and admirable phenomenological efforts for 
substantiating an ethics purged of Kantian formalism and formalism in general, Scheler was 
ultimately unable to forgo this subjective leaning in value-thinking. Similarly, Gadamer 
criticized the material ethics of value due to its turning "the critique of idealism … into a 
metaphysical -- even Thomistic -- ontology of values,"65 which might in essence be seen     
almost as ―the flip side of a Kantian essentialism‖66; namely, its professed rival.     And 
although such an ethics was successful in foregrounding ―the substantive contents of 
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morality, [and] not just the reflective phenomenon of the reason that tests laws,‖, it was 
ultimately hostage to ―its methodological claim to intuit a priori systems of value.‖67               
Scheler‘s basically Husserlian conviction that intuition or introspection could deliver 
ethical essences was still over-involved in the transcendental outlook of an earlier 
phenomenology. Taylor is obviously quite distant from such an understanding. In a more 
Heideggerian vein, he strives to distill the good from our life-wordly encounters as engaged 
agents; engaged in a background of tacit meanings, an inter-subjectively shared semantic 
field, which Taylor also construes as a moral field (he tries to capture the same meanings 
with terms like strongly qualified horizons or frameworks of qualitative contrast). Having 
recourse to what he calls the "best account" we can give of our lived experiences of strong 
goods -- that is, their demand on us, their power and hold on us -- Taylor pursues his 
philosophical goals not from a transcendental vista, but from a level of concrete human 
engagement.68 Thus, he proposes phenomenology as our last resort and affirms hermeneutic 
circularity here. 
 
5.7. Engaged Agency and Freedom 
 
Now, a number of questions stand out regarding this complex of connections leading 
to a moral realism of strong values or goods embedded in a life-world, embodied in a form 
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of life, or reserved in a moral space of evaluation. If human agents are so embedded, so 
engaged and exposed, if our embedding in a background of qualitative distinctions 
structured by the good, or in a life-world, is so strong and deep, how are innovation, 
criticism, or, in the end, even freedom possible? Doesn‘t this picture of human agency 
imply a heteronomus structure? Are all goods we have or can have internal to our form of 
life? How is this phenomenologically elucidated presence of the good compatible with 
freedom? How is engaged agency a free agency?  
In fact, one way in which Taylor‘s overall account of human agency might seem 
heteronomous or fragile against claims in the name of autonomy is this moral realism 
underlain with his hermeneutic phenomenology. As engaged agents facing the claims of 
strong goods, which are sometimes or maybe oftentimes in the tacit background of our 
world-engagement waiting for articulation, we might seem somewhat locked in a 
heteronomus matrix of meanings, values, goods, and so on. This picture of human agency 
recalls what Taylor himself dubs the ―porous selves‖ of pre-modern times, what C. 
Guignon calls the ―extended selves‖ of pre-modern times, or what B. Parekh calls the 
―overlapping selves‖ of some non-Western cultures.69 As Taylor interprets it, the gradual 
shift from the porous selves of pre-modern times to what he calls the ―buffered selves‖ of 
modern societies could and in essence should be considered a gain in the name of human 
freedom and emancipation. The multiply embedded selves of pre-modern times were, in the 
face of some already established human purposes and ideals, undergirded by a whole 
cosmology with correspondences in the social-political realm. Porosity here was not just a 
matter of moral presence under the claim of some already set ideals and purposes. It was 
also due to human vulnerability or openness to various non- or extra-human influences, 
powers, cosmic forces, spirits, demons, or possession for instance. The buffered selves of 
the modern era, on the other hand, are in large measure closed to such forces, and they are 
                                                          
69
 Charles Taylor elaborates on this notion in his Modern Social Imaginaries (Duke University Press, 2004) 
and in A Secular Age. See also Charles Guignon‘s On Being Authentic (Routledge, 2004), p. 108; and Bhikhu 
Parekh‘s Rethinking Multiculturalism (Macmillan, 2000). 
153 
 
conceived as capable of disengaging from pre-given ends, norms, conventions, or even 
horizons. There is a much sharper line separating agents and forces. This is a deep change 
in sensibility, transforming our experience of the world and ourselves. Taylor explains that 
such individuals ―see themselves as agents who, through disengaged, disciplined action, 
can reform their own lives as well as the larger social order,‖ adding: ―They are buffered, 
disciplined selves. Free agency is central to their self-understanding.‖70 This Taylor 
recognizes and gives a certain place in his overall account of modern social concepts. 
Although it is sometimes felt as a profound loss of a certain type of world experience, or as 
a loss of openness to certain feelings or experiences that results in impoverished 
sensibilities, he acknowledges that the modern self-understanding sketched here expanded 
the range and repertoire of individual and collective action. But, then, how does it square 
with his thoroughly engaged agency, exposed to a semantic field already replete with 
concerns, meanings, and horizons of significance, sharing a form of life? In a conception in 
which man‘s being is characterized so strongly as engaged, or embedded in a background 
of meanings and concerns, how can autonomy be made sense of, let alone preserved?   
As mentioned before, Taylor seeks to uncover the goods and values orienting us in a 
moral space of inescapable questions, and seeks to do so from a non-subjectivist or non-
anthropocentric starting point. Indeed, the elaboration of an ethics without an 
anthropocentric perspective has been a major task assumed by a variety of thinkers writing 
on ethics in the post-Heideggerian literature. The task was first to make sense of our 
ethical-being-in-the-world, as Hatab puts it, or the being of the ethical self. Even Levinas‘s 
ethics of the face, for instance, can be seen in this category. Taylor partakes in this ongoing 
conversation, and in this regard he could be considered among the company of those whose 
fundamental question is, in Ricoeur‘s words, ―what type of being human freedom must 
have in order for phenomena such as decision-making and responsibility to be possible.‖ 
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Their concern, then, is ―the ontological investigation of ‗being free.‘‖71 Accordingly, Taylor 
affirms critical agency and freedom, but on the condition that they are held as life-worldly 
achievements.  
Such a concern with non-anthropocentric ethics and interest in an engaged or life-
worldly understanding of agency might in some cases lead to a radical questioning of 
autonomy as the basis of ethics and politics, or it might seem to justify such questioning. 
Following in the footsteps of Levinas, for instance, Critchley interrogates what he calls the 
―autonomy orthodoxy‖ springing mainly from Kant‘s ethics of autonomous self-legislation 
of moral maxims. As I understand Critchley, analyzing Kant‘s idea of the ‗fact of reason‘ 
and some recent neo-Kantian reworkings of this concept, he tries to unpack a residual 
heteronomy in the whole Kantian metaphysics of morals. The awe that I feel before the 
moral law within me, the respect that I feel as an a priori feeling before the authority of the 
moral law, the facticity of reason that is inevitable if pure reason can be practical and 
motivationally potent all point to ―a moment of rebellious heteronomy that troubles the 
sovereignty of autonomy.‖72 Although the maxims of moral action are autonomously 
legislated by the moral subject, they must have the properties of necessity and universality 
so as to attain the status and authority of a universal moral law. What is autonomously 
legislated here is already a universal law, a law in a kingdom of ends. But the heteronomy 
here is in a sense good heteronomy because it discloses the fundamental structure of ethical 
experience and selfhood and, in this way seems, to vindicate Critchley‘s portrayal of a 
circle of demand and approval referred to above. In other words, the demand-approval 
structure underlying ethical agency and commitment is vindicated even by the autonomy 
orthodoxy originating with Kant. Such vindication is then developed in fruitful ways to 
envisage an ethics of responsibility, as in the case of Levinas, for instance. What is more 
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important, however, is that if this account is accurate, then even freedom is grounded in 
heteronomy; it is heteronomously structured. ―Freedom is not justified by freedom.‖73                              
This is a perspective questioning the very legitimacy of a claim in the name of 
autonomy; questioning perhaps its overly presumed character, incontestable self-evidence, 
or even categorical status. At the heart of many of such perspectives is a deep concern with 
otherness, alterity, or difference, and this has indeed been a major concern for many 
political and philosophical thinkers today. S. K. White identifies ―responsibility to 
otherness‖ as the characteristic concern of much postmodern literature, distinguishing it 
from the characteristically modernist concern with ―responsibility to act.‖74 Responsibility 
to otherness appears to be one of two main outlooks characterizing political thinking today. 
Rather than agents‘ capacity and responsibility to act in justifiable ways, the priority is 
given to responsibility to otherness, to other-demanding concerns. But this already much 
amplified orientation started to make enormous changes in understandings of agency. Put 
differently, ‗responsibility to otherness‘ should not be seen as the other side of 
‗responsibility to act,‘ but as altering the way responsible agency or agency in general is 
conceived. Bennet‘s notion of ―distributive agency‖ might be a good case in point. Bennet 
proposes to see agency ―along an ontological continuum of beings, entities, and forces,‖ 
including in some sense even ―quirky electron flows‖ and electrical grids.75 Interestingly, 
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this once again evokes Taylor‘s notion of porous selves or, more properly, his illustration 
of an enchanted world where boundaries between agents and forces are fuzzy and forces 
have some agency of their own.  
It seems that once the emergence of a disengaged or buffered self and the attendant 
withdrawal of the porous self were held as achievements in the name of human mastery and 
autonomy. But in due time this idea has itself started to look somewhat dubious or 
contestable, or maybe like a mixed blessing. Subsequently philosophers started redirecting 
our attention to the engaged, if not so porous, character of human agency. Still, at one end 
of the spectrum ideas of agency akin to the image of a porous self started to appear again; 
distributing agency, as Bennet does, along a variety of ―agentic sites,‖ or a ―web of agentic 
capacities,‖ including not only (social) structures and non-human animals, but also 
inanimate entities and forces. But again what is more important for our purposes here 
comes into view when Bennet states that ―autonomy and strong responsibility seem to me 
to be empirically false, and thus their invocation seems tinged with injustice.‖76 For an 
understanding in which agency is conceived in so expansive a way, autonomy and 
responsibility, or their inherence in distinctively human capacities, and in the end even the 
possibility of imputation might begin to appear to be  flimsy notions. Although in all these 
accounts ‗responsibility to the other‘ or non-anthropocentric sites of agency and 
responsibility are explored in truly elegant ways, the whole case  sometimes seems to tread 
too much on the idea of responsible agency and its connection to autonomy. This could 
indeed be identified as a pervasive difficulty besetting anti-humanism in ethics and politics. 
As Dallmayr puts it,  
On the cognitive-epistemological level, the main peril of anti-subjectivist 
positions … is the proclivity toward objectivism: by downgrading individual 
reason and consciousness they tend to curtail the reflective capacity needed for 
the critique of knowledge claims. Similarly, in the moral domain, the stress on 
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preconscious or extra-human structures or contexts is prone to obscure the 
dimension of human autonomy and responsibility.
77
        
Perhaps it is better to see the predicament here as, on the one hand, acknowledging 
the merits of non-anthropocentrism or post-subjectivism in ethics and politics but, on the 
other hand, preserving the possibility of responsible agency. As it seems to me, regarding 
the question of ‗responsibility to the other,‘ Taylor does not think we have to renounce 
ontology to pave the way for an ethics of responsibility. Neither do we need to renounce 
ontology to see the ‗face of the other‘ and to assume responsibility, nor displace autonomy 
to be aware of the life-worldly, engaged character of freedom and its ontological 
underpinnings. The ontological elucidation of selfhood or responsible agency can be seen 
as a necessary dimension of responsibility to otherness or acknowledging alterity. Taylor 
elaborates at considerable length on how inter-subjective identity formation and the good 
are constitutively connected, especially in his analysis of human identity as dialogical and 
essentially formed in ―webs of interlocution.‖78 In a manner similar to Taylor, Ricoeur takes 
issue with Levinas‘ uncompromising stress on the other and the requirement of self-
divestment, and finds the latter‘s tenor ‗accusative‘: ―[It is] in the accusative mode alone 
that the self is enjoined.‖79 But hearing and responding to the other requires a self capable 
of reflection and good will. On the other hand, one may even cast some doubt on the ethical 
façade of alterity or otherness that is usually assumed. As Kearney reminds us in a number 
of places, alterity can also be a monster. Referencing Critchley‘s perceptive questions, such 
as ―Why is radical otherness goodness? Why is alterity ethical? Why is it not rather evil or 
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an-ethical or neutral?‖ Kearney challenges adherence to the ethics of alterity on its own 
terms.80 As Tracy reads him, the other ―might be a monster‖ and ―not to face this possibility 
could be … deadly.‖ Tracy adds, ―He shows us the need for some kind of criteria, 
especially ethical criteria, for assessing what shows up, what shows itself.‖81  
When it comes to enlarging the scope of agency, Taylor seems to me unwilling to 
abandon some distinctiveness or exceptionalism on the part of human agency. But this is at 
least with two critical provisos: first, the distinctiveness affirmed here does not quite 
conform to the more conventional models, where human rationality, mastery, responsibility 
and autonomy are affirmed against an empirical, objective frame, or a frame in which the 
self is ―buffered.‖ In Taylor, agency is affirmed from within a non-subjectivist account of 
human world-engagement, or as what is sometimes called ‗situated subjectivity.‘ Even the 
distinctively Merleau-Pontyean notion of ‗body intentionality‘ is incorporated into Taylor‘s 
engaged understanding of agency. Second, and maybe more important, however, are 
Taylor‘s strictures against the radical humanization of agency, or the exclusive 
humanization of agency; hence his label ―exclusive humanism‖ for a host of modern 
perspectives. It is here that Taylor seems in line with conceptions of non-human or extra-
human modes of agency. Yet what Taylor seems to recognize at most here are nature, as a 
deep ecologist, and God, as a theist. Bennet‘s horizon, on the other hand, disseminates 
agency even to electrical grids or technological entities. From Taylor‘s perspective this 
would probably seem to be yet another attempt at ‗ontic enchantment‘ of nature he 
criticizes  among a number of modern, post-Enlightenment currents of thought and most 
dramatically epitomized in Hegel‘s philosophy of Spirit.            
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5.8. Beyond Autonomy and Heteronomy? 
 
Taylor recognizes the force and legitimacy of autonomy as a modern ideal, and 
affirms it somehow. As it seems to me, however, what Taylor seeks to achieve is to shelter 
a space beyond autonomy and heteronomy, or to cover a ground where freedom will neither 
fall victim to vacuity, which might possibly arise out of aspirations for radical autonomy, 
which is what Taylor sees as the upshot of various modern philosophies, nor be captivated 
or assimilated by forces of heteronomy. In interpreting Taylor this way I get my bearings 
from Schrag‘s exegesis of Kierkegaard, particularly the latter‘s construal of conscience, 
envisioning the call of conscience and its authority over us as coming from somewhere 
beyond autonomy and heteronomy. As Schrag makes clear, for Kierkegaard ―heteronomy 
leads to legalism, autonomy to lawlessness, which is simply a reaction against legalism.‖ 
The voice of conscience is not giving me my own law, which is, again, a form of 
lawlessness. But it is not heteronomy, either, because the call of conscience does not come 
to us from prescriptions external to us. It is voiced both ―through‖ us as well as ―about‖ us. 
It is an experience in which autonomy and heteronomy are transcended. For Kierkegaard, 
one cannot achieve autonomy without some third factor moving one toward the search for 
autonomy in the first place. In Schrag‘s words, ―The weakness of an ethical autonomy is 
the lack of a compelling factor which arouses the self to its freedom in which it can become 
itself.‖82  
I see in Taylor‘s account of strong evaluation and the gist of his picture of human 
agency a similar structure. Strong evaluations ―involve discriminations of right or wrong, 
better or worse, higher or lower, which are not rendered valid by our own desires, 
inclinations, or choices, but rather stand independent of these and offer standards by which 
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they can be judged.‖83 It is we who do the evaluation, we who do the work of evaluation, 
but in such a way that we are thereby evaluated. Our work of evaluation is the way strong 
values evaluate us; we are in the grip of our self-evaluation. The nuance here could also be 
captured by relating the point to the analysis of moods and emotions above; the states in 
which we find ourselves and which are not completely or primarily under our control. 
Sometimes moral feelings inform us of situations and predicaments more than our 
deliberate judgments and estimations. This is most apparent in such perplexing or odd cases 
as when we feel shameful or guilty despite the absence of any clear challenge to our plain 
convictions about shame or guilt, that is, despite the fact that we think we shouldn‘t feel 
that way. This is why Heidegger underscores the way moods put us before ourselves. But 
the other way is also open; that is, there can be cases when we think we ought to feel 
shameful or guilty yet, perhaps to our own surprise, we do not actually feel that way.    
The reason his frame sometimes seems largely heteronomous is his transcendentalism 
of sorts; or better put, his transcendentalism regarding sources of fullness or moral sources. 
Taylor has indeed been accused of heteronomy, which in some versions was more of a 
theonomy. His frame was held to be completely heteronomous, and not friendly to what is 
sometimes called ‗immanent flourishing.‘ Taylor himself engages most of these debates. 
Ultimately it is a question of philosophical traditions, perspectives, or, maybe more deeply, 
―existential faiths,‖ as Connolly puts it.84 And it is true that neither a Levinasian in his/her 
thirst for alterity (for the wholly other), nor a Kantian in his/her commitment to autonomy 
would find Taylor‘s approach wholly satisfactory. Still, we need not settle for leaving or 
dissolving debate and dialogue by cataloging these differences as emanations of 
incommensurable philosophies. We could rather try to see how Taylor could embrace 
autonomy or freedom despite and together with his transcendentalism of sorts. Ideas of 
natural goodness, or Aristotelian naturalism in some of its forms, have always emphasized 
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man‘s natural capacities, possibilities, needs and limitations, appealing to a certain 
understanding of human nature. In some versions, this tends toward a more political 
formulation, as in the case of Nussbaum‘s idea of ―Aristotelian Social Democracy.‖ Taylor, 
although he would well agree with a general affirmation of human natural goodness or 
human goods as defined with reference to man‘s natural possibilities, would include a more 
diversified understanding of the good and affirmation of goods transcending the merely 
human; goods which are sometimes even in conflict with a merely mundane or ordinary 
attainment of life goods. More succinctly, goods cannot be confined to life goods alone. In 
such an enlargement of the idea of the good, Taylor‘s historico-philosophical reference is to 
our post-axial conceptions of human goodness. By post-axial Taylor refers to notions of 
human goodness that find realization of human potentials not merely in the pursuit of 
ordinary human desires and needs, but ‗also‘ in deeper human cravings and aspirations; 
aspirations to transcendence, to the extra-mundane, or cravings for the beyond of the intra-
cosmic. What is distinctive in these kinds of aspirations expressed in various post-axial 
religions, philosophies, and wisdom literature is that they might sometimes even require us 
to break free from our normal ways of human flourishing. In most cases they comprise an 
appeal to modes of human flourishing which might bring about misery or suffering in 
ordinary human terms. Dying on the cross or martyrdom are obvious cases in point. But 
such modes of human flourishing are not necessarily limited to religion; they appear also in 
patriotic acts, philanthropic struggles, and even green or deep ecological concerns. What is 
common to them all is an aspiration to some fullness or consummation beyond the merely 
human, or to a mode of human flourishing which cannot be exhausted in the immediacy of 
ordinary human life. As I see it, on Taylor‘s view in such orientation to transcendence our 
ethical horizons and eudaimonistic concerns see their broadest and deepest expression, 
because what he calls the ―transformation perspective‖ is best maintained and safeguarded 
under such an orientation. Even the ―affirmation of ordinary life,‖ to use Taylor‘s term of 
art signifying a pervasive sensibility in modernity, was in the beginning deeply connected 
to this dimension of transcendence. ―The striving to surpass ourselves,‖ says Taylor, ―can 
also be seen as essentially human. …And what is more, the transcendent can be seen as 
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endorsing or affirming the value of ordinary human attention and concern, as has 
undoubtedly been the case with the Judaeo-Christian tradition, with decisive consequences 
for our whole moral outlook.‖85 Thus, Taylor affirms transcendence in some sense and 
gives it a Platonic flavor. As Voegelin notes, ―Concerning the content of the Agathon [the 
good] nothing can be said at all. This is the fundamental insight of Platonic ethics. The 
transcendence of the Agathon makes immanent propositions concerning its content 
impossible.‖86 But this might also bring to mind I. Murdoch‘s perceptive remark that the 
emptiness of the good is usually held as a condition of the possibility of freedom. Although 
one can certainly not describe Taylor the hermeneuticist as subscribing to a notion like the 
emptiness of the good, his understanding of ‗articulation‘ as a never-ending process 
provides something similar for him. As Maeve Cooke tries to show, representations of the 
good society with a view of a transcendent ethical object, which can never fully or 
exhaustively be represented in language and thought, have both a disclosive and orienting 
capacity.87  
Now, to recapitulate, as I see it, Taylor seeks to give us a felicitous account of 
freedom as beyond radical autonomy and heteronomy. But the extent to which he succeeds 
at that is open to debate and the objective itself might seem indeterminate for many. 
According to Jean-Luc Nancy, for instance, ―What is undoubtedly one of the most 
significant of contemporary ethical investigations ... into the 'ideal of authenticity' is left as 
though hanging halfway between these two directions.‖88 But Taylor‘s ethics of authenticity 
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may indeed be seen as a nuanced account of his attempt at establishing a ground beyond 
autonomy and heteronomy. 
 
5.9. Ethics of Authenticity 
 
 In line with the Canadian title of the book, The Malaises of Modernity, The Ethics of 
Authenticity89 begins with a brief account of some, actually three, malaises of modernity 
which sometimes lead to total condemnations of some of the central features of modernity 
and modern life. The three malaises are individualism and a consequent loss of meaning 
and moral horizons beyond the self; the ascendancy of instrumental reason and a 
corresponding withering away of (substantive) ends; and a loss of freedom, more 
particularly, the loss of political freedom and political control over our destiny. Taylor is 
primarily concerned with achieving a qualified salvage of modernity, and modern freedom, 
against both ―its boosters and knockers‖ by highlighting the ethical kernel of modernity 
against its debased forms. In other words, the book is intended to give an uplifting reading 
of core modern ideals. In order to do this, Taylor follows the argumentative strategy of 
identifying, uncovering, and clarifying the noble core in central modern moral ideals, 
especially the concept of authenticity, and then confronting this noble core with the 
debased versions of those ideals. What Taylor aspires to achieve here is ―a work of 
retrieval,‖ as he describes it. But identifying the noble elements in moral ideals opens up a 
more general question concerning the nature and possibility of moral argumentation, which 
is a question that is itself intimately tied to the very concern of the book. The task before 
Taylor at this point is to defend the possibility of reasoned argumentation with others about 
the relative merits or demerits of various moral ideals, as well as the propriety of different 
practices in terms of those ideals. Therefore, the task also involves a refutation of moral 
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relativism. In addition to all these daunting tasks, Taylor also aims at making us believe 
that the whole argument in favor of (the noble core of) modern freedom and authenticity 
could make a concrete change in our world; it could release some new and fresh energies to 
defy the major engines of instrumental reason, the market and the bureaucratic state. Put 
differently, Taylor challenges the opinion that we are locked in ―an iron cage‖ from which 
no definitive exit is possible, and instead encourages us to go against the prevailing 
pessimism, or cynicism, in today‘s world, and invites us to rescue the promises of modern 
developments from further degradation.  
The three malaises that Taylor identifies are in fact highly interrelated. Although it is 
seen by many as one of the greatest achievements of modernity, individualism also breeds 
detachment from moral horizons that once gave a certain order and meaning to our lives. 
Left to themselves and separated from older horizons of meaning and action, individuals 
are prone to a loss of purpose in their dealings with the world. This bad turn of 
individualism, along with the resulting gradual loss of moral horizons, prepares the ground 
for the primacy of instrumental reason, which, no longer restricted by any comprehensive 
moral horizon, now strikes against every dimension of life. In turn, the growing hegemony 
of instrumental reason, coupled with excessive interest in private satisfaction and self-
centeredness, empower the impersonal mechanisms of modern life to such a degree that we 
lose our political freedom at the hands of ―soft despotism,‖ as very well illustrated, in 
Taylor‘s view, by Tocqueville. In this way the three malaises mutually feed and reinforce 
each other.  
Despite this bleak picture, however, Taylor finds real promise in the background. In 
the case of individualism and the culture of self-fulfillment, for instance, he discerns a 
―powerful moral ideal at work,‖ ―that of being true to oneself,‖ ―however debased and 
travestied its expression might be‖ today. Though the whole language of self-fulfillment 
and being true to oneself sometimes takes absurd forms, and even though contemporary 
individualistic culture now and again turns into egoism, moral laxism, or self-indulgence, 
one needs to understand why this moral ideal is so powerful in order to understand why it 
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takes various debased and unpleasant turns. Before further elaborating on this point, Taylor 
attempts to identify the sources of the current failure to notice this underlying ideal. The 
major reason for this failure is our perpetuation of an ―inarticulate debate‖ about the 
modern ideal of authenticity and freedom, where respective positions in the debate are not 
sufficiently articulated. On the one hand are the detractors (the knockers) of this ideal, who 
see the modern culture of authenticity as merely a cover-up for egoism. Such an outlook is 
an impediment to a thorough grasp of the force of this ideal, because a total discrediting of 
authenticity forestalls realization of its full implications. On the other hand are the 
proponents (the boosters) of it, who lean on a kind of ―soft relativism‖ in defending 
authenticity, and consider the ―vigorous defense‖ of any ideal to be implausible. But this is 
self-defeating and self-contradictory, simply because even relativism is backed by a moral 
ideal and because an espousal of authenticity on relativistic grounds precludes a proper 
defense of it; hence the inarticulate debate. What Taylor calls the ―liberalism of neutrality,‖ 
to which the culture of authenticity is intimately linked, aggravates this condition of 
inarticulacy by pushing the question of the good (life) to the margins.  
Taylor gives two more reasons hindering proper articulation here. One is the ―hold of 
moral subjectivism in our culture‖; that is, the idea that moral disputes cannot be arbitrated 
by reason and moral ideals are not grounded in reason or anything beyond the human. 
Although there are thinkers who counter this position by arguing in favor of standards 
rooted in reason or, following Aristotle, human nature, and who think different ways of life 
can in fact be ranked or compared in terms of their ethical merit, these thinkers are usually 
not sympathetic to the ideal of authenticity, and hence see no reason to articulate it. (It is 
worth noting that here Taylor mentions MacIntyre.) The third factor behind this 
inarticulacy is the current state of social scientific explanations, which do not recognize any 
real role, any explanatory power, for moral ideals in social-political transformation. The 
social sciences are fond of explaining every process or change in terms of non-moral 
factors. Accordingly, individualism and the rise of instrumental reason are explained solely 
as by-products of macro-social changes such as urbanization, increased mobility, changes 
166 
 
in the mode of production, and so on. What is left out of such accounts is the inherent 
power of moral ideals in shaping human (moral) motivations and thus spawning the roots 
of social change. The social sciences build their explanations upon unidirectional 
causalities, where ideals are epiphenomenal. Here we find a theme that recurs in most of 
Taylor‘s writings. One of his outstanding merits is his determination and ability to reveal 
the role and power of (moral) ideals in concrete transformations. He pursues this theme also 
in accounting for the formation of what he calls ―closed world structures‖; that is, visions 
of the ‗world,‘ in the Heideggerian sense of the term, ―with no place … for the 
transcendent.‖ More recently he has attempted a new formulation of this general orientation 
in his thinking with recourse to the notion of the ‗social imaginary.‘90  
What is lacking, then, in the contemporary moral scene is an adequate articulation of 
the core moral ideals of modernity. Articulation for Taylor is not merely a way of 
correcting a distorted idea. Rather, it has a moral dimension, because the true articulation of 
a moral ideal makes it more accessible and appealing to its practitioners. The book itself is 
an attempt to articulate the modern ideal of authenticity. For this purpose, Taylor first turns 
to the sources of authenticity; that is, the historical-intellectual antecedents to the culture of 
authenticity. In somewhat chronological order these sources are: ―the individualism of 
disengaged rationality pioneered by Descartes‖; ―the political individualism of Locke‖; 
romantic critiques of disengaged rationality and atomism; the ideas of morality as a voice 
of nature within us and self-determining freedom as articulated by Rousseau and, in the 
case of the latter, also by Kant, taken in a more moral sense; and the ―principle of 
originality‖ as found in Herder. The culture of authenticity, even in its most debased forms, 
has its roots in this long line of development. 
Taylor then takes up the issue of the possibility of rational debate with others on 
moral matters. This issue is critical because sometimes, even frequently, the culture of 
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authenticity paves the way for a kind of ―soft relativism.‖ Choices and decisions are 
justified primarily in terms of being chosen by agents without appeal to any source beyond 
themselves. So how can one argue in reason with those who maintain such a position? The 
overall strategy pursued by Taylor here is to show the existence of what he calls 
―inescapable horizons‖ for the very possibility of meaningful, or significant, choices in life. 
In developing this theme Taylor gives a brief account of the nature of moral argument, or 
practical reasoning, which, as he puts it, always requires some background significances or 
horizons. He also provides a glimpse of his philosophical anthropology, which he more 
fully develops elsewhere. Here the notion of dialogicality as the fundamental condition of 
human agency is crucial in Taylor‘s account. Human self-definition and self-discovery are 
dependent upon our dialogical relations in various forms with others and ―our acquisition of 
rich human languages of expression.‖ We make our choices within certain horizons of 
significance which are more or less given. Outside, or in the absence of, these horizons, 
choices lose their moral relevance. True authenticity requires non-anthropocentric, 
therefore non-subjectivist, sources or frameworks of significance. This is why argument in 
reason with others on moral matters is feasible. But this also shows that a merely 
procedural liberalism is inadequate for meeting the challenge of the need for recognition of 
difference, because, like choices, ―recognizing difference … requires a horizon of 
significance, in this case, a shared one.‖ It requires ―commonalities of value … and one of 
the crucial ways we do this is sharing a participatory political life.‖  
Taylor also tries to expose the ways the ethic of authenticity slides into subjectivism. 
He distinguishes two levels here. At the level of popular culture he observes slides toward 
self-centered modes of fulfillment; and at the level of high culture he sees the traces of 
nihilism and the negation of all horizons of significance. The latter deveopment, which 
Taylor associates with the names of Nietzsche, Foucault, and Derrida, actually intensifies 
the former by giving it deeper philosophical support. The problem with these postmodern 
thinkers lies in their ―paradoxical impact‖: on the one hand they deconstruct the very 
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sovereignty and notion of the self but, on the other hand, they ultimately exalt and empower 
the self due to their elimination of any beyond-human source of true value.    
In explaining the chain of influences here Taylor makes recourse to developments in 
modern art. The shift from art as mimesis to art as creation is particularly revealing at this 
point. The latter conception of art gradually, or, more specifically, beginning in the 1800s, 
elevated artistic expression, or creation, as the paradigm example of authenticity. Art has 
gradually become the primary medium of self-discovery. But once it is conceived not in 
mimetic terms but in terms of the artist‘s authentic aesthetic experience and sensibility, or, 
stated differently, once its legitimate locus is seen solely within the artist himself/herself, 
art begins to confront morality, or moral conventions, sometimes in the name of 
challenging social conformity as the arch enemy of authenticity. Here one can see how 
some forms of authenticity are pitched against morality.  
Authenticity, thus, can develop in many branches, but not all of them are equally 
legitimate or desirable. In order to make a distinction between legitimate and illegitimate 
varieties Taylor develops a useful formulation. He draws two sets of requirements for the 
achievement of authenticity. The first set (A) involves 1) creation, construction, and 
discovery; 2) originality; and 3) opposition to conventions of society and morality. The 
second set (B) contains 1) openness to horizons of significance; and 2) self-definition in 
dialogue. For Taylor, embracing one of these sets at the expense of the other is 
unacceptable. Legitimate forms of authenticity can only develop by giving due weight to 
both sets of demands. Another highly useful distinction Taylor proposes is between what he 
calls the ―self-referentiality of manner‖ and the ―self-referentiality of matter.‖ Modern 
freedom is almost inconceivable without the former, but this does not mean that we are 
exclusively on our own (relying on our human capacities alone) in giving expression to our 
freedom and authenticity. On the contrary, we, more particularly modern artists, still build 
upon, or give expression to, something beyond us. Taylor refers to a number of celebrated 
modern poets who endeavor to articulate ―subtler languages,‖ meanings, or sensibilities 
rooted somewhere beyond.  
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Why is authenticity ultimately an ideal worth pursuing or defending for Taylor? 
Inviting us to a work of retrieval for the higher elements behind this ideal, Taylor redefines 
the nature and terms of the debate. It is no longer a debate ―over authenticity, for or against, 
but about it, defining its proper meaning.‖ And it is a worthy ideal because it ―opens an age 
of responsibilization,‖ where there is a promise of ―a more self-responsible life,‖ a fuller, 
―richer mode of existence,‖ ―because more fully appropriated as our own.‖ 
Now although Taylor details the long pedigree behind the ideal of authenticity, 
Romanticism and existentialism stand out as two major sources giving this ideal its current 
shape. But these two sources also need to be distinguished in terms of their subtly differing 
concerns. As Carman makes clear, although Heidegger‘s negative appraisals of 
inauthenticity as average everydayness or ‗falling‘ still seem to resonate with Romantic 
themes of anonymity and banality reigning in society and concomitant estrangement, 
alienation, and self-dispersal his positive account of authenticity signifies not basically 
wholeness or integrated self-hood, but a continual projection, or a ―thrown projection into 
future possibilities.‖ The crucial difference is that Heidegger‘s point of departure is not the 
Romantic concern with a ―normative ideal of integrated selfhood.‖ 91 On the other hand, as I 
see it, Taylor folds existential insights into Romantic concerns. Authenticity in Taylor is 
not only a matter of having access to the inner depths of the self, but is also and more 
substantially an ever-incomplete project enacted throughout the course of one‘s life. 
Integration here can only be achieved by way of narrative mediation, which always 
involves some projection toward possibilities and participates in other narratives beyond 
the self. Taylor elaborates a ―narrativist conception of authenticity,‖92 where storied 
selfhood might assume varying plots, and its narrative emplotment might go in more than 
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one direction. Therefore, authenticity is not the self reaching a standpoint of consummation 
or completion, but is at most part of an ongoing quest always storied. The expressive 
freedom underlying the ideal of authenticity then takes its bearings from a dialogical 
horizon, from an inter-narrative background. It is not just autonomy, because it is neither 
spontaneous nor legislative of a universal moral law; and it is not heteronomy, because it is 
not hostage to any one narrative or appropriation of given horizons of significance. 
     
5.10. Ethics of the Good and Critique 
 
Previously we highlighted one way in which Taylor‘s whole project might seem 
fragile or wanting due to its moral realism and engaged understanding of agency. But there 
is a second way in which Taylor‘s perspective might fall back on heteronomy. Taylor‘s 
stress on practices and forms of life, his Sittlich leanings, might expose his position to a 
social heteronomy and bring his approach to the brink of a contextualism ả la MacIntyre. 
Indeed, in political theory it is commonplace to locate Taylor among so-called 
communitarian critics of liberalism.  
Taylor‘s affirmation of a substantive ethics of the good must be obvious from the 
preceding account. But in a number of ways Taylor strives to guard this vision from a 
restrictive contextualism or narrow communitarianism. He tries to reconcile this ethics of 
the good with critique, and to come up with an ethico-political vision offering critical 
potential. In order to proceed in this venture Taylor attempts to uncover the underlying 
reasons and motives behind opposition to any substantive ethics of the good, in addition to 
further clarifying his own aspirations. Questions pertaining to the contrast or divergence 
between substantive and procedural conceptions of ethics and politics constitute a central 
feature of contemporary debates in moral and political philosophy. One of Taylor‘s 
principal concerns in recent years has been to attempt to uncover the underlying motives 
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behind the current appeal of proceduralist theorizing among students of ethics and politics. 
Procedural ethics here refers to the ―subsumption of the good under the right.‖ The 
substantive conception as a counter-thesis, on the other hand, is premised on the idea that 
―every ethics is founded upon a fundamental concept of the good.‖93 Among contemporary 
versions of the proceduralist variety, Taylor finds Apel‘s and Habermas‘s theories of 
discourse ethics the most sophisticated due to their success in resolving some of the 
characteristic problems of procedural theories, particularly the problem of monologicality, 
as seen in Kant, for instance. Yet, despite their sophistication and highly nuanced character, 
these theories still suffer from their mistaken position on the question of the primacy of the 
right over the good, though this assessment is not intended as a wholesale denial of every 
type of procedural theorizing. Rather, what Taylor aims to highlight is at most a 
―significant‖ reformulation, or restatement, of procedural ethics in substantive terms. For 
Taylor, at bottom this question, and the confrontation between substantive and procedural 
theories in general, concerns the relation between ethical and meta-ethical questions.  
In order to substantiate his theses Taylor turns to MacIntyre‘s After Virtue project as a 
special and distinctive type of substantive ethics. In fact, it seems that Taylor is trying to 
articulate his own position vis-à-vis substantive and procedural theories by way of a critical 
comparison between MacIntyre and various procedural theories. Taylor first treats 
MacIntyre‘s contentions about the construction of moral theories. MacIntyre argues that the 
gradual entrenchment of the fact-value divide, or the principle that ―no ought can be 
derived from an is,‖ in modern civilization reflects and leads to a sidelining and even a 
rejection of a central element of ancient ethics; namely, the concept of teleology. More 
importantly, however, MacIntyre also argues that the decline of teleological thinking is not 
just an outcome of accomplishments in science or developments in epistemology. It also 
comes along with a new vision of ―man‘s moral and spiritual predicament,‖ as Taylor puts 
it. Taylor concurs with MacIntyre in that both oppose explanations of changes in moral 
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outlook in modern times simply with reference to scientific or epistemological 
developments. It is usually held that scientific discoveries and the mechanization of our 
world-picture changed or necessitated changes in our moral outlook. Such explanations, 
however, are one-way or unidirectional. Both MacIntyre and Taylor argue that the other 
way is also open; that is, a) changes in morality, or in the understanding of morality, are 
encouraged by changes in moral vision, and b) changes in moral and spiritual vision 
influenced and contributed to the appeal of the scientific outlook. One of the examples 
Taylor gives here is the theological incentive to embrace mechanism, against the Greek 
conceptions of a fixed cosmos, in the 17
th
 century, as a more proper way of affirming God‘s 
sovereignty over his creation; hence, a change in spiritual vision leading, or contributing, to 
a change in ‗scientific‘ outlook. Furthermore, what we might call theological voluntarism 
then finds its parallel in the human realm. Rejection of a teleological cosmic order or 
nature, where we are set and where we find our ―paradigm purposes,‖ in favor of a neutral 
nature, including our passions, for instance, which await our control, is celebrated as a way 
of affirming man‘s freedom and dignity. This is why it is untenable to think that the modern 
meta-ethics of the fact-value split is ―a truth, at last discovered.‖ Rather, only certain ethical 
outlooks, conceptions of human agency, and, more particularly, in Taylor‘s terminology, 
the disengaged subject of much modern thought, make such a conceptual dichotomy 
possible. Thus far, Taylor is in agreement with MacIntyre on the latter‘s assessment 
regarding the construction of moral theories and the fate of ethics in modern times; that is, 
regarding the decline of the teleological perspective and thus the implausibility of purely 
scientistic explanations of it, or of moral change in general. 
In fact, Taylor is restating some of MacIntyre‘s ideas in his own terms. As Taylor 
sees it, both are trying to unmask, in slightly different ways, ―the spuriously independent 
validity of certain meta-ethical propositions.‖94 Major differences, however, appear after 
this point. The question is where to go and how to proceed after showing the biases of split 
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theories, or the modern fact-value meta-ethic. One possibility Taylor considers is to argue 
that this meta-ethic is not only biased but also false, and to push for a better and more 
accurate one (―let us call it for short Aristotelian‖), as MacIntyre already does. Usually, 
those who tread this path aim at showing us the inadequacy or even incoherence of the 
modern meta-ethic in the face of our ordinary moral experience and reasoning, which is 
replete with, or constituted by, ―virtue terms that cannot be neatly segmented into 
descriptive and evaluative components.‖ Although Taylor shares this assessment, he does 
not think this ought to lead one to conclude that the modern ethics of disengaged freedom is 
refuted. Such a conclusion would be too hasty in Taylor‘s view. He instead considers what 
can be saved or salvaged from the moral vision underlying the modern ethics of disengaged 
freedom. At one point Taylor calls this ―the rescue question.‖ Perhaps by articulating it in a 
more sophisticated way that would be sensitive to the mentioned inadequacies, this ethic 
might be uplifted and thus rescued. 
Beyond this, however, Taylor notices another question concerning how far it is 
possible for one to escape the Aristotelian forms of moral reasoning (Aristotelian meta-
ethic). Assuming that Aristotle‘s perspective provides us with a better account of ethical 
pragmatics how is it possible to avoid it in practice? Taylor regards this question as highly 
relevant for our overall evaluation of modern civilization; which is why he refers to this 
question as ―the diagnostic question,‖ signifying its relevance for our diagnosis of 
modernity. He detects two possible answers to this question. One view is that people cannot 
escape virtue terms and the notion of a good life (the Aristotelian meta-ethic in general), 
even though they can deny or depart from them in theory. The other view is that people can 
in fact escape the Aristotelian terms but only to their detriment. Taylor sees MacIntyre as 
leaning toward the second view, because the latter charges modern society with being an 
arena of emotivist lifestyles. As Taylor writes, ―Consequently, he tends to take modern 
society at the face value of its own dominant theories, as leading for runaway atomism and 
breakup.‖ But Taylor himself sympathizes with the first way of seeing our relation to the 
Aristotelian framework, and therefore reads modern moral life differently. In fact, he says, 
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―We are far more Aristotelian than we allow, and hence our practice is in some significant 
way based less on pure disengaged freedom and atomism than we realize‖.95 
Yet, he agrees with MacIntyre that largely in theory, but also to a considerable degree 
in practice, we have moved to an ethics of rules at the expense of an ethics of virtues. 
According to MacIntyre, in many of the dominant moral and political theories today, and 
more specifically in Rawls, virtues are derivative from rules of right. In response, he 
celebrates a moral perspective originating in the virtues. This Taylor finds very close to his 
own intention; that is, to articulate ―an ethic whose more basic concept is the good.‖ In 
fleshing this out Taylor returns to Aristotle‘s understanding of the relation between virtues 
and the good. Taylor identifies two kinds of qualities that virtues in Aristotle refer to: a) 
qualities as particular facets or features of the good life, that is, virtues as constitutive of the 
good life; and b) qualities generating, preserving, and maintaining the good life, namely, 
―preserving qualities.‖ What MacIntyre shows, as Taylor makes clear, is that this dual 
understanding of virtues (as both constitutive of, and instrumental for, or preserving, the 
good life) is largely lost in many modern theories where virtues are merely instrumental 
goods. In Aristotle, on the other hand, there is a particular understanding of the good. 
Aristotle cites or enumerates many preserving qualities/virtues, but he considers them also 
as part of the good (life). Now, in modern theories the notion of virtues as both constitutive 
and a ―causal condition of the good‖ is largely lost, because an important feature of modern 
reason is to differentiate means from ends. In line with this formal-instrumental rationality, 
modern moral theories have opted for specifying the targeted good and then the qualities 
required to attain that good. This has been the case for utilitarianism and indeed for any 
theory recognizing the ultimacy of rules in moral life. All this has rendered virtues as more 
and more instrumental and secondary in ethics, because ―if the basic point of morality is to 
do right actions, then the virtues must be seen as purely executive.‖ Thus interpreted, the 
place or role of virtues in a moral theory indicates whether it is framed in Aristotelian or 
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modern terms. Taylor finds this interpretation apt. As he says, ―MacIntyre is right to see the 
place accorded the virtues as a kind of litmus test for discriminating Aristotelian from 
modern ethical theory.‖ However, for Taylor, as a slight difference in perspective, the place 
of the good needs to be made the central issue, ―because … this enables us to get faster to 
the motivational core of these theories.‖96  
At the motivational core of modern (procedural) ethical theories, Taylor identifies 
two main concerns, one being epistemological, the other moral. The epistemological one 
pertains to the consideration that an ethics centering on a notion of the good presupposes 
certain metaphysical concepts, like a normative human nature, that are no longer viable. In 
contrast, an ethics based on the primacy accorded to rules and procedures is thought to be 
free from this obstacle. Moral concern, on the other hand, relates first to the issue of the 
possibility or range of freedom in a substantive (Aristotelian) theory, which construes our 
paradigm purposes as antecedently given by nature, or the cosmos, and by the notion of the 
good the theory is attached to. Modern notions of reason and agency, however, disengage 
us from any antecedently provided or naturally given purposes and sources. Secondly, 
because the Aristotelian framework is too close to a particular form of life, it deprives us of 
a critical attitude and universal validity. What ―a theory that makes rules ultimate‖ is 
supposed to achieve is just this critical and universal attitude allowing much more space for 
freedom. Should one, then, opt for procedural theories in order to affirm the modern notion 
of freedom? Needless to say, Taylor is not a proceduralist in orientation. Indeed, simple or 
pure proceduralism is an incoherent idea, according to Taylor, because even to be able to 
clarify their (above) motivations, procedural theories inevitably need to articulate their 
underlying notion of the good. ―The very structure of a moral theory‖ requires this. 
Therefore, again, only if it is reformulated in substantive terms, only if its substantive 
underpinnings are clarified, can a procedural theory come to be coherent and viable.  
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Apart from this, however, the presumption that only a procedural theory could 
achieve a critical attitude and release us from the blind prejudices associated with existing 
practices and institutions (the status quo in general) is also ill-conceived according to 
Taylor. In order to show this, Taylor points to a critical difference between Plato and 
Aristotle, a difference regarding the nature of moral reasoning and the issue of ―how 
closely one‘s ethical theory is tied to existing practice.‖97 Normally, and in terms of the 
question of the structure of a viable moral theory, both Plato and Aristotle are on the same 
page against procedural ethics. Both hold a substantive perspective. But with respect to the 
nature of moral reasoning and the level of our ethical theory vis-à-vis our practices, they 
diverge from each other. Plato represents what Taylor calls the ―revisionist‖ attitude in 
ethics due to the former‘s tendency to question all the goods ordinarily held and pursued by 
people in life in terms of an independent good. As Taylor writes, ―All the de facto goods 
people pursue in life can be sacrificed unless they are tested against an independent 
criterion of the good.‖98 This also means that practices need to be checked by independent 
criteria. Thus, in Plato we find an exemplary case of a substantive ethics that is also  
critical. Aristotle, on the other hand, has a much more practice-based conception of ethics, 
which Taylor calls ―comprehensive.‖ No good can be excluded from the good life, because 
all goods we seek in life are to some extent constitutive of the good life, ―in their correct 
rank and proportion.‖ Aristotle seems much more emphatic on the role and significance of 
our ―implicit‖ understanding of the prevailing practices in our moral reasoning. Such an 
implicit understanding, as later theorized in varying forms by Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and 
Polanyi, can never be foregrounded entirely; it can never be translated into a cluster of 
independent criteria completely.99 Hence the centrality of phronesis in our ethical life and 
experience. 
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Here Taylor reads into the Platonic-Aristotelian paradigm a meta-ethical dispute. 
Each gives his own ―reasons of principle‖; Plato urging recognition of anr independent 
criterion of the good, and Aristotle stressing the goods and common practices ―that people 
actually have in a given society‖ as the ultimate origin of a theory of justice and ethics. 
Modern theories, according to Taylor, almost on the whole followed the Platonic impulse in 
adopting the revisionist outlook. The capacity to question existing practices has been the 
central concern for most of them.100 As is noticeable, in Plato Taylor finds both an 
instructive case about how a substantive vision may be preserved together with a 
revisionist, critical perspective, and an early, negative example of how civic humanism is 
dismissed. Plato discounts the life of the citizen and activities in the polis, and hence 
internal goods, as ―mere appearances, simulacra.‖ Thus, his critical-revisionist attitude led 
him to underestimate the internal goods of the common practices of citizens. An analogue 
to this can again be followed in modern affirmations of ordinary life somewhat at the 
expense of citizen life. Still, Taylor makes it explicit that his appreciation of the depth of 
modern citizen life is not as low as MacIntyre‘s.      
Taylor‘s discussion about the difference between Plato and Aristotle reveals another 
divergence between him and MacIntyre. In fact, with respect to the question of the good 
and the virtues, Taylor is quite different from MacIntyre. Taylor thinks that our moral 
experience and understanding proceeds between two poles. On one side are the goods that 
we get acquainted with ―by being brought up in certain practices, to which they are 
internal.‖ On the other side, however, are transcendent goods, goods that ―transcend all our 
practices, such that we are capable of transforming or even repudiating some practices in 
the name of these goods.‖ And then Taylor‘s disarming example comes: ―So the prophets 
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of Israel could radically downgrade some of the hitherto accepted ritual and tell the people 
in God‘s name that … they should rather come with a pure heart before God.‖101  
I think Taylor‘s affirmation both of internal goods and transcendent ones signifies an 
important variation from MacIntyre, who is much more forceful in construing all goods as 
internal. By recognizing an equal place to transcendent goods Taylor makes room for 
revisionist, critical ethico-politics. Transcendent here means transcending our practices, not 
transcending ―the things of this world.‖ Only some goods belong to this category, and 
among them Taylor mentions also the modern idea of disengaged freedom. In this way 
Taylor is recognizing the significance of modern (procedural) ethical theories, which are 
based upon a notion of (transcendent) good, though they remain inarticulate about this. The 
difficult task is to reconcile the revisionist and comprehensive attitudes and to give due 
recognition to both types of goods. To mistake revisionism for proceduralism, as in the case 
of Habermas, in the name of a critical and universalist attitude, and at the expense of 
internal goods with their concrete context of practices, in Taylor‘s view, is one extreme 
here and unfit to the task at hand. But to reject revisionism and the place of transcendent 
goods in order to counter the inadequacies of abstract procedural rationality is the other 
extreme, of which Taylor cites Oakeshott as an example. Reconciliation is a hard task here, 
because Taylor recognizes also the possibility and in fact the reality of conflict between the 
two types of the good. Hence, as he puts it, ―There is no a priori way to resolve this; we 
have to work it out case by case.‖  
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5.11. The Right and the Good 
 
Does such rehabilitation of the good necessitate or require denial of any distinction 
between questions of rightness and concern with the good? Does Taylor deny or refute the 
moral point of view? Does his insistence on the need for re-stating ethics of the right in 
terms of the good amount to what Rasmussen and Uyl criticizes as ‗equinormativity,‘102 that 
is, indifference to any categorical distinction between different types of norms by seeing all 
values under the same heading, as species of a genus? 
Axel Honneth, for instance, criticizes his mentor Habermas‘s theory of discourse 
ethics due to the gap it opens and cannot then manage to close between transcendental 
pragmatics and ordinary life praxis, a gap prone to creating motivational frailties in moral 
agents. But, on the other hand, he detects as a general weakness some unwillingness on the 
part of the hermeneutic thinkers to specify the particular force of moral demands or the 
distinctive role of moral principles in adjudicating moral-political disagreements. Again, 
the priorities are different. The Habermasian perspective is ultimately wedded to an 
epistemological or rational epistemological concern with the validity claims of norms, or 
norms of action, conceived on an analogy with the validity claims of theoretical statements, 
that is, an analogy between the rightness of norms and the truth of propositions.103 
Hermeneutic thinkers, on the other hand, are concerned with the ontological underpinnings 
of practical reason and, despite Habermas‘s efforts not to conflate theoretical with practical 
reason, find the latter‘s perspective (and those similar to it) as still too engrossed by the 
epistemological bent of modern civilization.         
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Now, all those who recognize some priority or weight for the good grapple with this 
range of issues. But, as it seems to me, Taylor, and philosophers leaning toward similar 
positions, like Ricoeur, for instance, would not abstain from acknowledging some 
distinction between the right and the good. In fact, this is just what they are doing in some 
ways. They recognize a certain distinctive place for the norm as an inevitable consequence 
of modernity, or modern ethico-political or maybe also juridical imaginary and horizon. 
Questions of rightness, the ‗moral point of view,‘ or what Habermasians call ‗context-
transcending validity,‘ whichever name one chooses, have earned a distinctive place of its 
own in modernity. Political modernity, at least, is almost impossible to make sense of 
without some such recognition of the sublimity of the norm and the vitality of its 
institutionalization in terms of rights and entitlements, as well as morally right conduct and 
treatment. But the reason behind such acknowledgement is not historico-prudential alone; 
they articulate their own reasons for it. However, Taylor and Ricoeur are also concerned 
with the wider context within which the norm acquires its sublimity and meaning. They 
don‘t just leave it as separate, but want to see its mode of relation to the good in a better 
light. They inquire into the mode of relation between the right and the good. Ricoeur gives 
expression to this concern in a concise formula: ―the wish for a fulfilled life in and with 
others in just institutions.‖ He continues:  
Justice, for this reading, is an integral part of the wish to live well. In other 
words, the wish to live in just institutions arises from the same level of 
morality as do the desire for personal fulfillment and the reciprocity of 
friendship. The just is first an object of desire, of a lack, of a wish. It begins as 
a wish before it is an imperative.104                   
What I see here is a complex mediation between layers of moral life and experience. 
The right and the good are affirmed as part of a single ethical vision, as co-structuring the 
ethical life. Therefore, the mode of relation between the right and the good may be called a 
relation of structuration. This is also close to what Taylor calls the strategy of 
comprehension, or the comprehending strategy. Using the term ‗ethical life‘ should also 
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 Paul Ricoeur, The Just (The University of Chicago Press, 2000), p. xv. 
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reveal to us the general Hegelian background here, especially in Taylor‘s case. Hegel is 
well-known in his endeavors to integrate Kantian morality, or the right, into his vision of 
Sittlickheit, and, tellingly, names the work in which he elaborates on such a vision of 
integration as ‗sublation‘ The Philosophy of Right. Here the rightful place of the right is 
recognized, yet the ontological primacy and teleology of the good is retained.                 
What is aimed at here is not the rejection of disengaged freedom or of what is usually 
called the ‗moral point of view‘ above and beyond substantive ethical particularities. Taylor 
does not see any particular merit in a wholesale displacement of morality, or ethics of right 
or rules. On the contrary, he recognizes the rightful place of the moral in the general canvas 
of ethics, even to the point of acknowledging its priority in certain contexts and situations. 
But he demands that its wider habitat be acknowledged. The right is not accorded total 
autonomy here, because Taylor does not accept any a priori limitation on the use of 
practical reason in favor of a moral principle, or in favor of the right. Such a limitation 
would lead us to another version of what he calls single-principle ethics, ―squeezing stone 
for blood,‖ which is impoverishing given the multiple goods we affirm and our attempts to 
attain at least partial reconciliation among those goods throughout our lives. It also seems at 
variance with the tragic facets of life, that is, the necessity of making tragic choices at some 
points, which is certainly not the same, at least not always, as yielding to a single principle.  
Therefore, part of the reason for Taylor‘s position in this matter derives from his 
understanding of practical reasoning and ethical pragmatics. When the right or the moral 
point of view presides over aretaic concerns, over concerns for excellence or for the good, 
or for eudaimonistic consummation, is a case-sensitive issue. The working of practical 
reason is not from the ground up; it comprises a phronetic element, a hermeneutic 
sensitivity, and, as emphasized above, a prior implicit grasp of the good, even when it is 
giving priority to the right in a particular case. This is why Taylor calls this model of 
practical reasoning ‗ad hominem‘ as opposed to the ‗apodictic‘ model of practical 
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reasoning, which is modeled on the mode of argumentation or reasoning that reigns in the 
natural sciences.105       
Yet another reason is the ontological primacy he accords to the good in ethics. Taylor 
sees even the right or the moral point of view with all its implications ultimately as a 
manifestation and affirmation of certain goods or a certain conception of the good. He 
suggests seeing what is implied by the right as a characteristically modern example of a 
‗hypergood,‘ a good providing the point and purpose of various life goods. What is 
specified as the moral domain and the concerns and values affirmed particularly in that 
domain are just another expression of the modern identity, or another good incorporated 
into modern identity as a constituent dimension; and, hence, his endorsement of the idea of 
subsuming the right under the good. If not articulated in terms of the good, the categorical 
or first-order importance of the right, or what are sometimes called the meta-norms of 
liberalism, can hardly be grounded or entirely made sense of. This is also a call for the 
articulation of the deeper motives behind according such supreme importance to the right.      
Behind the powerful hold in modern culture of the apodictic model of practical 
reason and procedural ethics in general, Taylor finds one of the most important factors to 
be the false identification of the demands of critical morality with procedural rationality. 
Because substantive moralities are already too tainted with the prevailing order and norms, 
any critical perspective on society should assume a procedural mode of reasoning, or at 
least should start from a standpoint that is under the least possible influence from prevailing 
notions of the good. Implicit in such an understanding is also a view of the ethical, as 
distinct from the moral, as what is merely habitual or purely empirical or given. Against 
this, Taylor tries to show the possibility of critique even on the basis of a substantive ethics 
of the good. Plato does this, according to him, criticizing all the 'internal goods' of the polis 
from the standpoint of an ethics of the good. This Taylor also calls 'transcendent goods,' as 
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 Charles Taylor, ―Explanation and Practical Reason‖ in his Philosophical Arguments (Harvard University 
Press, 1995), pp. 34-60.  
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opposed to internal goods. In a way he tries to show that criticism is not the exclusive 
property of procedural ethics or the moral use of practical reason. In addition to all this, 
Taylor is of the opinion that an ethics of the good affirmed in this way is closer to the 
motivational depths of ethical agency and experience. Circumscribing a special domain of 
the moral seems wanting in this regard.   
Admittedly, this way of modulating the good and the right might sometimes seem as 
ultimately aporetic; that is, unable to go beyond a certain aporetics of the good and the 
right. Yet, they seek to make a virtue out of this tinge of aporetics. Taylor presents this as 
an inevitable outcome of the plurality of goods we have to affirm. We cannot squeeze the 
realm of the goods so as to subject them to a single-principle ethics. The very plurality of 
the goods our form of life incorporates is resistant to such subjection. When it happens, it is 
only at the cost of a great impoverishment in our ethical self-understanding and motivation. 
But this does not mean that there is no ranking or priority among the goods an individual or 
group of individuals may embrace. On the contrary, some goods are much stronger in their 
hold on us: strong values or hyper goods. So, some are stronger, or might have priority over 
others. Moreover, one might attain some reconciliation among a variety of goods one 
pursues during one‘s course of life. But that is all without an a priori constraint on the use 
of practical reason; a constraint in favor of a single principle over all others. This is also a 
way of acknowledging the tragic possibilities of life. But the tragedy does not stem from 
the nature of the goods themselves, as if the goods are tragic by their very ontology. It is 
rather because of the limitations of man or human finitude.  
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CONCLUSION: 
TOWARD A RECONCILIATION OF VIRTUE AND FREEDOM 
 
 
Every scholarly writing, and therefore as a sub-genre every dissertation, opens up a 
reflective field that bears witness to some tension between freedom and virtue in the 
practice of writing. One is free to trace and retrace various theoretical paths, proceed along 
several different routes to the subject matter, and follow the call of curiosity to the end. But, 
on the other hand, to avoid taking too much license and losing the point, such freedom must 
be reasonably constrained by some general standards of excellence, regard for conventions, 
and respect for exemplars. To further complicate the matter, one could exchange the roles 
here and say that excellence in writing requires one to cover all the relevant materials, to 
search for all the sources on the subject matter, and freedom is the ability or right to retreat 
from this; a complexity attesting to the tensional affiliation between freedom and virtue. In 
either construal, writing appears to be an experience of participation in an emergent and 
anticipated achievement. Writing cannot be seen in the register of radical choice, pure self-
determination, or negative freedom. Pondering now on what I have experientially learned 
from my practice of writing I would say that that elusive thing we call freedom seems to me 
truly akin to ―a strange process in which we participate,‖1 a process charged with aretaic 
tests and possibilities leading to ethical self-transformation.  
                                                          
1
 William Connolly, ―Belief, Spirituality, and Time‖ in M. Warner, J. Vanantwerpen, C. Calhoun (eds.), 
Varieties of Secularism in a Secular Age (Harvard University Press, 2010), p. 135.  
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Clearly, this is a participatory, or situated, understanding of freedom. But what does 
such a characterization of freedom more specifically imply? Freedom is not the sort of 
thing we can capture in full; it is not a ready-made possession amenable to appropriation. 
Freedom is an achievement, and not once and for all, but as a continuous quest in a space of 
concerns. In Wellmer‘s words, freedom ―is not the sort of thing that could ever be realized 
in a definitive or perfect sense.‖2 But if this is true, then it allows us to understand freedom 
in terms of more or less, or in terms of better/richer or weaker/impoverished, thereby giving 
an ethical inflection to our conception of freedom.  
Now, certainly not everyone would take freedom in this way. In fact, in contemporary 
political philosophy there have been at least two kinds of attempt to establish a non-moral 
or, at least, a less moral conception of freedom. One was moved by the perceived need to 
render freedom amenable or more amenable to operationalization and objective analysis. 
This was motivated by a political scientific interest during the post-war period, but also by 
the intention of purifying the concept of freedom of ideological distortion during the Cold 
War period.3 But in more recent years it reappeared with an egalitarian intent and within a 
justice-theoretic framework. Now in this latter case freedom is interpreted in a way that 
renders it conceptually purified so as to obtain a unit of socio-economic comparison, 
analysis, and critique. This unit is called ―distributive freedom.‖4  
The second attempt was similarly motivated by an interest in purifying or, more 
accurately put, distinguishing the concept of freedom from other weighty concepts like 
equality, fraternity, and solidarity. This finds its best expression in Berlin, when he says, 
―Everything is what it is, liberty is liberty, not equality or fairness or justice or culture, or 
                                                          
2
 Albrecht Wellmer, ―Models of Freedom in the Modern World‖, in Michael Kelly (ed.) Hermeneutics and 
Critical Theory in Ethics and Politics (MIT Press, 1990), p. 250. 
3
 William Connolly, The Terms of Political Discourse (Princeton University Press, 1993[1974)], pp. 140-75. 
4
 Katrin Flikschuh, Freedom (Polity Press, 2007), pp. 89-113. 
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human happiness or a quiet conscience.‖5 Berlin, too, as we know, was writing in order to 
counteract what he had seen as the ideological distortion of freedom during the Cold War.  
As far as I can see none of these understandings of freedom sufficiently attend to the 
situated character of our freedom, which is so rigorously delineated by MacIntyre and 
Taylor.6 How freedom takes shape as a self-transformative process in concrete practices 
and in our life-worldly encounters does not find any place in these conceptions. Apart from 
the question of their conceptual and theoretical viability, however, from the perspective of 
these conceptions the evaluative spectrum mentioned above loses much of its import. The 
ethical quality of freedom is lost from view or seriously strained; more specifically for my 
purposes, freedom so construed is not virtue-evaluable. In other words, at this level 
freedom does not join hands with virtue.    
These comments are not meant to criticize negative freedom as such. In fact, negative 
freedoms have a relatively well-established place in modern political settings as rights and 
entitlements. But although indispensable as formal protective shields, rights risk amounting 
only to ―substanceless virtuality of open options‖7 or sliding into vested rights. As 
Dallmayr makes clear, ―Typically, rights are initially acquired through struggle; yet, once 
social conditions stabilize or solidify, there is a subtle transition from rights to 'vested 
                                                          
5
 Isaiah Berlin, Four Concepts of Liberty (Oxford University Press, 1971[1958]), p. 125. 
6
 Some political philosophers, most notable Richard Flathman, broadly following the lead of Berlin try to 
argue for a ―situated negative freedom‖, but here the notion (situated) is given a quite weakened import. See 
R. Flathman, The Philosophy and Politics of Freedom (Chicago University Press, 1987). For a comparison of 
weak and strong conceptions of the life-world see Fred Dallmayr, ―Life-world: Variations on a Theme‖, in 
S.K. White (ed.), Life-World and Politics: Between Modernity and Postmodernity (University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1989), pp.25-65.   
7
 Alessandro Ferrara, Modernity and Authenticity: A Study of the Social and Ethical Thought of Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau (SUNY Press, 1993), p. 61.  
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rights' – commonly to the detriment of the underprivileged or outcasts of society.‖8 This 
means that rights, too, need to be opened to ethical evaluation.  
At the level of positive freedom in the sense of autonomy or self-determination our 
conception of freedom starts entering an aretaic domain and taking on the quality of an 
ethical achievement. At this level freedom covers also the ability to cope with internal 
impediments and centers on the quality of our motivation. But in a philosophical context 
where the classical idea of subjectivity is destabilized in various ways even the notion of 
positive freedom and autonomy requires rethinking.9 Also, as regards the question of the 
virtues, even autonomy does not fully capture the complex fabric of the virtues. Self-
determination or autonomy cannot exhaustively define our ethical relations and being. Our 
relations to our significant others and those who, in MacIntyre‘s words, ―contingency and 
chance put in our care‖ do not neatly fit into the language of self-legislation. And 
sometimes ―excellence in being for the good‖10 requires acknowledgment of ethical 
demands on us that an autonomist understanding of freedom would only obscure.11  
                                                          
8
 Fred Dallmayr, The Other Heidegger (Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 129. 
9
  As Axel Honneth makes clear ―in contrast to the classical ideal of autonomy, a systematic weakening has to 
follow on all three levels. The classical goal of need transparency must be replaced by the ability to articulate 
in language. The idea of biographical consistency should be replaced by the notion of a narrative coherence of 
life. Finally, the idea of a principled orientation should be supplemented by the criterion of moral sensitivity 
to context‖; see his ―Decentered Autonomy: the Subject after the Fall‖, in L. Langddorf, S.H. Watson, K. A. 
Smith (eds.) Reinterpreting the Political: Continental Philosophy and Political Theory (SUNY Press, 1998), 
p. 204.          
10
 Robert Merrihew adams A Theory of Virtue Excellence in Being for the Good (Oxford University Press, 
2006). 
11
 This is why L. Hatab says at one point that ―virtue ... also disrupts the modern ideal of autonomy, strictly 
construed‖; Ethics and Finitude: Heideggerian Contributions to Moral Philosophy (Rowman and Littlefield, 
2000), p. 118. There has been several recent attempts to articulate a richer conception of autonomy, like the 
one developed by M. Cooke whose conception integrates Taylor‘s notion of ‗strong evaluation‘ to the 
definition of autonomy; see Maeve Cooke, Re-Presenting the Good Society (MIT Press, 2006), pp. 133-38. 
On the other hand, S.K. White argues, rightly in my view, that despite recent moves to ―a more sophisticated 
picture of the autonomous self of liberalism‖ incorporating into their accounts the necessity of cultural or 
semantic resources for the fruition and practice of autonomy, these (his case is W. Kymlicka) are still couched 
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But this last point takes us also to a new understanding of the virtues as well. If what 
is said about autonomy is true, then an agent-centered virtue-ethical perspective would fall 
short of accounting for the kind of virtues or virtuous responses which are not primarily 
directed to agent-flourishing. Some of the virtues and virtuous responses are target-centered 
or devoted to the ―recipient-dimension of moral order,‖12 though the virtues are still the 
virtues of the virtuous agent. Think of MacIntyre‘s ―just generosity‖ or Taylor‘s agapic 
affirmation of the human (bearing also upon his reading of the post-axial revolution in 
conceptions of the good going beyond mere human flourishing). These are modes of ethical 
acknowledgment or affirmation the bases of which go beyond the strict boundaries of 
agent-flourishing, but calling for an ethic of cultivation and self-transformation. It should 
immediately be noted, however, that even at this level of the matter what is entailed is not 
necessarily the kinds of action which are sometimes called ‗supererogatory.‘ The networks 
of receiving and giving described by MacIntyre are not necessarily networks of 
supererogation. On the contrary, just generosity and virtuous responsiveness are displayed 
in the warp and woof of daily or ordinary life.  
The path toward a possible reconciliation between freedom and virtue thus leads us 
beyond our dominant understandings of virtue as well as freedom, beyond agent-
flourishing and autonomy, or, more accurately, beyond their subject-centered and 
anthropocentric conceptions. But this does not leave us under the mandate of heteronomy. 
On the contrary, ethical demands calling for virtuous responses constitute the very field in 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
in instrumental terms, missing our more engaged or embedded relation to our semantic background; see his 
―Weak Ontology: Genealogy and Critical Issues‖, The Hedgehog Review 7.2 Summer (2005).     
12
 It has in the past been a standard criticism against virtue ethics that its eudaimonistic concern involves an 
element of egoism. This criticism has been countered in various successful ways, but accentuating what is 
called the target-centered dimension of virtue ethics has been much more helpful in my view. For a target-
centered perspective, see Christine Swanton, Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View (Oxford University Press, 
2003). The phrase ―recipient dimension of moral order‖ belongs to Nicholas Wolterstorff, Justice: Rights and 
Wrongs (Princeton University Press, 2008).     
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which we can see our ethical possibilities. In Murdoch‘s words, ―The exercise of our 
freedom is a small piecemeal business which goes on all the time.‖13 Freedom works 
through limiting conditions, but these very conditions are full of possibilities for the 
perfection or enrichment of freedom, because they give freedom different possibilities of 
expression. Freedom perfects itself and takes on an ethical quality in situations, relations 
and encounters putting demands on us, or awaiting ethical responses from us. Freedom 
acquires its ethical quality against an arteaic depth opened up in our worldly engagements. 
By aretaic depth I am alluding here also to Taylor‘s phenomenological notion of ―moral 
space,‖ but giving it a virtue-ethical inflection.  
Have we reached a point of reconciliation, then? Reconciliation14 does not amount to 
a state of perfect harmony, but to a process of transformation which cannot clear away 
every trace of negativity. Some tension or tensional affiliation will remain between virtue 
and freedom, constituting the highway, not of despair hopefully, but of human maturation 
or Bildung. In other words, there seem to be paths to some reconciliation between freedom 
and virtue as we have seen throughout this study. But, in general, their relation will remain 
the kind that some philosophers call ‗differential entwinement,‘ sustaining the ethical 
platform of any society between richer and poorer forms of freedom.  
                                                          
13
 Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good (Routledge, 2004 [1970]), p. 36. These words echo also Gadamer‘s 
remarks that being-ethical is not in our discretion, we are always already ethical.  
14
 Michael O. Hardimon, Hegel’s Scocial Philosophy: the Project of Reconciliation (Cambridge university 
Press, 1994). 
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